Integrity Through Mediated Interfaces PI Meeting: July 19-21, 2000 Bob Balzer Teknowledge Legend: Turquoise Changes from July 99 PI meeting GreenChanges from Feb 00 PI meeting

Technical Objectives Wrap Data with Integrity Marks –Insure its Integrity –Record its processing history –Reconstruct it from this history if it is corrupted by program bugs by malicious attacks Demo these capabilities on major COTS product –Microsoft Office Suite (PowerPoint & Word only) –Also demo on a mission critical military system

This Slide Intentionally Blank Existing Practice Integrity Stove-Piped on Tool-by-Tool Basis End-to-End Integrity Not Supported Persistent Data only Safeguarded by OS Corruption Detection is Ad-Hoc Corruption Repair –Based on Backups –Not Integrated with Detection

Wrap Program –Detect access of integrity marked data & decode it M M M M MediationCocoon Environment = Operating System External Programs Program Change Monitor –Monitor User Interface to detect change actions Translate GUI actions into application specific modifications Technical Approach –Detect update of integrity marked data Re-encode & re-integrity mark the updated data Repair any subsequent Corruption from History Build on existing research infrastructure

Major Risks and Planned Mitigation Ability to detect application-level modifications Application Openness Spectrum: –Event-Generators:Capture as transaction history –Scripting API:Examine state to infer action –Black-Box:Mediate GUI to infer action => Generic Mediators + Tool Specific mapping Two Level Architecture M M M M MediationCocoon Environment = Operating System External Programs Program Change Monitor 1. Application Independent GUI Monitor signals action types 2. Application Dependent Change Monitor Determines Action Parameters Logs Modification History

Major Risks and Planned Mitigation Ability to detect application-level modifications Application Openness Spectrum: –Event-Generators:Capture as transaction history –Scripting API:Examine state to infer action –Black-Box:Mediate GUI to infer action => Generic Mediators + Tool Specific mapping Ability to protect transaction history => Hide the location of the transaction history Virtual File System wrapper System-level Randomization Techniques Tool-Specific Modification Trackers Expensive => Automate common portions => Provide rule-based scripting language

Accomplishments To Date Corruption Detector –IDsDocument Version on Save (in Document) –Records Document Cryptographic Digest on Save –Checks Document Cryptographic Digest on Load Demo Change Monitor for MS Word 2000 –Determines parameters for application-level action –Records transaction history (for possible Replay) Corruption Repairer –Rebuilds document by replaying transaction history Demo

Accomplishments To Date Safe Attachments Wrapper protects attachment execution –Automatically spawned when attachment opened –Restricts Files that can be read/written Remote Sites that can be downloaded-from/uploaded-to Portions of Registry that can be read/written Processes that can be spawned Demo Planned Deployment –Aug: Alpha at Teknowledge/MitreTek –Sept: Beta at DARPA –Nov: Pilot at military command (TBD)

Accomplishments To Date IFE 2.3 ReRun Experiment (IA) 14 Blue Flags established (asset targets) 12 captured by Red-Team 2 uncaptured (protected by NT Wrappers) M M M M M M M M

–Executionof detected modified executables IFE 2.3 ReRun Wrapper Defenses Detection Attacks Prevention Layered Protection Tolerance Prevent modification of –Database by anyone other than DB Manager –EDI Orders by anyone other than FTP Server –Executables by anyone (during “production”) –Execution of unauthorized processes Detect modification of –Executablesby checking hidden digital signature Tolerate modification of –Executablesby reinstalling hidden saved copy

Accomplishments To Date Other IA Projects IFE 2.3 ReRun: o nly uncaptured blue flags NT Security Manager –Policy specifies which processes can run whether executables should be integrity checked how processes should be wrapped –All processes wrapped before execution New AIA Project :Enterprise Wrappers (Tek/ NAI) –Goal: Network Management of Host Wrappers Common NT/Linux Interface & Infrastructure

Measures of Success Widespread Deployment of Integrity Manager for MS-Office Extensibility of Integrity Manager to other COTS products Ease of creating Modification Trackers Resistance to Malicious Attacks –Corruption Avoidance –Corruption Detection –Corruption Repair => Red-Team Experiment

Expected Major Achievements for Integrity Marked Documents: –End-To-End Data Integrity (through multiple tools/sessions) –Modifications Monitored, Authorized, & Recorded Authorization Control of Users, Tools, and Operations All Changes Attributed and Time Stamped –Assured Detection of Corruption –Ability to Restore Corrupted Data Ability to operate with COTS products MS-Office Documents Integrity Marked Mission Critical Military System Integrity Marked

Task Schedule Dec99:Tool-Level Integrity Manager –Monitor & Authorize Tool access & updates Jun00:Operation-Level Integrity Manager –Monitor, Authorize, & Record Modifications Dec00:Integrity Management for MS-Office Jun01:Corruption Repair Dec01: Integrity Management for Mission Critical Military System Jun02:Automated Modification Tracking

Task Schedule Safe -Attachments July00:Demo at PI Meeting Aug00:Alpha at Teknowledge/MitreTek Sept00:Beta at DARPA Nov00:Pilot at military command (TBD)

Enforced Policies MS Word documents (PowerPoint next) –Attack: Document corrupted between usages –Policy: Check integrity when used. Rebuild if corrupted –Attack: Insider corrupts document using Word/PowerPoint –Policy: Log changes. Attribute changes to individuals Suspect Programs –Attack: Program may harm persistent resources –Policy: Copy files just before they are modified. Rollback when requested -Attachments (Web Browsers) –Attack: Program may harm resources –Policy: Restrict access/modification of resources Executables –Attack: Unauthorized changes are made to executables –Policy: Integrity Check executables before loading Prohibit unauthorized modification of executables

(To Be) Enforced Policies can only modify files it creates can’t leave any persistent files after it terminates can only create/access files in that are selected by user

Key Outstanding Issues None Yet

Transition of Technology Piggyback our Technology on a widely used Target Product (MS Office) –Integrity Manager automatically invoked as needed Make technology available for COTS products Work with Vendors to encourage publication of modification events

Needed PM Assistance Help identifying suitable mission critical military system (possibly at PACOM)