Christopher Jay Department of Philosophy University of York

There are some things which are [morally] good One action or state of affairs is better than another if it is more good An action of state of affairs is best if there is no action or state of affairs better

There are some things which are [morally] good One action or state of affairs is better than another if it is more good An action of state of affairs is best if there is no action or state of affairs better

Consequentialism One always ought to do the thing which will produce the most good possible.

Consequentialism One always ought to do the thing which will produce the most good possible. or: One always ought to do the thing which will have the best result

(1) What is (intrinsically) morally good is X, Y, Z... (2) One always ought to do the thing which produces the most X, Y, Z... possible

(1) What is (intrinsically) morally good is pleasure (2) One always ought to do the thing which produces the most pleasure possible

(1) What is (intrinsically) morally good is wellbeing (2) One always ought to do the thing which produces the most wellbeing possible

(1) What is (intrinsically) morally good is X, Y, Z... (2) One always ought to do the thing which produces the most X, Y, Z... possible

(1) What is (intrinsically) morally good is X, Y, Z... (2) One always ought to do the thing which produces the most X, Y, Z... possible T HIS IS THE DISTINCTIVE CLAIM

(1) What is (intrinsically) morally good is X, Y, Z... Y OU DON ’ T HAVE TO BE A C ONSEQUENTIALIST TO BELIEVE THIS (1) One always ought to do the thing which produces the most X, Y, Z... possible

The Uncontroversial Claim One ought to perform the act with the best consequences, other things being equal

The Uncontroversial Claim One ought to perform the act with the best consequences, other things being equal i.e.: unless there are decisive reasons not to maximising the good is the default right thing to do

 Organ harvesting

 Hanging the innocent

 Organ harvesting  Hanging the innocent  The Rwandan’s dilemma

 Organ harvesting  Hanging the innocent  The Rwandan’s dilemma  Gifts for your children

 Organ harvesting Rights  Hanging the innocent  The Rwandan’s dilemma Duties  Gifts for your children

Deontology There are some things which one ought not to do regardless of the consequences.

The crucial question: Are there ever decisive reasons not to do the best you can? Consequentialists: No Deontologists: Yes

Consequentialists might say: There can’t be decisive reasons to be irrational, and it is always irrational not to (try to) maximise the good.

Deontologists and Consequentialists can agree that morality is a matter of practical rationality So they can agree that if it is necessarily irrational not to maximise the good, we can have no decisive reasons not to

An ‘Aristotelian’ conception of rationality: Rationality is responsiveness to reasons – to be rational is to respond appropriately to the reasons which there are (i) There might be some reasons which we can only see and respond appropriately to when affected by, e.g., love or anger

An ‘Aristotelian’ conception of rationality: Rationality is responsiveness to reasons – to be rational is to respond appropriately to the reasons which there are (ii) Being rational does not require us to be perfectly rational

An ‘Aristotelian’ conception of rationality: Rationality is responsiveness to reasons – to be rational is to respond appropriately to the reasons which there are (iii) Rationality does not require us to have beliefs about reasons in order to respond appropriately to them

An ‘Aristotelian’ conception of rationality: Rationality is responsiveness to reasons – to be rational is to respond appropriately to the reasons which there are (iv) Rationality requires us to respond with both actions and attitudes

Rationality is closely connected to agency Agents act well when they act rationally (in the Aristotelian sense described) Since morality is about acting well too, morality is connected to practical rationality

‘[A]gents are not necessarily concerned, at all times and in all places, with the production of goodness. Hence bringing about goodness is not the role of agency. It is just one thing that agency sometimes does.... [A]nother thing that agents sometimes do is express their loyalty to some form of goodness. And one way of expressing one’s loyalty to a form of goodness is to observe a constraint that it grounds.’ (Timothy Chappell, ‘Intuition, System, and the “Paradox” of Deontology’: p.275)

Since practical rationality is a matter of acting well, the varieties of agency tell us something about the varieties of practical reason – including, perhaps, different ways in which it is rational to respond to good and bad.

We can promote some good by trying to secure as much of it as possible And we can honour some good by trying to act in a way which exemplifies it. (E.g. War in the interests of peace (promoting) vs. pacifism (honouring).)

Consequentialists might say: Agency might involve lots of different projects, but the very meaning of ‘rational’ entails that it is irrational not to promote the good.

Consequentialists might say: Agency might involve lots of different projects, but the very meaning of ‘rational’ entails that it is irrational not to promote the good. But what about the rationality of beliefs? There, rationality is a matter of responding to evidence in the right way; not having as many true beliefs as possible, or responding to evidence in as many cases as possible!

Consequentialists might say: Agency might involve lots of different projects, but the very meaning of ‘rational’ entails that it is irrational not to promote the good. And in practical rationality, we accept that facts about what is possible and what isn’t give us reasons to abandon certain projects; but the rationality of that is not at all a matter of trying to maximise anything!

Consequentialists might say: Agency might involve lots of different projects, but the very meaning of ‘rational’ entails that it is irrational not to promote the good. So if there is some privileged role for promotion/maximising in practical rationality, it is not established by the nature of rationality itself.

 Deontologists and Consequentialists can agree about what is morally good

 They can agree that unless there are decisive reasons to do otherwise we ought to promote the good

 Deontologists and Consequentialists can agree about what is morally good.  They can agree that unless there are decisive reasons to do otherwise we ought to promote the good  But Deontologists accept that there are sometimes decisive reasons not to promote the good, because rationality requires us to honour some goods rather than promote them (especially if promoting them conflicts with honouring them).