Decentralization and service delivery. The problem Disappointing health and education outcomes, especially for poor people.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
1 A relationship of accountability has five features Actors (principals) including clients, citizens, policy- makers Accountable actors (agents) including.
Advertisements

World development report 2004 Making Services Work for Poor People.
Managing Public Expenditures to Make Services Work for Poor People Discussion with Public Expenditure Thematic Group Shanta Devarajan, Shekhar Shah WDR.
Government’s Role in Economy
Human development and public finances Servaas van der Berg Dept of Economics, University of Stellenbosch Presentation to first ERSA Public Economics Workshop,
Making Services Work for Poor People world development report 2004 Making Services Work for Poor People Youth Open House, The World Bank New Delhi, March.
Progress out of Poverty Index
Social Development in India 1255: The Politics of India Emily Clough and Roberto Foa.
Peru Public Expenditure Tracking Survey José R. López-Cálix, LCSPE Highlights from PER Task Managers PEAM Core Course January 14, 2004.
Public Expenditures in Health. Main Principles Establish Market Failures Identify beneficiaries of expenditures Balance potential benefits with ability.
DECENTRALIZATION AND RURAL SERVICES : MESSAGES FROM RECENT RESEARCH AND PRACTICE Graham B. Kerr Community Based Rural Development Advisor The World Bank.
January 29, What is decentralization? Modes of decentralization Administrative Fiscal Political Forms of decentralization Deconcentration Devolution.
Conditional Cash Transfers for Improving Utilization of Health Services Health Systems Innovation Workshop Abuja, January 25 th -29 th, 2010.
World development report 2004 Making Services Work for Poor People.
Moving towards the goal of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in Bangladesh Md. Ashadul Islam Director General Health Economics Unit Ministry of Health and.
The 8-7 National Poverty Reduction Program in China: the National Strategy and its Impact Wang Sangui, Li Zhou, Ren Yanshun.
Public Expenditure Analysis for Education Deon Filmer DECRG January 2004.
Tracking Public Expenditure: A Guide Waly Wane Development Research Group The World Bank Are You Being Served? June 2009.
Public Financial Accountability at the Local Level : The role of PFM in Service Delivery and Accountability Rama Krishnan, Senior Financial Management.
Education as a Strategic Investment Conference Prepared by Tony Levitas and Marko Paunovic Belgrade, February 14 th 2009.
Tackling Health Care Corruption and Governance Woes in Developing Countries Maureen Lewis Advisor, HD Vice Presidency Nonresident Fellow, CGD.
Measurement Matters: The Use of PETS and QSDS Public Expenditure Analysis and Management Course Ritva Reinikka Development Research Group (DEC) Public.
Comments on “New Orleans: Political Economy of Public Money” by Aaron Schneider James Alm.
1 African Development Bank Agnes Soucat, MD, Ph.D Director Department of Human Development African Development Bank Agnes Soucat, MD, Ph.D Director Department.
Fiscal Decentralization and Links to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
Public Expenditure Tracking and Service Delivery Surveys Qualidade do Gasto Publico no Brasil June 26-27, 2003 Ritva Reinikka Development Research Group,
Making Services Work for Poor People Shanta Devarajan World Bank.
Boiling it down to politics: Evidence from federalism in India (and thoughts on local decentralization across the world) Stuti Khemani Development Research.
The Economics of “Fiscal Space” Shanta Devarajan World Bank.
Decentralization in Social Sectors 1. Overview - Donald Winkler (LCSHD) 2. Institutional Issues in Education and Community Empowerment - Andrei Markov.
1 World Health Organization, Geneva Human Resources for Scaling Up HIV/AIDS Interventions Evidence and Information for Policy Barbara Stilwell, Coordinator,
Framework for Fiscal Decentralization Professor Roy Bahl Georgia State University
Defining a good governance assessment framework Decentralisation and local governance Shipra Narang Suri International Consultant, OGC Stakeholders’ Consultative.
