Institutional Change at NASA Howard E. McCurdy American University March 4, 2005

H. G. Wells, “The Things That Live on Mars,” March 1908, Cosmopolitan.

NASA’s Post-Apollo Vision Space transportation system (reusable shuttle, space tug, nuclear transfer vehicle) Large rotating space station Lunar space station Lunar base Deep space human expeditions, including Mars Space telescopes “Grand tour” of outer planets Venus probes Source: Space Task Group, Post-Apollo Space Program. Washington: Executive Office of President, 1969.

Premises of the Post-Apollo Vision Maintain NASA appropriations at Apollo program levels: $29 billion per year in 2002 dollars (fiscal ) Create a space transportation system that will “provide a major improvement…in terms of cost.” Source for latter: Space Task Group, Post- Apollo Space Program, 15.

The Reality: Reducing the Cost of Space Flight by a “Factor of Ten” “A realistic combined mission model…calls for 580 flights over a 12-year period ( ).…Using the shuttle, the total launch costs, including procurement of replacement boosters, drop to about $8.1 billion”* (p. 13) *$14 million per flight in 1972 dollars; $63 million in 2002 dollars. Actual: $562 million per flight (2002 dollars)

Space Station: the “Next Logical Step” “A 1991 IOC would require approximately $8 billion.” P. Finarelli, NASA, to B. Borrasca, OMB September 8, 1983 Actual cost: $51 billion (development, initial operations, research & technology, redesign, & transportation)

Is NASA Ready? Thirty years of incremental space policy, annually- funded NASA centers, large-scale systems management, dwindling in-house technical capability, and large aerospace contractors existing outside commercial markets have left the U.S. civil space effort unprepared for new exploration goals.

Vision for Space Exploration (2004): Lunar, Martian, and Electro-magnetic Exploration

Elements of the Space Exploration Vision Return the space shuttle to flight, complete the ISS, and retire the shuttle (2010 target). Return to the Moon, beginning with robotic missions (2008) followed by human activities in part to prepare for Mars ( ). Construct telescopes to search for habitable environments around other stars Conduct robotic and eventual human expeditions to Mars. Develop a Crew Exploration Vehicle (2014). Pursue international and commercial participation.

All Exploration Activities, Human and Robotic: $170 billion (FY 06-20, in blues) ($154 billion in 2003$)

From Robots to Humans on Mars: One Giant Step Human missions will require landed masses in the tens of tons Courtesy: J. Geffre/JSC Lander + Aerobrake Mass (tons) Mars Circular Staging Orbit Altitude (km) Number of Crew + Days on Mars Surface mt mt 90 – 100 mt MSR/MSL are here Reference Point 6 crew, 60 days 500 x 33,572 km 82,800 kg

Institutional Change at NASA If NASA succeeds in returning to the Moon by 2016 and sending humans to Mars, it will not resemble the institution that began the initiative in 2004 – no more than the NASA of 1969 resembled the institution that began the Moon race in 1961.

Human Space Flight: the Apollo Approach Launch costs of $1,000 per pound ($5 K in 2002 dollars) $7 billion for spacecraft development (about $42 billion in 2002 dollars) Large scale systems management In-house technical capability Extensive use and penetration of aerospace contractors 129,000 kg to LEO; 45,000 kg to escape trajectory Total cost through Apollo 11: $21.4 billion (about $140 billion in 2002 dollars) With apologies for using pounds. Source: McCurdy, “Cost of Space Flight,” Space Policy 10 (November 1994)

How Can NASA Fit a $147 Apollo-type Lunar Return inside a $154 Exploration Budget? (billions of 2003 dollars) $7 Save on crew exploration vehicle and lander $20 Save on new launch vehicle $32 No new field centers, tracking network, Saturn IB $25 Omit extra hardware used beyond Apollo 11 $84 Total savings $63 Total cost for first human return to the Moon Source: NASA, “Budget Estimates Behind “Sand Chart,” February 26, 2004, attachment.

Cost of a First Mars Mission Using Apollo Methods and Existing Launch Technology Spacecraft development (810,000 pounds in LEO) = $365 billion at Apollo style costs Program management and operational support = $170 billion Apollo style Transportation to Mars (810,000 pounds at $25,000 per pound) = $20 billion Total cost: $555 billion (2002 dollars + inflation) Impossible!

Cost Innovation: the Robotics Approach Accept planetary launch costs of $25,000 per pound Reduce spacecraft development costs to $150,000 per pound Reduce spacecraft mass and complexity to 1,000 pounds Mars Pathfinder: $265 million NEAR-Shoemaker: $212 million Source: McCurdy, Faster, Better, Cheaper. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

The Discovery Model NASA solicits proposals for entire missions Proposals submitted by government laboratories partnered with universities and business firms Teams complete for funds Strict cost caps Rapid development times Innovation and new technologies

The Commercial Model Why commerce? –Expands participants –Allows nontraditional approaches –Raises additional cash –Allows NASA to “move on” How? –Launch, exploration and development authorities (airports & East India Company analogies) –Private provision of transportation, base management, and in situ resources (McMurdo Sound) –Sale of related services in the open marketplace (airmail analogy) –Government incentives (assets, tax incentives, loan guarantees, insurance coverage (transcontinental railroad)

A Low-Cost Mission to Mars Launch vehicle development: $5 billion 800,000 pounds (six spacecraft) to $1,000 per pound = $800 million $26,000 per pound (same as ISS) = $21 b. In situ propellant production on Mars Operations & technology Total: around $35 billion over 8 years Source: NASA, “Human Exploration of Mars: the Reference Mission of the NASA Mars Exploration Study Team,” ed. by Stephen J. Hoffman and David L. Kaplin, July 1977.

Summary: Institutional Change at NASA Seems to Work Robotics and rovers. Discovery-type programs. Federally-funded research & development centers with strong in-house capability. Competition for projects. Low-cost innovation. Commercial incentives that involve new players. Strong technical capability. Doesn’t Work Civil space programs without a long term vision to provide focus and discipline. Large, costly human space flight projects carried out by appropriation-dependent aerospace firms with weak government oversight. Cost reduction efforts that are disproportionate to project complexity.