Status of ITER collaboration for Machine Protection I. Romera On behalf of the colleagues who contribute to the project Thanks to: Sigrid, Markus, Rüdiger,

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
LHC Machine Protection
Advertisements

/// MELSEC Safety /// QS001CPU /// QS0J61BT12 /// QS0J65BTB2-12DT /// MELSEC Safety /// Mitsubishi Electric - MELSEC Safety - Training Documentation -
Power Supply System John Joseph LBNL Spectrometer Solenoid Test Plan Review Feb 17 th 2012.
1 ITER Standardization for Integration of local and central interlocks Riccardo Pedica PLC Based Interlock systems Workshop 4-5 December 2014 – ITER Organization.
1 ITC242 – Introduction to Data Communications Week 12 Topic 18 Chapter 19 Network Management.
CERN Ivan Romera MPE-Technical meeting Status on CERN-ITER collaboration for Machine Protection Acknowledgments: J.Burdalo, R.Schmidt, S.Wagner, M.Zaera.
The Architecture, Design and Realisation of the LHC Beam Interlock System Machine Protection Review – 12 th April 2005.
LHC Beam Dump System Technical Audit Trigger Synchronisation Unit.
1 Copper Stabilizer Continuity Measurement Project CSCM Mini Review Powering Implementation H. Thiesen 30 November 2011.
LIPAc status report EPICS Integration and Commissioning + RFQ LCS status at INFN/LNL Alvaro Marqueta LIPAc Project Team on behalf of the LIPAc Control.
ITER – Interlocks Luis Fernandez December 2014 Central Interlock System CIS v0.
Chamonix Risks due to UPS malfunctioning Impact on the Superconducting Circuit Protection System Hugues Thiesen Acknowledgments:K. Dahlerup-Petersen,
The european ITM Task Force data structure F. Imbeaux.
HC Review, May 2005 Hardware Commissioning Review Hardware Commissioning Review Quality Assurance and Documentation of Results Félix Rodríguez Mateos,
Chiller control system Lukasz Zwalinski – PH/DT.
Behaviour of Runaway Electrons during Injection of High Z Impurities/Gas Puffing in HT-7 S.Sajjad INSTITUTE OF PLASMA PHYSICS,HEFEI CHINA.
1 Reliability and Availability of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) MachineProtection System Jan Uythoven CERN, Geneva, Switzerland Thanks to R. Schmidt,
Training LHC Powering R. Denz Quench Protection System R. Denz AT-MEL.
1 Will We Ever Get The Green Light For Beam Operation? J. Uythoven & R. Filippini For the Reliability Working Group Sub Working Group of the MPWG.
Interlocks for Magnet Protection System Iván Romera Ramírez, Markus Zerlauth - CERN.
CERN Timing Workshop, Geneva, 15 Feb Geneva, 15 Feb 2008 Franck Di Maio – ITER IO Geneva, 15 Feb 2008 Franck Di Maio – ITER IO CERN Timing Workshop.
Beam Interlock System MPP Internal ReviewB. Puccio17-18 th June 2010.
D1/D2 Circuit Baseline Update Rationales for Baseline Discussion B. Auchmann, F. Rodriguez Mateos, A. Verweij, D. Wollmann CERN, TE-MPE.
AB/CO Review, Interlock team, 20 th September Interlock team – the AB/CO point of view M.Zerlauth, R.Harrison Powering Interlocks A common task.
16-17 January 2007 Post-Mortem Workshop Logging data in relation with Post-Mortem and archiving Ronny Billen AB-CO.
Conclusions on UPS powering test and procedure I. Romera Acknowledgements: V. Chareyre, M. Zerlauth 86 th MPP meeting –
Machine Protection Review, R. Denz, 11-APR Introduction to Magnet Powering and Protection R. Denz, AT-MEL-PM.
Control System Considerations for ADS EuCARD-2/MAX Accelerators for Accelerator Driven Systems Workshop, CERN, March 20-21, 2014 Klemen Žagar Robert Modic.
E.Sbrissa EP/TA3 - IC ATLAS EDR_MAG Magnet Project Fault analysis, QA & Failure rate.
Training LHC Powering - Markus Zerlauth Powering Interlocks Markus Zerlauth AB/CO/MI.
First discussion on MSS for Katrin March 26, 2013 M.Capeans CERN PH-DT.
XFEL The European X-Ray Laser Project X-Ray Free-Electron Laser Wojciech Jalmuzna, Technical University of Lodz, Department of Microelectronics and Computer.
LHC’s Modular Machine ITER – Machine ProtectionB. ToddJuly 2010 Thanks to : TE/MPE/MI, CERN Machine Protection Panel, et al 1v0 Protection System.
PLCs at CERN for machine protection and access interlocks Session: Machine Protection and interlock systems at different labs I. Romera Ramírez (CERN /
LIU-PSB Working Group meeting: 25/06/2015, Markus Zerlauth Consolidation of magnet interlocks in the PS complex – Warm magnet Interlock System (WIC) R.Mompo,
Design process of the Interlock Systems Patrice Nouvel - CERN / Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse CLIC Workshop Accelerator / Parameters.
Machine Protection Review, Markus Zerlauth, 12 th April Magnet powering system and beam dump requests Markus Zerlauth, AB-CO-IN.
Inner Triplet Protection Strategy LHC & HL-LHC Daniel Wollmann with Inputs from B. Auchmann, G. Ambrosio, R. Denz, P. Fessia, E. Ravaioli, F. Rodrigues.
Hardware Commissioning Review, R. Denz, 12-May Superconducting circuits: what remains to be done during hardware commissioning R. Denz AT-MEL-PM.
PLC based Interlock Workshop CIS Team February 2016 ITER Central Interlock System Fast Interlock Controller.
09/05/ Modelling and testing of circuit protection of new superconducting magnets for the HL-LHC project 2 nd Workshop of the Spanish Traineeship.
Modelling and testing of circuit protection of new superconducting magnets for the HL-LHC project
Combining safety and conventional interfaces for interlock PLCs
Dibyendu Roy Advait Ghate Yogesh Gaikwad Manojkumar Annigeri
D1 and D2 powering and protection
Testing of SC Magnets Status - November 2010
The HL-LHC Circuits: Global View and Open Questions
Acknowledgements: H.Milcent, R.Denz, R.Schmidt, M.Zerlauth
LINAC4 50 MeV phase BIS STATUS
RELIABILITY OF 600 A ENERGY EXTRACTION SYSTEMS
Current Status of ITER I&C System as Integration Begins
Powering the LHC Magnets
FMEA of a CLIQ-based protection of D1
SPS CC: Final plan for interlocking of crab cavities in SPS
STPA FOR LINAC4 AVAILABILITY REQUIREMENTS
Magnet Safety System for NA61/Shine
Outline Introduction Switchgear Modeling in IEC 61850
Initial Experience with the Machine Protection System for LHC
The simple system solution
Interlocking of CNGS (and other high intensity beams) at the SPS
LOTO(V) Procedures MESH Process Safety, 8.7 Energy Control
COntrol, Data Access and Communication System for ITER
Knowing When to Stop: An Examination of Methods to Minimize the False Negative Risk of Automated Abort Triggers RAM XI Training Summit October 2018 Patrick.
Will We Ever Get The Green Light For Beam Operation?
System Architecture of MPSVac and MPSID
PSS0 Design & Concept of Operations
PSS verification and validation
The LHC Beam Interlock System
Operation of Target Safety System (TSS)
Review of hardware commissioning
Presentation transcript:

