Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit. All rights reserved. Making Economics a Cyber-Security Weapon Scott Borg Director (CEO) and Chief Economist U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit2 If you are a cyber-security professional, what is your job? (from a business standpoint) (from a business standpoint) What were you hired for?

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit3 The ultimate goal of cyber security: Reduce Cyber Risk Reduce Cyber Risk But... can you say what this is?

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit4 Risk= Expected Loss Over Time= Threat x Consequence x Vulnerabilities Risk = Expected Loss Over Time = Threat x Consequence x Vulnerabilities Frequency of a given attack type with an associated skill level x Potential business loss from that attack x Extent to which that loss would occur, given a specific set of policies and counter-measures Frequency of a given attack type with an associated skill level x Potential business loss from that attack x Extent to which that loss would occur, given a specific set of policies and counter-measures = Annualized Expected Loss = Annualized Expected Loss

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit5 Of the three risk factors, Threat, Consequence, and Vulnerability... the hardest to understand is Consequence the hardest to understand is Consequence

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit6 OUTPUTS INPUTS (Inputs are benefits lost) (Outputs are benefits gained) Supplier Customer Value Creation What does a business or government agency do to create value? Businesses take Inputs and turn them into Outputs.

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit7 OUTPUTS INPUTS Opportunity Cost Willingness- to-Pay Supplier Customer Total Value Created Value Creation MEASURING A PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit8 Opportunity Cost Willingness- to-Pay Supplier Customer Willingness- to-Pay Opportunity Cost A CHANGE IN THE VALUE CREATED: WHAT SUBSTITUTES

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit9 9 Protecting “High Value Assets” Is the Wrong Approach! The value of an asset doesn’t correlate with damage that could be done by attacking it The value of an asset doesn’t correlate with damage that could be done by attacking it Value in business doesn’t reside in things; value is something the business is continually creating Value in business doesn’t reside in things; value is something the business is continually creating Value is created by the way things work together, not by their separate outputs Value is created by the way things work together, not by their separate outputs Cyber attacks can do serious damage without doing anything observable to assets Cyber attacks can do serious damage without doing anything observable to assets

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit10 Threat x Consequence x Vulnerabilities = Risk Frequency of a given attack type x Potential Loss x Extent to which the loss would occur = Annualized Expected Loss Frequency of a given attack type x Potential Loss x Extent to which the loss would occur = Annualized Expected Loss Making Cyber Risk Quantitative by Unpacking the Components THREAT Attackers Motives Targets Capabilities IV. Undermining III. Discrediting II. Corrupting I. Interrupting Business Effects Value Differential CONSEQUENCE VULNERABILITIES Findable Penetrable Corruptible Concealable Irreversible 1

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit11 Being able to estimate cyber risk and say how it is changed by different cyber-security measures... Will give you an objective basis for every cyber-security choice Will give you an objective basis for every cyber-security choice Will justify your budget Will justify your budget Will allow you to determine the ROI for your activities Will allow you to determine the ROI for your activities Will give you a solid business defense of your actions if something goes wrong (i.e., save your job) Will give you a solid business defense of your actions if something goes wrong (i.e., save your job)

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit12 But estimating cyber risk is hard, because you might not know enough yet about...  The potential attackers, their motives, how they choose attacks, what their capabilities are, and how these factors are changing over time  Where and how your organization creates value, where its potential liabilities are, and what would happen in the event of an attack  How your organization’s vulnerabilities would affect attacker activities and success rates collectively, rather than one-by-one

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit13 What should you do in the meantime? (if you don’t have enough information to estimate risks)

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit14 You already know a lot about how to do this! The stepping-stone goal for cyber security: Increase Attacker Costs Increase Attacker Costs (while holding down attacker gains) (while holding down attacker gains)

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit15 Ask yourself — What hurdles would an attacker need to overcome to carry out a profitable attack? (Hint: never just penetration) How much time and skill would it take to overcome these hurdles? How can the time and skill required from an attacker be most effectively increased? You will probably find you can even make quantitative estimates of these things!

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit16 Attacker cost is the real guide to hitting attackers where it hurts! (Even a modest-sized business can typically increase attacker costs by a factor of 10 or 100!) (Even a modest-sized business can typically increase attacker costs by a factor of 10 or 100!) This is how to make the game of cyber security into one you can win!

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit17  If you can make the costs of attacking your systems greater than the benefits from attacking them, you have won absolutely!  If you can make the return-on-investment for attacking your organization considerably worse than for attacking another target, you have won relatively! Winning: Not as good a guide as quantifying risk (notice why!), but the next best thing

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit18 What economics is most fundamentally about: Not cash flows and markets! Not cash flows and markets! Maximizing the benefits gained, relative to the benefits lost. Maximizing the benefits gained, relative to the benefits lost. Attackers are already thinking this way. You should be too!

Copyright © 2015 Scott Borg/U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit19 For more information or permission to use this material, please contact: For more information or permission to use this material, please contact: Scott Borg U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit P.O. Box 1390 Norwich, VT