IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Technical Meeting on the Demonstration of Operational and Long Term Safety of Predisposal Management Facilities for Radioactive Waste – 28 Sep. - 9 Oct Ms Monika Kinker Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management Unit Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety - NSRW Overview of IAEA Activities in Relation to the CRAFT project

IAEA Methods and Tools for Safety Case and Safety Assessment Methods set out in Safety Standards Safety Assessment Framework (SAFRAN) Tool for Safety Case and Safety Assessment Reference SC, Example SC documents

IAEA 33 RW Storage Classification Management Systems L/ILW Reactors DS 448 HLW FCFs DS 447 IAEA Publications: Safety of RW Predisposal Management Spent Fuel Storage Step 5 DS 477 Small Users Step 11 DS 454 Step NEW!!!

IAEA 4 1. Government responsibilities 2. National Policy & Strategy 3. Regulatory Responsibilities 4. Operator Responsibilities 5. Safety/Security 6. Interdependences 7. Management systems 8. Waste minimization 9. Characterization and classification 10. Waste treatment 11. Waste storage 12. Waste acceptance for processing, storage and/or disposal 13. Preparation of the SC and supporting SA 14. Scope of the SC and supporting SA 15. Documentation of the SC and supporting SA 16. Periodic safety review 17. Facilities location and design 18. Facility construction and commissioning 19. Facilities operation, maintenance, emergency preparedness 20. Decommissioning 21. Nuclear safeguards 22. Existing facilities GSR Part 5, Safety Requirements for Predisposal Management of RW 1.Introduction 2.Protection of Human Health & Environment 3.Responsibilities 4.Steps in the Predisposal Management of RW 5.Development and Operation of RWM Facilities & Activities

IAEA Government Responsibilities Setting well defined responsibilities (legal, technical, financial) Ensuring national policy and legislation are established Establishing an effective, independent RB Ensuring continuity of responsibility for safety through regulatory control (licensing regime) Covers all steps and stages (including transfer) Legal requirements, decision making, involvement of interested parties 5

IAEA Regulatory Body Responsibilities Establish, define and implement a process for licensing Review and assess safety case (SC) and environmental impact statement (EIS) Prior to authorization and periodically during operation Provide for the issuing, amending, suspension or revoking of licences subject to any necessary requirements and conditions Perform verification and enforcement actions 6

IAEA Waste Generator Responsibilities Take measures to identify and control RW (e.g., volume and radioactivity content) Characterize and classify RW (e.g. radionuclide content and activity, physical, chemical, biological, mechanical) Treat and condition the waste in accordance with acceptance criteria for safe processing, storage and disposal Maintain records of the wastes (supports accountability and traceability) 7

IAEA Operator’s Responsibilities Develops the SC Demonstration of safety, including periodic reviews Demonstrating compatibilities with next waste management steps (up to and including disposal) in the event that a disposal option has not been identified, assumptions should be made and clearly set down about the likely options Short, medium and long term aspects should be considered and the possible need for future handling and treatment of the waste Derivation of operational limits & conditions (incl WAC) The facility must be operated in accordance with the licence conditions and with the safety case 8

IAEA Regulatory Hold Points: Nuclear Installations 9

IAEA 10 The overall goal of the regulatory review is to verify the facility (or activity) will not cause an unacceptable adverse impact on human health or safety, or on the environment, both now and in the future. Primary objectives include reviewing the SA & SC and assumptions used. Secondary objectives (to ensure SC evaluation) include sufficiently complete, data clearly presented by competent personnel, uncertainties listed, and facility operations understood. 10 Why do I need a license?

IAEA 11 Overview: What is a Safety Case? The collection of arguments and evidence, including the outcome of safety assessment, in support of the safety of a facility or activity (GSR-5, GSG-3) The basis for the safety considerations in respect of siting and locating facilities, construction, operation and decommissioning of the facility, including the justification for changes The basis for interaction and dialogue between the operating organization and the regulatory body 11

IAEA Overview: Purpose of safety case Demonstrate that all planned activities can be carried out in a safe manner Provide guidance for the design, engineering and planning of operations to ensure safety Input to regulatory process (e.g. licensing), including evidence of compliance and arguments for confidence building 12

IAEA Overview: Roles of SC (GSG-3) Demonstrating safety (incl. uncertainties) Integrating scientific and other information Demonstrating compatibilities with next waste management steps (e.g. disposal) Aiding decision making on the authorisation/ licensing of the facilities Providing other information and arguments that support continued development, use or eventual decommissioning of the facility 13

IAEA Role of the Safety Case in Ensuring Long Term Safety (up to 100 years) Interdependencies: Transfer of Ownership, Responsibilities, Information Long Term Strategies for management of RW/DSRS Safety implications of delayed disposal Informing decision making (e.g., management of legacy sites, considering new/expanded nuclear programmes) Demonstration of Safety Licensing and authorization Interactions w Interested Parties Engineering Barriers Management Systems Monitoring and Inspections 14 Waste and materials Exempt waste and materials Radioactive material (for reuse/recycle) Pretreatment Treatment Conditioning Disposal STORAGE TRANSPORT STORAGE TRANSPORT

IAEA 15 GSG-3: Components of the SC and SA The required content of the SC for a facility or activity may vary among States; however, the documentation of the SC should cover, at a minimum, the SA and the operating limits and conditions. Safety Assessment Management System Site and Engineering Non radiological environmental impact Operational Safety Radiological Impact Scenarios Models Calculations Radiological Impact Scenarios Models Calculations Safety Case Safety Assessment

