Today’s Lecture A comment about your Third Assignment and final Paper Preliminary comments on James William James

A comment about your Third Assignment and final Paper I’m going to take the long weekend to grade your Third Assignments. As you will get them back three days before the paper is due, this will not give you any less days before the paper due date to look over my comments than you have had for the previous assignments.

A comment about your Third Assignment and final Paper In saying this, my guess is that you will be even more tired then than you are now. So I propose to give you a bonus day of grace to get your final Paper in to me. Three things to note about this proposal: (1) It means that IF you get your paper to me, or the assignment drop box, by 4:00 p.m. on August 11th, THEN you will not receive any late penalties for your paper. (2) This extra day of grace only applies to your Paper. (3) Technically, this does not change the due date for the paper (which remains August 8th).

Preliminary comments on James One of the important foils for William James is evidentialism, particularly the evidentialism of W.K. Clifford. Remember, Clifford contends that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (CP, p.4). The wrong committed, according to Clifford, is moral in nature. Also remember that evidentialism need not commit itself to the view that believing on insufficient evidence is morally wrong. It can simply argue (1) that to believe on insufficient evidence is to acquire beliefs with negative epistemic value, and (2) that we have an epistemic duty to acquire beliefs with positive epistemic value.

Preliminary comments on James The Ontological, Cosmological and Teleological Arguments for the existence of the God or Goddess reflect evidentialist sympathies. I.e. philosophers who use these arguments typically believe that we should ensure that (all of) our beliefs have appropriate justificatory support or grounding, and that belief in God(’s existence) can be shown to be either demonstrably, or probably, true. Remember that evidentialism is a form of Strong Rationalism (i.e. the view that a religious system of belief can only be rightly believed to be true if it can be convincingly shown to be true [to any reasonable person]).

William James William James was one of the more famous of the Twentieth Century American philosophers. He was born in 1842 and died in Though he wrote about and studied religious phenomena, he is perhaps most famous for his work in psychology (he is the author of the classic Principles of Psychology).

William James He is famously connected to the American philosophical school known as Pragmatism. Putting it crudely, Pragmatists are, in an important sense, radical empiricists. For Pragmatists, the epistemic value of a belief lies in its usefulness (broadly construed) to the organisms that hold it. They also typically think that we ought only to concern ourselves with those beliefs that have experiential import (i.e. rightly lead us to expect, and successfully interact with, future observables or experience).

William James James’ essay “The Will to Believe” is often regarded as one of the best contemporary expressions of Fideism. Remember Fideism is the view that religious systems of belief are not open to rational evaluation (even if this view of religious systems of belief is a rational one to take). The question is: Is William James properly regarded as a Fideist?

William James Consider this quote from your readings: James describes this essay as “a defense of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced” (FP, p.121). What do you think? Is he a Fideist? Do we know enough yet to judge?

“The Will to Believe”: I Hypothesis: anything which may be proffered for belief (FP, p.121). Live hypothesis: a hypothesis which is, to the believer, a real possibility (i.e. it is something that possesses some degree of prima facie credibility). Note that to be a live hypothesis a hypothesis must have (some) appeal to the epistemic sensibilities of the relevant epistemic subject. This means that a hypothesis could be both live and dead, though not to the same epistemic subject at time t (FP, p.121). Option: the decision between two hypotheses (FP, p.121).

“The Will to Believe”: I Living (versus dead) option: A decision in which each competing hypothesis for belief is a live hypothesis to (i.e. is a real or genuine candidate for belief to) the relevant epistemic subject (FP, p.121).

“The Will to Believe”: I Forced (versus avoidable) option: The believer must choose between competing hypotheses for belief (FP, p.122). “Every dilemma based on a complete logical disjunction, with no possibility of not choosing, is an option of this forced kind” (FP, p.122). A logical disjunction is a compound sentence in which the simpler (complete) sentences are linked by an ‘either … or’ logical operator. ‘Either this action is right or this action is wrong’ is an example of a logical disjunction. Note this example is not a genuine option because it is not forced…the action under consideration may be morally neutral.

“The Will to Believe”: I Momentous (versus trivial) option: An option which, when taken, is unique, significant or irreversible (FP, p.122). Genuine Option: An option which is forced, living and momentous (FP, p.121).

“The Will to Believe”: II James opens this section with a distinction between beliefs on the basis of which are under our control to believe or not to believe. There are some beliefs we find ourselves incapable of not believing, or incapable of believing. These, according to James, typically concern matters of fact or analytic (i.e. a priori) truths, or known falsehoods (FP, p.122). Disagreement in philosophy of religion has been partially over whether this is true for religious belief (i.e. whether we find ourselves incapable of not believing or believing in, say, the existence of the Goddess).

