1 Access Control Policies: Modeling and Validation Luigi Logrippo & Mahdi Mankai Université du Québec en Outaouais.

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Presentation transcript:

1 Access Control Policies: Modeling and Validation Luigi Logrippo & Mahdi Mankai Université du Québec en Outaouais

2 Overview Introduction XACML overview A Logical Model of XACML Modeling with Alloy Access Control Verification and Validation Related Work Conclusion

3 Introduction Access control policies languages –XACML –EPAL –PONDER –… Possible inconsistencies within policies How to solve inconsistencies at execution time –Precedence rules –Priorities How to detect inconsistencies at design time –First-order logic –Model-checking tools

4 An example A policy 1.A professor can read or modify the file of course marks 2.A student can read the file of course marks 3.A student cannot modify the file of course marks Question: –A subject that is both student and professor wants to modify the file of course marks –Will his request be accepted of refused? Users and administrators should know about these potential inconsistencies  avoid security leaks, denial of service and unauthorized access Subject

5 XACML overview eXtensible Access Control Markup language : an OASIS standard Architecture, policies and messages Policy Enforcement Point Policy Decision Point

6 XACML Request

7 XACML Structures A syntax based on XML to define Access Control –Rules –Policies –Policy sets Rule 13 Rule 11 Rule 12 Policy 1 Rule 23 Rule 21 Rule 22 Policy 2 PolicySet

8 Targets and Conditions Not all policies are applied to a request Targets define the applicability of policy sets, policies and rules Conditions are additional and more complex filters Rule 1 Rule N Policy1 Rule 1 Rule N Policy2 Request

9 Rules Rule –Rule Target –Effect –Condition (optional) (Luigi): Je ne suis pas certain de la signification de ceci...

10 Targets A policy 1.A professor can read or modify the file of course marks 2.A student can read the file of course marks 3.A student cannot modify the file of course marks Rule 2 is applied when (target) –Subject’s role is “student” –Resource’s name is “course marks” –Action’s name is “read” Request : a student Bob wants to read the file of course marks –Rule 2 is applied but not Rule1 nor Rule 3

11 Target subject resource action

12 Combining Algorithms Mechanisms to resolve conflicts online Example: –Bob is PhD student and an assistant professor, –he wants to modify the file of course marks Permit-overrides : Permit Deny-Overrides : Deny First-Applicable : Permit (Rule 1 appears before Rule 3 in an xml file) Only-one-applicable : Indeterminate (Error)

13 A Logical Model of XACML Use of sets, relations and functions Structures and constraints use of Alloy syntax Alloy –Modeling language –Analyzer tool –Relational first-order logic

14 Alloy Structural –Signature –Relation Declarative –first-order logic –facts, predicates, functions, and assertions Analyzable –Simulation and automatic verification –run predicate –check assertion

15 Examples: Request Sets Relations

16 Basic structures Inheritance as subsetting

17 Structures Expliquer couleurs

18 Constraints Use of functions and predicates First order logic

19 Constraints a predicate that evaluates a request against a target to check whether the target matches the request

20 Constraints A function that returns the response of a given rule regarding a given request

21 Combining Algorithms

22 Verification and Validation Check properties Use of predicates and assertions Examples 1.An example of a rule returning a permit response regarding a specific request  an example? 2.Inconsistency: different rules within the same policy return different decisions (permit and deny)  an example? 3.Access should always be granted to a professor requesting modification  a counterexample?

23 Access Control Policy –Rule1 : A professor can read or modify the file of course marks –Rule2 : A student can read the file of course marks –Rule3 : A student cannot modify the file of course marks

24 Example 1 An example of a rule returning a permit response regarding a specific request

25 Example 1 Rule2 is applied and returns a permit when a students requests a read access on course marks file

26 Example 2 Inconsistency: different rules within the same policy return different decision (permit and deny)

27 Example 2 Both rule1 and rule3 are applied when –a subject with both professor and student role tries to modify the file of course marks –rule3's response is permit –rule3's response is deny

28 Example 3 Access should always be granted to a professor (and not student requesting modification Alloy doesn't find any solution

29 Related work MTBDDs to verify XACML policies Conflicts detection tools for PONDER RW  verification  XACML Other logical approaches

30 Conclusion XACML validation and verification using model-checking and first-order logic Only a subset of XACML was covered A translation tool for transforming XACML policies to Alloy specifications

31 Future work GUI to permit clear visualization of XACML rules –More intuitive syntax than XACML GUI to permit editing XACML –Without touching XACML code directly GUI to display the results of the analysis in user-friendly format –Immediately after editing