Local Governance and Accountability for Health Services in Nigeria International Conference on Governance and Accountability in Social Sector Decentralization.
1 DECENTRALIZATION & LOCALIZING THE MDGs Hachemi Bahloul Local Governance Policy Adviser UNDP Bratislava Joint Sub-Regional Communities of Practice Meeting.
Page1 Decentralization of Functions International Conference on Governance and Accountability in Social Sector Decentralization Dana Weist
World development report 2004 Making Services Work for Poor People.
Addressing Financial Needs. What is the best investment we can make for India ’ s future? “ The development of children is the first priority on the country.
Local level governance and schooling in decentralizing Indonesia Vivi Alatas (EASPR) and Deon Filmer (DECRG) Conference on Governance and Accountability.
Political Economy and Results Based Financing: Client’s Power, Voice, and the challenge of monitoring Agnes Soucat, World Bank and Gaston Sorgho, World.
Public Expenditure and Service Delivery in Papua New Guinea Deon Filmer Development Research Group The World Bank IWGE January
Managing Public Budget to Facilitate Economic Growth and Reduce Poverty Public Expenditure Analysis & Management Staff Training Course May , 2001.
Federal Politics and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the states of India Stuti Khemani Development Research Group, The World Bank Macro Seminar, September.
Targeting of Public Spending Menno Pradhan Senior Poverty Economist The World Bank office, Jakarta.
Fiscal rules for sub-central governments – a Norwegian perspective Rune J. Sørensen Norwegian School of Management (BI), Oslo, Norway
Public Expenditures in Health. Main Principles Establish Market Failures Identify beneficiaries of expenditures Balance potential benefits with ability.
Economic Analysis of Education: Public-Private Roles E. Jimenez March 2008.
Making services work for poor people: What’s decentralization got to do with it? World Development Report 2004 Shanta Devarajan and Shekhar Shah Decentralization.
Institutional and Governance Reviews and the Role of Political Economy Analysis in Operations Philip Keefer DECRG Flagship Course on Governance and Anti-corruption.
1 Decentralization for better service delivery Regional Seminar on Poverty Analysis and Data Initiative (PADI) Jasmin Chakeri Consultant World Bank Office,
EQUALIZATION IN THE INTERGOVERNMEN TAL TRANSFER SYSTEM ROY BAHL Regents Professor of Economics, Emeritus Georgia State University September, 2015 Manila.
Making Services Work for the Poor in Rwanda. WDR04 Messages Services are failing poor people. But they can work. How? By empowering poor people to –Monitor.
Political Economy and Results Based Financing: Client’s Power, Voice, and the challenge of monitoring Agnes Soucat, World Bank and Gaston Sorgho, World.
Public Expenditure Tracking and Service Delivery Surveys 11 th International Anti-Corruption Conference Seoul May 26, 2003 Magnus Lindelow Development.
Framework for Expenditure Assignment Decentralization and Intergovernmental Fiscal Reform 24 March 2003 Dana Weist PRMPS.
Governance in Central and Eastern Europe Cheryl W. Gray Europe and Central Asia Region World Bank.
Page1 Intergovernmental Aspects of Service Delivery Public Expenditure for Human Development Course Dana Weist PRMPS 12 November 2003.
Gender, Health and Poverty: Critical Factors Beyond the Health Sector Arlette Campbell White World Bank Institute.
Evaluating Social Funds: A Cross- Country Analysis of Community Investments February 2004 Laura Rawlings, Lynne Sherburne-Benz, Julie Van Domelen.
EDUCATION AND THE PUBLIC BUDGET Emmanuel Jimenez Budgetary Processes & Public Expenditure Course May 2000.
Making Services Work for Poor People
NS4540 Winter Term 2017 Latin America: Income Distribution
DECENTRALIZATION IN ALBANIA
Institutional Networks and Community-driven Adaptation and Mitigation
Government’s Role in Economy
Global Experience And Framework For Fiscal Decentralization
Making Services Work for Poor People
NS4540 Winter Term 2019 Latin America: Income Distribution
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys(PETS)
Measurement Matters: The Use of PETS and QSDS
Presentation transcript:

