Worst-Case Bounds on R&D and Pricing Distortions: Theory and Disturbing Conclusions if Consumer Values Follow the World Income Distribution Michael Kremer Harvard University Christopher Snyder Dartmouth College
Introduction
Basic Ideas 1 1 1/2 Figure 1: Numerical example
Basic Ideas 1 1 1/2 Figure 2: STRZ demand curve
Vaccines versus Drugs Spin off paper from Kremer & Snyder (2015) Zipf distribution of disease risk limits ability to extract rent with vaccine Risk resolves when drug sold, leading to possible bias against vaccines Ideal laboratory for general ideas here, plus calibrations and empirical tests Equal revenue (STRZ) demand Maleug & Snyder (2006) bounding profitability of price discrimination Hartline & Roughgarden (2009) compare worst case from auction mechanisms Brooks (2013) optimality of proposed auction mechanism Bergemann, Brooks & Morris (2014) general welfare results for price discrimination Rent extraction and efficiency Makowski & Ostroy (1995, 2001) Shape of demand curves Anderson & Renault (2003); Johnson & Myatt (2006); Garber, Jones & Romer (2006); Weyl & Fabinger (2013); Fabinger & Weyl (2015) Innovation incentives Dosi (1988); Freeman (1994); Acemolu & Linn (2004); Weyl & Tirole (2012); Budish, Roin, & Williams (2013) Literature
Model
Bounding Deadweight Loss
General Oligopoly Models
STRZ Demand
Decomposition
Static Inefficiency
Specific Distributions Discrete
Specific Distributions Beta
Specific Distributions Means, medians, modes
Specific Distributions General demand curvature
World Income Calibration Figure 12: World income distribution from Pinkovsky and Sala-i-Martin (2009) Figure 13: Calibrated producer surplus using 2006 data