Status of ITER collaboration for Machine Protection I. Romera On behalf of the colleagues who contribute to the project Thanks to: Sigrid, Markus, Rüdiger, Manuel, Jonathan et all…

Outline  Introduction  Magnet Powering Layout  Current activities ongoing  Next milestones

Facts Q ≥ 10 (500 MW) 840m 3 of plasma 150M °C Tons 12.8 Billion Euros 34 nations ITER Tokamak

CERN-ITER agreement  Agreement nº 7 of 2007 cooperation between ITER and CERN  4 tasks:  Consultancy for the set up of a MPWG  Definition of overall architecture of Machine Protection and Central Interlock System  Specifications for the fault scenario simulations  Definition of tools for diagnostics

Outline  Introduction  Magnet Powering Layout  Current activities ongoing  Next steps

Magnet Powering Layout Toroidal Field coils  Plasma confinement  18 coils / 1 circuit  Stored energy = 41 GJ  Nominal current = 68 kA

Magnet Powering Layout Poloidal Field coils  Keep plasma away from walls  6 coils / 6 circuits  Stored energy = 4 GJ  Nominal current = 48 kA

Magnet Powering Layout Central Solenoid coils  Induce plasma current by changing current in the CS  6 coils / 5 circuits  Stored energy = 6 GJ  Nominal current = 45 kA

Magnet Powering Layout Corrector coils  Compensation of errors in confining magnetic field  18 coils / 9 circuits  Stored energy = 2 GJ  Nominal current = 10 kA

Magnet powering layout

Outline  Introduction  Magnet Powering Layout  Current activities ongoing  Next steps

 Functional specification of necessary logic in CIS for magnet powering protection  3 levels of protection:  Circuit level  Family level  Global level  Defining dependability level for each IPF  Includes fault tree representations of IPF Activities ongoing – IPF