“The Will to Believe”: II James introduces you to Pascal’s Wager (Blaise Pascal was a Seventeenth Century mathematician and philosopher). Pascal held the view that we could choose to believe in the existence of God. (1) You must either believe that God exists or believe that He does not. (2) The decision cannot be decided on rational grounds (i.e. on the basis of a priori, or even a posteriori, truths). (3) It is more reasonable to risk a finite loss (even certain finite loss) in the face of (even just the possibility of) infinite gain, than to risk losing the possibility of infinite gain because of certain finite loss.

“The Will to Believe”: II (4) If you choose to believe that God exists, and He doesn’t, then you lose nothing. (5) If you choose to believe that God exists, and He does, then you gain eternal life/happiness/peace. (6) So you should choose to believe that God exists (FP, pp ).

“The Will to Believe”: II It would seem, James thinks, that this Fideistic argument is unpersuasive on several grounds: (1) This kind of argument smacks of desperation. (2) A religious belief based on such grounds hardly qualifies as ‘faith-full’. (3) No Deity is going to take seriously this kind of commitment, nor should they. (4) Most importantly, such a option is not a live one. No Muslim or Protestant Christian is going to find themselves adopting Catholic Christianity on these grounds, and reasonably so.

“The Will to Believe”: II (5) If we change the religious context to another World Faith Tradition not currently well represented in the room (e.g. Hinduism), we will not increase its religious or epistemic appeal simply or merely by appealing to Pascal’s considerations. Yet the argument would be relevantly similar to the one offered by Pascal for belief in Catholic Christianity (FP, p.123).

“The Will to Believe”: II James does think that this can be pushed too far. Though there are beliefs that we are clearly incapable of not believing or of believing based on considerations of logic or fact, this does not mean that all beliefs fall into this category nor do we do any wrong in believing such (other) beliefs on grounds other than logic or fact (FP, p.123).

“The Will to Believe”: III James, in this section, suggest some candidates for belief that we do not believe because we have sufficient, never mind inescapable, evidence. (1) Certain basic scientific beliefs are held on no more than the testimony of others (and a faith in their trustworthiness). (2) We have faith that there are truths (about the world and ourselves) to be discovered and that we possess the relevant ability to discover them, but we cannot decisively defend these claims in the face of epistemological skepticism. (3) We have faith in the progress of science and scientific knowledge, but, again, we cannot decisively defend such a view in the face of epistemological skepticism.

“The Will to Believe”: III (4) Some beliefs we even believe on no more grounds than their current respectability, or their prestige in certain belief communities (FP, p.124). It would seem, then, that there is room for “passional tendencies and volitions” (FP, p.125) in our belief choices (and our narrative about how we go about forming our beliefs) (FP, p.125). But are we right in these beliefs (or is it epistemically permissible to form our beliefs in this way)?

“The Will to Believe”: IV This is James’ thesis: “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, ‘Do not decide, but leave the question open,’ is itself a passional decision... and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth” (FP, p.125).

“The Will to Believe”: V-VI Do note James’ rejection of absolutism, or infallibilism, as an approach to philosophy. James rejects the idea that there are self-evident truths, save perhaps that “the present phenomenon of consciousness exists” (FP, p.126). Note he makes no claim about a self or thinker. James claims that what we regard as knowledge almost always involve claims that we take to be true, but could in fact be false (FP, pp.125, 127).

“The Will to Believe”: VII James points out two fundamental duties - “our first and great commandments as would-be knowers” (FP, p.128): (1) “We must know the truth” (FP, p.128), and (2) “We must avoid error” (FP, p.128). It is important to note that these do not amount to the same prescription/commandment (FP, p.128). If you hold (1) to the exclusion of (2), you will likely form many beliefs in the hopes of forming true ones. If you hold (2) to the exclusion of (1), you will likely form few beliefs in the hopes of avoiding forming false ones (FP, p.128).

“The Will to Believe”: VII We can choose to order our intellectual lives around one, the other, or both duties. Clifford endorses living around the second duty. James endorses both. He sees the difference over this issue which exists between himself and Clifford as arising, fundamentally, from differences in passion or feeling (e.g. the “horror of being duped”) (FP, p.128).

