Overview of Testbed Area PAWNS Testbed Secure Sensor Middleware Integrating Policy and Group Key Management Himanshu Khurana Senior Security Engineer, NCSA

Testbed Area Goal: provide a testbed for integration, evaluation, and demonstration of technologies developed by NCASSR Long-term Vision: a testbed integrated with NCASSR organizations’ and external testbeds for scalability testing and transfer of technology NCSA’s globus alliance and production environment efforts DHS/NSF Deter Testbed NRL Protean Lab Step-by-step approach Provide a means for testing individual NCASSR technologies Enhance collaboration between NCASSR and other organization projects to develop integrated technologies

Y2 Testbed Projects Five projects managed by three organizations SABRE – PI: Ouderkirk (PNNL) Multilevel – PI: Irvine ( NPS) CyberCIEGE – PI: Irvine (NPS) PKI Testbed – PI: Basney (NCSA) PAWNS – PI: Khurana (NCSA) PAWNS: A testbed for Programming Applications for a Wireless Network of (motes-based) Sensors Team Members: Himanshu Khurana, Peter Bajcsy, Rakesh Bobba, David Scherba Goal: Integrate, evaluate and demonstrate Hazard Awareness using sensors (PI: Bajcsy) Security services for sensor networks (PI: Khurana)

PAWNS/Hazard Awareness/Secure Sensor Middleware Technology Components Hazard Awareness and Response Deploy Point Sensors (“smart” motes) Using Robot Control Calibrate Spectral Cameras and Point Sensors Proactive Camera Control Using Point Sensors Hazard Analysis and Human Alert Hazard Confirmation and Elimination Using Robot Control Security and Reliability over multi-hop sensor networks Encrypt data between sensors and base station Key Management using Smart Dust, Public-Key and Random Graph techniques Tinysec link-layer encryption with Skipjack Reliability transfer of messages Link-level retransmission, erasure codes

Experimental Setup and Hazard Simulation * * Slide provided by Peter Bajcsy

Proactive Camera Control and Hazard Alert and Elimination * Proactive Camera Control Logic: If light = on then visible camera = on If light = off then thermal IR camera = on Based on image analysis re- direct human attention to hazardous situation * Slide provided by Peter Bajcsy

Integrating Policy and Group Key Mgmt Research Area: Secure Group Communication (SGC) GCSs enable collaborative applications such as C&C and conferencing Need for scalable security and multicast services Problems Scalable Group Key Management approaches require Group Controllers to bear significant trust liabilities Lack of tools to evaluate efficacy of key mgmt techniques Policy and key mgmt are both necessary to enable SGC but have not been integrated Goals/Approach Develop new key mgmt solutions that minimize trust liability in group controllers Implement SGC framework based on IETF MSEC WG Security Architecture specification Evaluate key mgmt solution in framework Framework integrates policy and key mgmt Team Members Himanshu Khurana, Luke St. Clair, Neelay Shah

Minimizing Trust Liability in GC Previous scalable key mgmt schemes use a trusted GC GC organizes long-term member (symmetric) keys in a tree to enable O(log n) scalability If GC is compromised, adversary gets access to data and key encryption keys and makes recovery costly Our solution (TASK) using proxy cryptography so that GC does not have access to data and key encrypting keys GC organizes shares of member (asymmetric) keys in a tree, uses shares to transform messages between members, enables O(log n) scalability If GC is compromised, adversary only gets shares which can be refreshed easily for quick and cheap recovery Publication Himanshu Khurana, Rafael Bonilla, Adam Slagell, Raja Afandi, Hyung- Seok Hahm, and Jim Basney. Scalable Group Key Management with Partially Trusted Controllers. To appear in the International Conference on Networking, Reunion Island, April 2005

SGC Framework Implementation Key Mgmt: Task, LKH Auth: Openssl, IKE Policy Spec: Antigone M1M2Mn M1M2 Key Mgmt Auth Policy Spec. Domain A Domain B GC Policy Server GC Policy Server … Reliable Multicast Layer: NORM, Spread

Testbed Area Funding (Y2) SABRE (Simulated Anomalous Behavior & REcognition)Ouderkirk PNNL/ Battelle$350,000 PAWNS (Programming & testing Applications on Wireless Network of Sensors)KhuranaNCSA$175,000 Multilevel Testbed Encryption Experiments/Trusted Channel ImplementationIrvineNPS$80,000 PKI TestbedBasneyNCSA$255,000 CyberCIEGE Extended ScenariosIrvineNPS$200,000 Thrust Total Budget: $1,060,000