Fire Resistance of the Load Bearing Structure of High Bay and Instrument Halls Fire and Egress Safety Analysis of the Instrument Halls Björn Yndemark WSP.

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Fire Resistance of the Load Bearing Structure of High Bay and Instrument Halls Fire and Egress Safety Analysis of the Instrument Halls Björn Yndemark WSP Fire & Risk Oct, 2015

Aim and Objective  The aim of the analysis is to determine fire resistance of the structural elements in the High Bay and in the Instrumental Halls.  This includes:  Determining whether flashover might occur.  Measuring ceiling/local temperature from calculations and simulations of fires.  Determining safe distances and safe fire load to prevent flash over or local critical temperatures. 2

Yes,… for some very rare cases. Not applicable for High Bay and Instrumental Halls. No Yes Natural Fire Exposure Classification ISO 834 Yes Reduced / No Protection Fully developed fire No Can a flashover occur? Can the consequences of a collaps be accepted? Local fire Reduced / no protection

No,…. EKS kap § If it can be verified that a flashover cannot occur it is allowed to design the load bearing structure of the buidling according to the exposure from a local fire. In the High Bay and the Instrument Halls this might be possible due to the large volume. EKS § The fire scenario and the heat production from the local fire shall be calculated due to the expected conditions in the building. The hight and location of the fire load should be taken into account. No Yes Natural Fire Exposure Classification ISO 834 Yes Reduced/ No Protection Fully Developed Fire No Can a flashover occur? Can the consequences of a collaps be accepted? Local Fire Do not forget the impact from flames Local Fire (Natural Fire Exposure)

Local Fire

EKS §6 When designing according to classification (nominal temperature-time curves) structural elements shall be designed in a way that a collaps will not occur in a certain time period (according to table C-7). –Tests according to SS-EN (ISO 834), –Calculations based on the same nominal temperature-time curve, or –A combination of tests and calculations above No Yes Natural Fire Exposure Classifiaction ISO 834 Yes Reduced/ No Protection Fully developed fire No Can a flashover occur? Can the consequences of a collaps be accepted? Local Fire Klassificering utifrån ISO 834

Classification ISO 834 (EKS kap §6)

EKS §8 The temperature development shall be calculated by using energy and mass balance equations. The model described in i SS EN , appendix A must be used. No Yes Natural Fire Exposure Classifiaction ISO 834 Yes Reduced/ No Protection Fully developed fire No Can a flashover occur? Can the consequences of a collaps be accepted? Local Fire Natural Fire Exposure (fully delevoped fire)

Experimental Halls

High Bay

No,…. EKS kap § If it can be verified that a flashover cannot occur it is allowed to design the load bearing structure of the buidling according to the exposure from a local fire. In the High Bay and the Instrument Halls this might be possible due to the large volume. EKS § The fire scenario and the heat production from the local fire shall be calculated due to the expected conditions in the building. The hight and location of the fire load should be taken into account. No Yes Natural Fire Exposure Classification ISO 834 Yes Reduced/ No Protection Fully Developed Fire No Can a flashover occur? Can the consequences of a collaps be accepted? Local Fire Local Fire (Natural Fire Exposure)

Flashover 12

Critical Temperature of Hot Gas Layer 13

Computational Fluid Dynamics Fire Dynamics Simulator: High Bay Simulation (30 MW Truck fire) 14

Computational Fluid Dynamics Fire Dynamics Simulator: High Bay Simulation (30 MW Truck fire) 15

Computational Fluid Dynamics Fire Dynamics Simulator: High Bay Simulation (30 MW Truck fire) 16

Computational Fluid Dynamics Fire Dynamics Simulator: High Bay Simulation (30 MW Truck fire) 17

No,…. EKS kap § If it can be verified that a flashover cannot occur it is allowed to design the load bearing structure of the buidling according to the exposure from a local fire. In the High Bay and the Instrument Halls this might be possible due to the large volume. EKS § The fire scenario and the heat production from the local fire shall be calculated due to the exptected conditions in the building. The hight and location of the fire load should be taken into account. No Yes Natural Fire Exposure Classification ISO 834 Yes Reduced/ No Protection Fully Developed Fire No Can a flashover occur? Can the consequences of a collaps be accepted? Local Fire Include the impact from flames Local Fire (Natural Fire Exposure)

