CONCEPTS | NIGERIA APPRAISAL | CHALLENGES | ROAD AHEAD Essential IT Infrastructure Plan for a Sustainable e-Voting Process in Nigeria.

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Presentation transcript:

CONCEPTS | NIGERIA APPRAISAL | CHALLENGES | ROAD AHEAD Essential IT Infrastructure Plan for a Sustainable e-Voting Process in Nigeria

E-VOTING Electronic Voting (E-Voting) as a term encompasses a broad range of voting systems that apply electronic elements in one or more steps of the electoral cycle: the recording, the casting and/or the counting of votes. A basic Distinction: (1) E-voting systems in controlled environments include such forms as punch-card voting, optical scans and DRE. They are characterized by the fact that voting is taking place in a physically supervised (by representatives of government or independent electoral authorities) place such as a polling station (2) E-voting in uncontrolled environments means that the casting of the vote can take place anywhere outside a polling station, e.g. at home at a PC. The vote is then transmitted over the Internet the television, telephone or mobile phone network. Another form of e-voting in a partially uncontrolled environment is kiosk voting. Hereby the voting machine is located in a public place that can only partially be controlled by election officials. CONCEPTS E-VOTING TYPES 1.Punch-card Voting Systems 2.Optical Scan (Voting) Systems 3.Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machines 4.Internet Voting voting/types-of-e-voting E-VOTING IN OTHER CLIMES  Brazil (Voting Machines)  Canada (Remote Internet Voting)  Estonia (Remote Internet Voting)  Germany (DRE Voting Machines)  India (Electronic Voting Machines & Remote Internet Voting)  Norway (Remote Internet Voting)  Switzerland (Remote Internet Voting)  The Netherlands (Voting Machines)  USA (Voting Machines)

NIGERIA 2015 E-VOTING APPRAISAL THINGS WE GOT RIGHT  The utilisation of the biometric capabilities of permanent voter’s cards and card-readers for accreditation of voters.  Creation of electronic voters database THINGS WE MUST STOP  Deployment of insufficiently technically trained personnel to man e- voting machines.  Draining scarce national resources to import e-voting solutions that can be locally sourced with better quality. THINGS WE GOT WRONG  Logistics movement and handling.  Deployment of some untested card readers on election day. THINGS WE MUST DO  To ensure that only persons with the right to vote are able to cast a vote.  To ensure that every vote cast is counted and that each vote is counted only once.  To maintain the voter’s right to form and to express his or her opinion in a free manner, without any coercion or undue influence.  To protect the secrecy of the vote at all stages of the voting process.  To guarantee accessibility to as many voters as possible, especially with regard to persons with disabilities.  To make sure that the general public, as well as other key stakeholders in the electoral process, have confidence in the e-voting solution. Many e-voting experts consider trust as the most critical and all-encompassing goal.

FAILING DATABASE The card readers were standalone units with the data of each polling unit loaded on them. The readers were expected to compare the data stored in the cards with the ones in its memory and determine whether they were original or fake.  No real time card authentication from central database (if in existence)  Deployment of card reader with voters data meant for a particular polling booth to a wrong one.  This may have contributed to the many incidences of card readers inability to authenticate some cards at some polling booth. CHALLENGES FAILING MACHINE  The card reader in some polling units could not capture biometrics even after several trials. President Goodluck Jonathan’s accreditation was delayed as three card readers failed to read his biometrics.  INEC officials complained of low battery to power the card readers.  Some INEC officials were battling to adjust the date on a card reader that read February 14, which was the initial date fixed for elections before the six weeks extension by INEC.  In some polling stations, the INEC officials could not operate the card readers and decided to dump them.  Card reader hitches occurred in about 350 polling units across the country

EXPECTED GOALS  Ensure that only human beings are listed, i.e., that only real people can vote;  That those human beings are Nigerians;  Those Nigerians are alive and of voting age (18 years old);  Those Nigerians of voting age can only vote once for a candidate of their choice at any particular election;  All votes are equal and that they are the actual and only determinants of the outcomes of electoral contests;  Nigerians can be assured and therefore be satisfied after the whole exercise that items 1 to 5 indeed had been conformed to – a kind of confirmatory or compliance test, and ultimately;  In the event of disputes, the huge investment in biometric technology would speed up adjudication by the judiciary and help judges correctly and convincingly administer justice. ROAD AHEAD EXPECTED BENEFITS  Get identity verification right for the voting age  Permanently ensure only real living people can vote  Permanently ensure only one genuine vote can come from one genuine person for one particular candidate seeking one particular post.  Checkmate election fraud  Restore confidence in the electoral process

BUILDING TRUST DESIGN & USABILITY ASPECT AUDITING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ROAD AHEAD FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS  Mobility of Voter  Convenient Usage  Transparent Voting  Flexible Ballot Format  Support Disabled Voters  Accuracy  Eligibility  Uniqueness  Auditability  Voter Confirmation  No Over-voting  Permit Under-voting  Documentation & Assurance SOFTWARE SOLUTION & PROVIDERS NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK SECRECY OF VOTE VERIFIABILITY VOTE CONFIRMATION BY VOTER

VOTER AUTHENTICATION PERSONNEL INTEGRITY AUDITING SYSTEM & DATA INTEGRITY ROAD AHEAD SECURITY REQUIREMENTS  Voter Authenticity  Registration  Voter Anonymity  System Integrity  Data Integrity  Secrecy/Privacy  Non-coercibility  Reliability  Availability  System Disclosability  Simplicity  Testing & Certification  Personnel Integrity  Operator Authentication & Control TESTING & CERTIFICATION OF DEVICES AND APPLICATIONS OPERATOR AUTHENTICATION & CONTROL SECRECY OF VOTE VERIFIABILITY NON COERCIBILITY

RISKS COSTS INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ROAD AHEAD SUNDRY OTHER ISSUES  Risks Mitigation  Local Content Issues  Capital Flight Issues  Employment Generation Issues  Equipment Supply Contracts  Software Vendor Contracts  National Project Challenge for Developing Home Grown System  Litigation & E-voting Evidence STAKEHOLDERS NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

There is one thing greater than all the armies of the world, and that is an idea whose time has come. -Victor Hugo Thank You! 437, Herbert Macaulay Way, Yaba, Lagos,