 Circuit level IPF CF-QFCPA Quench in any circuit has to result in: Opening of all FDUs: o Case of the Toroidal Field Circuit at least 7oo9 o No action (no FDUs) in the case of Corrector Coils Fast Power Abort of the corresponding Power Converter Fast Discharge Request detected by PC, CIS and FDUs Inhibit Start of Powering/next plasma discharge Inform PCS to start Plasma ramp down/disruption mitigation A FDU spurious opening in any circuit (no action in case of Corrector Coil circuits) result in the same procedure as above. A CIS Fast Discharge Request has to result in the same actions as in the case of Quench. A Power Converter Fast Discharge Request has to result in the same actions as in the case of Quench Required SIL level SIL 3 equivalent. Direct hardwired loop, daisy chaining all involved user systems (quench loop)

Activities ongoing – IPF  Family level IPF CF-QFCPA Quench in any circuit of a family has to result in: Opening of all FDUs for the family of circuits considering: o No action (no FDUs) in the case of Corrector Coils Fast Power Abort of the Power Converters for all circuits of the corresponding family Fast Discharge Request detected by PC, CIS and FDUs Inhibit Start of Powering/next plasma discharge Inform PCS to start Plasma ramp down/disruption mitigation A FDU spurious opening in any family of circuits (no action in case of Corrector Coil circuits) result in the same procedure as above. A CIS Fast Discharge Request has to result in the same actions as in the case of Quench. A Power Converter Fast Discharge Request has to result in the same actions as in the case of Quench Required SIL level SIL 2 equivalent. ‘Configurable’ function implemented in Safety PLC and probably additional redundant HW module.

Activities ongoing – IPF  Global level IPF GF-CR2A less critical failure in the Cryogenics system due to a for instance an unbalanced coil cool down distribution implies: Inhibit Start for all the circuits of all families Slow Abort of the Power Converters for all circuits of all families Inform PCS to start Plasma ramp down/disruption mitigation Required SIL level SIL 2 equivalent. Hardware signal exchange with safety PLC I/O

 Functional specification of signal exchange between clients  Dependability requirements for different signals types  Transmission type and architecture  Electrical properties of interfaces and connections (interface box, safety PLC I/O) Activities ongoing – Hardware interfaces

 Fast discharges in magnet coils limited to ~50 during ITER life (real+false)  To ensure investment protection, CIS design must not only account for high level of safety, but also for high availability (to limit mechanical stress)  Studies confirmed 2oo3 architecture as the best candidate to meet dependability requirements Activities ongoing – Dependability studies Courtesy of S.Wagner Quench Loop Interface (voting fault-free) Interface with loop components (voting fault-free)

Activities ongoing – Dependability studies Interface with voting component Courtesy of S.Wagner Interface with redundant voting component  Series of quantitative studies performed on architecture of  Quench Loop  Interface with fault-free voting  Interface with voting component prone to failures (with and without redundancy)  Interface with voting logic

Activities ongoing – Dependability studies Courtesy of S.Wagner Interface with voting logic A. Apollonio  Series of quantitative studies performed on architecture of  Quench Loop  Interface with fault-free voting  Interface with voting component prone to failures (with and without redundancy)  Interface with voting logic

Activities ongoing – Dependability studies Courtesy of S.Wagner Availability Safety  2oo3 is the best compromise for availability and safety, but… it is only efficient if does not stop at the level of the CIS, but … Quench Loop

Activities ongoing – Dependability studies Courtesy of S.Wagner Interface A_B1_B2_C1_C2_C3_B0CO_ Mission completed B7 7.95E E E E E E E E-01 Emergency success B5A 1.28E E E E E E E E-01 False successB5B 7.62E E E E E E E E-02 Emergency missed B6A 4.62E E E E E E E E-05 False missedB6B 5.87E-02 Availability Safety … continued to the client system.

 Several proposals based on PLC S series:  Redundant configuration: S7-400H + 2oo3  Redundant + Safety configuration: S7-400FH + 2oo3  Performance analysis on periphery based on:  Response times  MTBF figures from SIEMENS catalogue  Results shown:  F modules ~3 times slower than standard  F modules ~3 to 5 times more likely to fail than standard Activities ongoing – Interlock prototype Courtesy of M. Zaera-Sanz

 Provides unique interface to the Quench Loop with required dependability  Remote test facility  Simplified test and commissioning  Unique version common to all clients  Based on CIBU design Activities ongoing – Interface box Courtesy of J. Burdalo-Gil

Next milestones  First version of PLC program, implementing local and global IPFs  Performance measurements for realistic configuration  Functional verification of prototype  Remote diagnostics for user interfaces  Experimental setup being built in China with current leads QD

Next milestones

Thanks for your attention

Parameters of electrical circuits

Fault tree representations