Critical Steel Temperature  Maximum load utilization for the steel structure : 80 % According to SS-EN :2005 (table 4.1) this means:  Critical steel temperature: 496 °C 19

Computational Fluid Dynamics Fire Dynamics Simulator: High Bay Simulation (30 MW Truck fire) 20

Safe distance from fire load Local fire effect on supporting steel girders: 21

Conclusions  Flashover will not occur.  Design according to a local fire is acceptable.  Two main scenarios:  Truck in the loading area  Cables in the High Bay  The mean flame length in case of a truck fire is calculated to 6.6 m, which on top of a truck still leaves 18 m to the steel construction. The temperature of the smoke plume is calculated to 102 °C at the height of the steel beams (hand calculations).  In the case of a truck fire burning in steady-state with 30 MW, the highest temperature of the hot gas layer is achieved closest to the ceiling directly above the fire, where it reaches 375 °C. The mean temperature of the hot gas layer is around 260 °C at this time (CFD).  A fire in a cable tray is estimated to a HRR of 700 kW (200 kW/m2). The flame length of such a fire is calculated to 2.5 m, and the smoke plume reaches a temperature of 496 °C (the critical temperature of the steel beam) at 2.6 m above the fire source (i.e. close to the mean flame length).

Conclusions  Steel columns must be protected (R60)  Steel beams can be unprotected (R0)

Fire and Egress Safety Analysis 24 The Swedish Building and Planning Authority (Boverket) "Guidelines on analytical design for fire protection of buildings" (BBRAD) Objective: Required Safe Egress Time < Available Safe Egress Time

Fire and Egress Safety Analysis 25 Total egress time (t t ): t t = t a + t p + t m t a = time until people become aware of the fire t p = pre-movement time t m = movement time

Fire and Egress Safety Analysis Awareness time:  Activated fire alarm?  Visible smoke?  Smell of smoke? 2. Pre-movement time:  Information seeking  Group behavior  Training  Perceived threat 3. Movement time:  Distance  Door width  Occupant density (queuing)  Familiarity with the building  Speed of movement (~1,5 m/s horizontally)

Fire and Egress Safety Analysis 27 Available Safe Egress Time:  Smoke layer height  Visibility 2,0 metres above floor level  Toxicity 2,0 metres above floor level  Temperature  Heat radiation

Fire and Egress Safety Analysis 28 Fire location Experiment hall 1 Fire location Experiment hall 3  CFD-simulations to determine available safe egress time.

Fire and Egress Safety Analysis  In accordance with BBRAD the following fire and egress scenarios should be analysed: 1.Transient t-squared fire (high strain, all systems work). The sprinkler system is functional. After sprinkler activation the HRR is kept constant for one minute. Subsequently the HRR is decreased to one third linearly during the next minute. 2.Transient t-squared fire. Sprinkler is not operating. The HRR is kept growing until it reaches the maximum value of 2 MW and is subsequently kept constant at the maximum value. 3.The same scenario as scenario 1 with the exception that the evacuation alarm is not functional. BBRAD does not give a clear indication of the maximum HRR for scenario 1 for the current type of facility.

Scenarios according to BBRAD

Fire and Egress Safety Analysis In our analysis BBRAD has not been fully applied. Instead, conservative parameters have been used in the calculated scenarios: 1.Transient t-squared fire. The sprinkler system is not taken into account in this design scenario, which is very conservative. In Experiment hall 1 och 2 maximum HRR is 30 MW representing a fire in a heavy goods vehicle. 2.The same scenario as scenario 1 with the expectance that the evacuation alarm is malfunctioning.

Scenario in the analysis

Fire and Egress Safety Analysis 33  Is required safe egress time less than available safe egress time?

Fire and Egress Safety Analysis 34 Scenario Fire alarm system working Awareness time [s] Pre movement time [s] Movement time [s] RSET [s] Experiment hall 1 Yes No Experiment hall 2 Yes No Experiment hall 3 Yes No Scenario Fire alarm system working RSET [s]ASET [s]The time margin for safe egress [s] Experiment hall 1Yes No Experiment hall 2Yes No Experiment hall 3 Yes No