© European Communities, 2011 Contact Dr. Sandra M. Dingli The Edward de Bono Institute, University of Malta Tel ; INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY FORESIGHT Dr. Sandra M. Dingli, University of Malta A theoretical underpinning for what counts as valid knowledge in foresight and FTA is urgently required. A clear deliniation of the epistemology of foresight could provide the justification required for increased legitimacy to the knowledge claims made by practitioners with the consequence that ‘buy-in’ from experts, policy makers, funding agencies and stakeholders would posses increased conviction and augment integrity. University of Malta Some questions which arise: Is it possible to argue for an epistemology of foresight? Is it possible to provide epistemological justification for knowledge obtained from foresight? Does technological foresight give rise to knowledge? Does ‘learning’ constitute ‘knowledge’? Is truth merely indicative? Or could it be considered as ‘socially constructed’? Does this apply to all disciplines or only to disciplines which are ‘uncertain’ because of their future orientation? Helmer and Rescher (1959) provided an interesting discussion on the possibility of knowledge and the inexact sciences in a paper entitled ‘On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences’. They acknowledged that: ‘While the value of scientific prediction for sound decision making is beyond question, it can hardly be claimed that the inexact sciences have the situation regarding the use of predictive expertise well in hand. Quite to the contrary,... significant improvements are possible in the predictive instruments available to the decision maker. These improvements are contingent on the development of methods for the more effective predictive use of expert judgment.’ (1959: 41) The value of considering a ‘prediction’ or future ‘illusion’ may raise questions about whether the results of foresight practice constitute knowledge or not. If the ideas, scenarios, visions, strategies or goals are based on the medium to long term future, are they of any value from an epistemological point of view? One claim is that ‘epistemological work also clarifies and catalogs the growing body of validated and socially discovered, not socially invented knowledge about the universe.’ (Acceleration Watch, 2006) Moreover, while untested and presently unverifiable belief is an element of all knowledge acquisition (epistemology), a commitment to the testing (where possible) and minimization (where feasible) of such belief is a generally accepted principle in both scientific and scholarly inquiry. Thus some belief-driven futurists, including those religious futurists, astrologers, mystics, and others whose work extensively utilizes personal revelation rather than logic or empiricism, would also not fall within a consensus definition of the futures studies term, as used by most practitioners. Perhaps the most critical issue in whether a belief system promotes or hinders foresight is whether it encourages or closes one off to evidence-based thinking. (Acceleration Watch, 2006) ‘One widely accepted branch of modern epistemological theory holds that knowledge results from the building of simplified mental models of reality in order to solve problems. The ‘validity’ of a model (or knowledge) emanates from its utility in problem solving. This approach seems sufficient for our purposes. Knowledge is a practical human response to the challenges of our environment. Valid knowledge is that which has sufficient practical correspondence to our environment to be useful for problem solving.’ (Rubel, 2006: ) ‘Here [in epistemological futures work] Futures Studies merges into the foundational areas that feed into the futures enterprise and provide part of its substantive basis. Hence what has been termed the ‘social construction of reality’ philosophy, ontology, macrohistory, the study of time, cosmology, etc. are all relevant at this level. It is here that the deepest and, perhaps, the most powerful forms of futures enquiry operate.’ (Slaughter, 2003: 27) Reflection on epistemological aspects implies a metacognitive perspective which could inform and improve practice. This perspective gives rise to the view that knowledge claims which result from foresight practice possess elements of validity, in spite of the fact that they may also be viewed as ‘socially constructed’, yet there are numerous socially constructed concepts which we take as providing valid knowledge claims in many spheres of life. ‘Valid knowledge can emerge from war games, but only if due diligence is applied. That diligence is considerably hampered today because war gaming is a craft or an art, not a true profession, a discipline. Much more work must be done. Those who believe in the value of games must now link up and work toward the goal of truly professional war gaming.’ (Rubel, 2006: 127) A metacognitive perspective of foresight considered from an epistemological perspective gives rise to the view that knowledge claims which result from foresight practice possess elements of validity in spite of the fact that they may also be viewed as ‘socially constructed’. Yet, as Rubel and Helmer and Rescher have demonstrated, there are numerous socially constructed concepts which are taken to provide valid knowledge claims in many spheres of life.