IAEA 16 GSG-3: Safety Guide Demonstrating the Safety of RWM Safety Case Role, Components, Documentation and Use Safety Assessment Approach, Scenarios, Models, Analysis of Results Specific Issues SC evolution, graded approach, DID, facility lifetime, LTS Regulatory Review Process Annex I Examples of Hazards and Initiating Events Annex II Topical Issues for Review of SC Annex III Template of Regulatory Review Report Annex IV SADRWMS Project Proposal to June 2010 WASSC -> CRAFT

IAEA 17 CRAFT (Complimentary Safety Reports: Development and Application to Waste Management Facilities) 4 Year Project 1st Plenary May nd, 3rd Plenaries 2012, 2013 Final Plenary October 2014 Objectives: APPLY GSG-3, SADRWMS methodology, SAFRAN Tool PROVIDE a forum for application of the methodology and SAFRAN tool DEVELOP, document Publication illustrating application of GSG-3 Facility/process specific Process/Regulatory Review

IAEA 18 CRAFT Working Methods, Outcomes Radon Type Facility Application Case develop illustrative test case(s) for applying the IAEA methodology/tools to RADON type facilities RW retrieval activity at Murmansk RADON Storage and Processing Facility Apply IAEA methodology/tools to facilities for the storage and processing of RW Central Storage Facility in Slovenia Regulatory Interactions Apply IAEA methodology/tools in regulatory review of WG application cases, and provide recommendations

IAEA Objectives Reinforcing the safety of all components of the management of RS and national regulatory framework Reinforcing capacities of national regulatory authorities to license and exercise regulatory control over facilities and activities Project counterparts from: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Ghana, Greece, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Nigeria, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Republic of Tanzania INT9176 “Mediterranean” Project 19

IAEA Mediterranean Project: Outcomes Implementation in SAFRAN Tool of a Generic SC & SA of Predisposal Management of DSRS (including at Borehole Disposal site) Provision of assistance to the operators in the development of the SC & SA South Africa March: CS to develop Model SC Simple Storage Facility Centralized Predisposal Management In preparation for disposal (BDC) 20

IAEA SAFRAN Tool “Reinforcing Safety Assessment capabilities and support licensing” SAFRAN Tool - for SA of operations for conditioning and storage of DSRS and operations for their final disposal Generic Operational Safety Assessment (GOSA) for DSRS SIMBOD Tool - for supporting Member States to manage information on DSRS that are intended for disposal using the IAEA BDC 21

IAEA What is SAFRAN? Software package for assessing radiological safety of pre-disposal waste management activities Purpose: describing predisposal RWM activities in a systematic way Conducting the SA with clear documentation of the methodology, assumptions, input data and models, Establishing a traceable and transparent record of the safety basis for decisions on proposed waste management solutions, Demonstrating clear consideration of and compliance with national and international safety standards and recommendations.

IAEA GOSA A SA undertaken on a site-generic rather than site- specific basis using a synthetic system Can provide useful input to decisions concerning a variety of issues: suitable designs, site characteristics & activity limits Use of the GOSA Starting point for the SA of a specific site Worked example that can be used to guide/inform a site- specific assessment Identify key waste and site attributes that need to be characterised 23

IAEA Provision of Assistance to the Operators in the Development of SC & SA (select N African MS) Background Necsa was contracted by the IAEA to assist with development of SC, SA for management of DSRS Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon Objective Draft SC and SA, including a radiation protection plan to cover DSRS management Action plan for selection and licensing of dedicated management options 24

IAEA Collection & transport to dedicated facility Receipt, identification, characterization, handling Temporary storage at the facility Conditioning of DSRS Long term storage 25 Scope of the Safety Cases

IAEA Work on Safety Cases & SAFRAN Tool in parallel Necsa approach to SA based on expert judgement Missing elements, justifications/rationale for selection of accidents for quantitative evaluation SAFRAN Tool used “quantitative” approach to SA Missing “qualitative” evaluations, e.g. analysis of engineering and DSRS-specific issues e.g. surface contamination, doses to extremities and lens of the eye Proposed to develop generic/model SC and specific templates for SA (core requirements w flexibility for site specific circumstances) 26 Observations

IAEA Model Safety Case Objective: Develop a Model SC for end of life mgmt of DSRS with supporting documentation compliant w GSG-3 and using the SAFRAN tool The final product was to be Complete model SC document for a storage facility for DSRS covering development and operation, Reference SC for a storage facility for DSRS under development (i.e. the Mauritian SC for licence application for construction) and Reference SC for an operational facility for conditioning and storage of DSRS (i.e. the Moroccan SC for licence application for continued operation). 27

IAEA Approach SCs had been prepared by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ghana, Morocco, Mauritius, and Tunisia. SA work had been undertaken using the SAFRAN software tool for these countries. Generic/Model document based on GSG-3 had also been compiled with a proposed structure for the SC Based on the SCs of Mauritius and Morocco The SCs reflected unique and different national situations, incl legal and regulatory frameworks Work during the week focussed on review and revision of the national SCs, review and feedback on the Generic/ Model SC, and development of Lessons Learnt 28

IAEA Conclusions of the Experts Generic/Model/Reference document valuable in providing a reference and in guiding development of other SCs 5 SC documents with SAFRAN files Represent a number of different facilities in different stages of development and within different national legal and regulatory frameworks. Illustrates the dynamic nature of SC documentation and ongoing need for updating to reflect current status of facilities and activities. Lessons Learnt include feedback on application of GSG-3 and for consideration in its future revision 29

IAEA Looking Ahead IAEA publication w the SC documents and the process undertaken, lessons learned Require another 1-2 consultancies to polish drafts Network on GNSSN to include associated SAFRAN files Broad application of these tools in Member States Training of experts from Member States on the application of the methodology & tools for safety demonstration (SC and SA) “Toolbox” of the different tools relevant for Safety Case and Safety Assessment covering all phases in the management of DSRS Continuous feedback and improvement of the tools 30

IAEA 31 Thank you!