Analysis of peering strategy adoption by transit providers in the Internet Aemen Lodhi (Georgia Tech) Amogh Dhamdhere (CAIDA) Constantine Dovrolis (Georgia.

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Presentation transcript:

Analysis of peering strategy adoption by transit providers in the Internet Aemen Lodhi (Georgia Tech) Amogh Dhamdhere (CAIDA) Constantine Dovrolis (Georgia Tech) 1 DANCES, April 19, 2012

Outline Background Motivation & Objective Approach: the GENESIS model Results – Adoption of peering strategies – Impact on economic fitness – Who loses? Who gains? Alternative peering strategies Conclusion 2

Pretty picture of the Internet 3

Background The Internet consists of ~40,000 networks Each independently operated and managed – Called “Autonomous Systems” (ASes) – Various types: transit, content, access, enterprise Distributed, decentralized interactions between ASes Transit link: Customer pays provider Settlement-free peering link: Exchange traffic for free 4

Background 5 Enterprise customer Transit Provider Enterprise customer Content Provider Tier-1 network The Internet again..less pretty

Motivation: Existing peering environment Increasing fraction of interdomain traffic flows over peering links* How are transit providers responding? 6 Transit Provider Content Provider/CDN Access ISP/Eyeballs *C. Labovitz, S. Iekel Johnson, D. McPherson, J. Oberheide and F. Jahanian, “Internet Interdomain Traffic,” in ACM SIGCOMM, 2010

Motivation: Existing peering environment Peering strategies of ASes in the Internet (source: PeeringDB Transit Providers peering openly ? 7

Objective Why are so many transit providers peering openly? What gives them the incentive to do so? What is the impact on their economic fitness? Which transit providers lose/gain? Are their any alternative peering strategies? 8

The model: GENESIS*GENESIS* Agent based interdomain network formation model – Sorry, no game theory Incorporates – Geographic constraints in provider/peer selection – Interdomain traffic matrix – Public & Private peering – Realistic peering costs, transit costs, transit revenue 9 *GENESIS: An agent-based model of interdomain network formation, traffic flow and economics. InfoCom'12

The model: GENESIS*GENESIS* Fitness = Transit Revenue – Transit Cost – Peering cost Objective: Maximize economic fitness Optimize connectivity through peer and transit provider selection Choose the peering strategy that maximizes fitness

Peering strategies 11 Networks must be co-located in order to establish a peering link Restrictive: Peer only if the internetwork would otherwise be partitioned Selective: Peer only with networks of “similar size” – Use total traffic volume of potential peers as proxy for size Open: Agree to peer with any co-located network

Peering strategy adoption Strategy update in each round Enumerate all available strategies Estimate fitness with the connectivity that results from each strategy Choose the one which gives maximum fitness 12

Execution of a sample path N Iteration 1.Depeering 2.Peering 3.Transit provider selection 4.Peering strategy update 1.Depeering 2.Peering 3.Transit provider selection 4.Peering strategy update 1.Depeering 2.Peering 3.Transit provider selection 4.Peering strategy update 12 N Iteration Time No exogenous changes Networks have no foresight Networks do not co-ordinate Continues until every network has played, but none has changed its peering strategy

Scenarios *Stubs always use Open Without-open Selective Restrictive With-open Selective Restrictive Open vs.

RESULTS 15

Strategy adoption by transit providers 16

Strategy adoption by transit providers 17 Attraction towards Open peering not uniform Less attractive for large transit providers

Impact of Open peering on cumulative fitness Cumulative fitness reduced in all simulations 18

Impact of Open peering on individual fitness 70% providers have lower fitness 19

Effects of Open peering xy zw v Save transit costs But your customers are doing the same! Affects: Transit Cost Transit Revenue Peering Cost

Why gravitate towards Open peering? xy zw z w, z y, traffic bypasses x Options for x? Y peering openly x adopts Open peering Not isolated decisions!! z w, traffic passes through x Y stole transit traffic and revenue from X!! X recovers some of its transit traffic

Quantifying traffic stealing Contention metric: Quantify traffic stealing effect 22 xy z w No contention Maximum Contention

Contention and fitness Cumulative fitness of transit providers decreases as traffic stealing becomes more prevalent 23

Avoid fitness loss? xy zw xy zw vs. Lack of coordination No incentive to unilaterally withdraw from peering with peer’s customer Sub-optimal equilibrium

Traffic volume and customer cone size Traffic stealing seems to be the root cause of fitness loss Let’s classify providers based on how likely they are to steal traffic and have their traffic stolen by peers See what happens to different classes

Classification of transit providers – Traffic volume, Customer cone size 26

Who loses? Who gains? 27

Who loses? Who gains? Who gains: Small customer cone small traffic volume – Cannot peer with large providers using Selective – Little transit revenue loss Who loses: Large customer cone large traffic volume – Can peer with large transit providers with Selective – Customers peer extensively

Alternatives: Open peering variants Do not peer with immediate customers of peer (Direct Customer Forbiddance DCF) Do not peer with any AS in the customer tree of peer (All Customer Forbiddance ACF) 29 xy zw DCF xy z w v ACF

Open peering variants: Fitness Collective fitness with DCF approaches Selective Selective Open DCF ACF

Why the improvement with DCF? – No traffic “stealing” by peers – Aggregation of peering traffic over fewer links (economies of scale !!) – Less pressure to adopt Open peering Why did collective fitness not increase with ACF? – Non-peer transit providers peer openly with stub customers 31 Open peering variants: Fitness

These rules cannot be enforced! What happens if some networks decide to cheat at the eqilibrium? i.e., is the DCF equilibrium stable? What if some networks never agree to DCF? Can these networks cause the system to gravitate towards Open peering? Open peering variants: Open questions

Gravitation towards Open peering is a network effect for transit providers (79% adopt Open peering) – Economically motivated strategy selection – Myopic decisions – Lack of coordination Extensive Open peering by transit providers in the network results in collective loss 33 Conclusion

Effect on the fitness of transit providers is not uniform – Small transit providers gain – Large transit providers lose Coordination is required to mitigate losses Not peering with customers of peers can avoid fitness loss 34 Conclusion

Thank you 35

Motivation Traffic ratio requirement for peering? (source: PeeringDB 36

Traffic components Traffic consumed in the AS Transit traffic = Inbound traffic – Consumed traffic same as Transit traffic = Outbound traffic – Generated traffic 37 Autonomous system Inbound traffic Traffic transiting through the AS Traffic generated within the AS Outbound traffic

Customer-Provider traffic comparison – PeeringDB.com 38 Traffic carried by the AS

Customer-Provider traffic comparison 2500 customer-provider pairs 90% pairs: Customer traffic significantly less than provider traffic 9.5% pairs: Customer traffic larger than provider traffic (difference less than 20%) 0.05% pairs: Customer traffic significantly larger than provider traffic 39

Geographic presence & constraints 40 Link formation across geography not possible Regions corresponding to unique IXPs Peering link at top tier possible across regions Geographic overlap

Logical Connectivity 41

Traffic Matrix Traffic for ‘N’’ size network represented through an N * N matrix Illustration of traffic matrix for a 4 AS network Traffic sent by AS 0 to other ASes in the network Traffic received by AS 0 from other ASes in the network Intra-domain traffic not captured in the model Generated traffic Consumed traffic 42