Comparative Political Economics Paolo Graziano Lecture 6

The Process of WS Adaptation power concentration in the executive is often empirically associated to ‘big’ welfare states that can be reformed more easily fragmented systems are arenas where numerous ‘veto points’ have (limited) reform potential: too many actors - with specific and contrasting preferences - are involved

Power concentration: UK 1986 pension reform: example of ‘privatisation’ strong power of the Conservative Party (in both the executive and the legislative) single-member constituencies electoral system (with wide Conservative majorities) means difficult electoral ‘punishment’ result: from state to market pension system

Power concentration: Switzerland pension reform (1995): case of ‘success’ (trade unions and Social Democrats were divided and a referendum against the reform failed) unemployment insurance reform (1995): case of success due to ‘incremental’ and ‘negotiated’ type of changes unemployment insurance reform (1997): case of failure

Power fragmentation: France private sector pension reform (1993): success with ‘cohabitation’ (Mitterand- Balladur) public sector pension reform (plan Juppé, 1995): case of failure due to a too radical change proposal by a ‘strong’ government unemployment insurance reform (1997): case of failure

Explaining WS reforms or WS immobilism power concentration: some explanatory potential (especially in the medium/long term); it does not have a fixed feature, but it is something that can change over time structure of labour movements: great explanatory potential - capacity to mobilize workers and organize protest events presence of institutional veto points (such as referenda): good explanatory potential