“The Will to Believe”: VIII When the option is not forced (or when not forced and trivial), James prescribes the use of disinterested reason. There is nothing to be gained in risking believing falsehoods in contexts where the evidence is not in and we need not decide for the moment (FP, pp ). In science, it is not mere truth that is pursued, but truths which conform to the relevant epistemic values (for James, those which can be “technically verified” [FP, p.129]). In the context of justifying views or claiming knowledge this is, for James, as it should be. In the context of making discoveries, or ‘pushing envelopes’ to follow up a hunch, James thinks a more passional approach will serve science best (FP, p.129).

“The Will to Believe”: IX James now suggests examples of forced options (i.e. where we must make a choice one way or another) which may require passional decisions, and legitimately so. (1) On the question of moral facts or truth: your overall moral outlook, moral realism versus antirealism, depends not on decisive argument but on your willingness or unwillingness to entertain either perspective (FP, p.130).

“The Will to Believe”: IX “Moral skepticism can be no more refuted or proved by logic than intellectual skepticism can. When we stick to it that there is truth (be it of either kind), we do so with our whole nature, and resolve to stand or fall by the results” (FP, p.130).

“The Will to Believe”: IX (2) Epistemological skepticism: you overall epistemological outlook, whether it is skeptical or anti-skeptical, depends not on decisive argument but on your willingness or unwillingness to entertain either perspective (FP, p.130).

“The Will to Believe”: IX (3) Social relations: your stance towards others, whether friendly or unfriendly (or the like), if predicated upon decisive argument or sufficient evidence will, in all likelihood, undermine your present and future relations with them (FP, p.130). “Who gains promotions, boons, appointments, but the man in whose life they are seen to play the part of live hypotheses, who discounts them, sacrifices other things for their sake before they have come, and takes risks for them in advance?” (FP, p.130).

“The Will to Believe”: IX A certain leap of faith can often bring about the object of faith in our social environment. Where this is the case, and doubt will preclude that object from obtaining (at a greater cost to you than is entailed by leaping in faith), you ought to so leap (FP, p.131). Think of James’ ‘train robbing’ or ‘efficient society’ examples (see FP, pp ).

“The Will to Believe”: X Religious systems of belief typically share the following in common: (1) Those matters which have eternal significance are better than those of a more temporal nature. (2) We are better off now if we believe (1) (FP, p.131).

“The Will to Believe”: X Is the religious option a genuine one? Is it live? That depends on where you currently stand on matters pertaining to spirituality. For some the answer will be ‘yes’ and for others ‘no’ (FP, p.131). Is it momentous? Yes, there is a vital good, and great cost, associated with religious belief, or unbelief (FP, p.131). Is it forced? Yes, we preclude reaping the benefit of religious commitment if we remain neutral to the relevant hypothesis, just as surely as if we had adopted a denial of the relevant belief or set of beliefs (FP, p.131).

“The Will to Believe”: X We are supposed to see that the religious skeptic is placing more emphasis on the avoidance of error than on the acquisition of truth. The religious person is, on the other hand, placing more emphasis on the acquisition of truth than on the avoidance of error. The difference of approach is, again, fundamentally passional not intellectual (FP, p.131).

“The Will to Believe”: X “To preach skepticism to us as a duty until ‘sufficient evidence’ for religion be found, is tantamount therefore to telling us, when in presence of the religious hypothesis, that to yield to our fear of its being error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may be true. It is not intellect against passions, then; it is only intellect with one passion laying down its law” (FP, p.131).

“The Will to Believe”: X Is it reasonable to adopt religious belief? (1) To most of us religion is a live hypothesis, and stands as a genuine option. Given that a wrong choice may be profoundly detrimental to our future welfare, and we must in the end choose (with passion) the type of risk we take, it would be reasonable for us to choose religion (FP, p.131).

“The Will to Believe”: X (2) Essential to the religious hypothesis, according to James, is the belief that we must meet That Which Is “half-way” (FP, p.132), by ordering ourselves towards It as if It exists and is concerned for us. Given (1), and the possibility that we cut ourselves off from this Other if we adopt irreligion, the choice for James is clear (FP, p.132).

“The Will to Believe”: X Remember that, in James words, “ the freedom to believe can only cover living options which the intellect of the individual cannot by itself resolve” (FP, p.132).

“The Will to Believe”: X “No one of us ought to issue vetoes to the other, nor should we bandy words of abuse. We ought, on the contrary, delicately and profoundly to respect one another’s mental freedom: then only shall we bring about the intellectual republic; then only shall we have that spirit of inner tolerance without which all our outer tolerance is soulless, and which is empiricism’s glory; then only shall we live and let live, in speculative as well as in practical things” (FP, p.133).