Policy Evaluation Testbed Vincent Hu Tom Karygiannis Steve Quirolgico NIST ITL PET Report May 4, 2010.

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Presentation transcript:

Policy Evaluation Testbed Vincent Hu Tom Karygiannis Steve Quirolgico NIST ITL PET Report May 4, 2010

2 AC Policy Composing Problems No structure model framework to support policy authoring. No tool to check correct policy rule specifications, which are hand crafted by administrators. No tool for checking the effect (conflicts of rules) when combining more than one polices. No efficient ways to generate exhaust test cases for the correctness of an access control system.

3 Access Control Policy Tool (ACPT) ACPT is a tool for composing access control models (such as RBAC and Multi-Level models) Features: Allows specification of policy combinations, rules and properties through model templates Allows testing and verification of policies against specified properties and reports problems that may lead to security holes Generates efficient test suites (by applying NIST’s combinatorial testing technology) for testing of access control implementation Test suites can be applied to any access control implementation Ensures the safety and flexibility in composing access control policies XACML policy generation

4 ACPT Architecture GUI AC Model Templates Data Acquisition Policy GeneratorModel Checker Test Suite Generator Combinatorial Array Generator Access Control Policy Tool User, attribute, resource, role, etc. data GUI allows specification of users, groups, attributes, roles, rules, policies, and resources Generates encoded policies.xml Generates test suites Validates access control policy models API/mechanism to consume/acquire external data related to policies Generates combinatorial test array Test suite Administrator optional functions XACML

5 ACPT

6

7 ACPT Demo Policy A (excerpt from 28 CFR Part 23 Statutes and Govt. Category) Subject Attributes Resource Attributes Action Rule number 28 CFR Part 23 Training Government Category Privacy Category Read 1CurrentFederalISEYes 2CurrentStateISEYes 3Expired/Non e FederalISEYes 4CurrentFederalSLTYes 5CurrentStateSLTYes 6Expired/Non e StateSLTYes Policy B (excerpt from Govt. Category, Remote Access, and OMB/NIST Assurance) Subject AttributesResource Attributes Action Rule number Government Category Remote Access OMB/NIST Assurance Level Privacy Category Read 7FederalYes2ISEYes 8FederalYes3 or greaterISEYes 9FederalNo2 or greaterISEYes 10StateYes3 or greaterISEYes 11StateNo2ISEYes 12FederalYes3 or greaterSLTYes 13FederalNo2 or greaterSLTYes 14StateYes2SLTYes 15StateYes3 or greaterSLTYes 16StateNo2SLTYes

8 ACPT Demo Property to test: A request with the attributes: * “Current” for 28 CFR Part 23 Training, * “Federal” for Government Category, * “ 1” for Assurance Level, * “True” for Remote Access, to “read” data with * “ISE” Privacy Category attribute should not be allowed. The rules say: Rule number 1 of Policy A grants the request of the property, but no rule in Policy B grants such request.

9 ACPT Demo Property specification in ACPT

10 ACPT Demo Test the property against Policy A, the result return false with counterexample.

11 ACPT Demo Test the property against Policy B, the result return true.

12 ACPT Demo Test the property against Policy A merged with Policy B, the result return false for Policy A but true for Policy B. Note that for merged policies there is no priorities between policies

13 ACPT Demo Test the property against Policy A combined with Policy B. Combined polices has the priorities of the combined rules. This slide shows the combination of policies, where Policy B has higher priority than policy A

14 ACPT Demo Test the property against Policy A combined with Policy B, and we set the “Default Deny” rules for both policies, the verification result return true for the combined policy.

15 ACPT Demo Test cases generation:

16 ACPT Demo XACML generation:

17 Live Demo

18 Compare ACPT with commercial AC tools So far, a commercial AC policy management tool does not have all the following capabilities that NIST ACPT has:  AC (access control) model templates for entering polices: RBAC, Multi- Level, RuBAC (rule based), and Workflow, even some (such as IBM Tivoli) claims provide RuBAC, RBAC, and ABAC templates which are only simulated by using rules, in other words, there is no Role or Attribute relation (hierarchy) building capability,  Combining different AC models into one. (e.g. combine RBAC policy with RuBAC and ABAC policies)  AC Property (described by Boolean predicate) verification (IBM has limited SOD (Separation of Duty) check) to ensure the created policy can satisfy any combination of rule constraints.  Test case (suite) generator for testing in real operation environment to assure there is no privilege leakage caused by faults other than the AC policy.

19 ACPT Future Work  Policy (or rule) priority configuration for combining different models or rules (e.g., combinations of global and local policies)  White-box model/properties verification to verify coverage and confinement of access control rules  Generate XACML policies derived from verified access control model or rules  Additional access control policy templates including dynamic and historical access control models  API or mechanism for acquiring or consuming information about users, attributes, resources, etc.  Web-ACPT allowing convenient web-based policy composition

20 Progress Report  PET State-to-State policy scenarios defined XACML and PEP coding to support new scenario Numerous software enhancements Preparing demo for Fusion Center conference  DHS/JHUAPL Identity Provider Service Privacy Policy Matrix  DoJ and HHS Presentations  Computer Associates CRADA Policy Expression and Automated Extraction  National Security Agency Quarterly Technical Exchanges

21 Progress Report (cont.)  Presentation and Demo, 2010 Fusion Center Technology Workshop, June 8th and 9th, 2010  Decentralized Information Group, Computer Science & Artificial Intelligence Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  Nationwide Health Information Network (NHIN), CONNECT, HHS – ACPT Tool

22 Contact Information  Vincent Hu –  Tom Karygiannis –  Steve Quirolgico –