Decentralization and service delivery

The problem Disappointing health and education outcomes, especially for poor people

Outcomes are worse for poor people Deaths per 1000 births Source: Analysis of Demographic and Health Survey data

Outcomes are worse for poor people Percent aged 15 to 19 completing each grade or higher Source: Analysis of Demographic and Health Survey data

The problem Disappointing health and education outcomes, especially for poor people Increasing public spending is not enough

* Percent deviation from rate predicted by GDP per capita Source: Spending and GDP from World Development Indicators database. School completion from Bruns, Mingat and Rakatomalala 2003

Increasing public spending is not enough * Percent deviation from rate predicted by GDP per capita Source: Spending and GDP from World Development Indicators database. Under-5 mortality from Unicef 2002

The problem Disappointing health and education outcomes, especially for poor people Increasing public spending is not enough Services failing poor people at local levels

Resources fail to reach frontline service providers –Bulky state administrations soak up bulk of the resources –Leakage: in Uganda, only 13 percent of non- wage recurrent spending on primary education reached primary schools –Mismanagement: in Nigeria, community health workers often don’t get paid The real problem for policy: Services failing poor people

The real problem for policy: Services failing poor people Service quality is low for poor people –Bangladesh: Absenteeism rates for doctors in primary health care centers: 74 percent –Zimbabwe: 13 percent of respondents gave as a reason for not delivering babies in public facilities that “nurses hit mothers during delivery” –Guinea: 70 percent of government drugs disappeared

The solution: Decentralize? Increasing accountability for local services Decentralization to locally elected governments—analyzing potential impact within a framework of accountability

Poor peopleProviders A framework of relationships of accountability

Poor peopleProviders Policymakers A framework of relationships of accountability

Mexico’s PRONASOL, Large social assistance program (1.2 percent of GDP) Water, sanitation, electricity and education construction to poor communities Limited poverty impact –Reduced poverty by 3 percent –If better targeted, could have reduced it by 64 percent

PRONASOL expenditures according to party in municipal government Source: Estevez, Magaloni and Diaz-Cayeros 2002

Poor peopleProviders Policymakers A framework of relationships of accountability

Absence rate among teachers CountryRate (percent) Ecuador16 India25 Indonesia18 Papua New Guinea15 Peru13 Zambia17 Uganda26

Poor peopleProviders National policymakers Decentralized service delivery Local policymakers

Poor peopleProviders National policymakers Fiscal issues Local policymakers

Fiscal Issues Expenditure assignments –Loss of economies of scale –Concurrent responsibilities can lead to duplication, confusion, and evasion Financing—tax assignments, intergovernmental transfers, borrowing –Soft budget constraints –Tax inefficiencies and inequities –Political distortions in resource distribution

Poor peopleProviders National policymakers Administrative responsibilities Local policymakers

Poor peopleProviders National policymakers Capacity constraints Local policymakers

Poor peopleProviders National policymakers Political issues Local policymakers

Political Issues Why do services fail poor people even in democracies where politicians depend upon their support to gain and remain in office? Political market imperfections –Information constraints –Social polarization –Credibility of political promises

Do information problems improve with decentralization? Voters better informed about local public goods Easier to monitor local services Easier to coordinate rewards/ punishments when policy dimensionality is reduced In Uganda and the Philippines, voters rely on local social networks for information about local govts., and on national newspapers for national govts. In Nigeria, uncertainty about fiscal resources available to local govts. In India, voters hold state governments responsible for local services

Does social polarization reduce with decentralization? Decentralized units more homogeneous Some local communities even more polarized (within-village inequality in India very high) Local elites find it easier to mobilize and “capture” public resources

Does political credibility increase with decentralization? Proximity and reputation breed credibility In young democracies, politicians build credibility by targeting their “clients” Combination of social polarization and young democracy make local politics particularly “clientelistic”

Political Issues Why do services fail poor people even in democracies where politicians depend upon their support to gain and remain in office? Political market imperfections –Information constraints –Social polarization –Credibility of political promises Political Institutions and Electoral Rules

Non-pivotal/non- swing voters get neglected under centralization (Eg. Bolivia) Lower barriers to entry increases political competition National political parties determine objectives and incentives of local governments Proportional representation and district magnitude more significant determinants of service delivery incentives

Poor peopleProviders National policymakers Transition dilemmas Local policymakers

EDUCO Program in El Salvador Parents’ associations (ACEs) –Hire and fire teachers –Visit schools on regular basis –Contract with Ministry of Education to deliver primary education

EDUCO promoted parental involvement… Source: Adapted from Jimenez and Sawada 1999 …which boosts student performance

Conclusion Services fail when accountability breaks down Decentralization can overcome or exacerbate accountability failures Institutional design should address political market imperfections: -- provide more relevant information -- de-emphasize social polarization -- build credibility for public services