Operating Guide and Planning Guide Revision Requests Blake Williams, ROS Chair September 13, 2012.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Project Definition of Bulk Electric System & Bulk Electric System Rules of Procedure Development Presenter: Peter Heidrich, FRCC – BES Drafting.
Advertisements

Goshen Area Bus Reconfiguration
Tucson Area Reliability Mike Flores Control Area Operations Tucson Electric Power May 2000.
Recent ERCOT Events Lessons Learned
Real-Time Transmission Congestion Management & Market Effects
ERCOT Compliance Audits Robert Potts Sr. Reliability Analyst March 23, 2005.
B O N N E V I L L E P O W E R A D M I N I S T R A T I O N 1 Network Operating Committee (NOC) June 12 th, 2014.
Determine Facility Ratings, SOLs and Transfer Capabilities Paul Johnson Chair of the Determine Facility Ratings Standard Drafting Team An Overview of the.
Costs of Ancillary Services & Congestion Management Fedor Opadchiy Deputy Chairman of the Board.
ERCOT SOL Methodology for the Planning and Operations Horizons Stephen Solis 2014 OTS 1.
Applying the Distribution System in Grid Restoration/NERC CIP-014 Risk Assessment Srijib Mukherjee, Ph.D., P.E. UC Synergetic.
December 7, 2012 ERCOT Planning Horizon SOL Methodology Update Jeff Billo RPG.
Peak RCCo Performance Metrics Draft –November 2013.
POWER SYSTEM PLANNING CHARTER AND PROCESSES Presentation to TAC 10/09/2003 KENNETH A. DONOHOO, P.E. Manager of System Planning Transmission Services
1. 2 NERC Bulk Electric System (BES) Definition (NERC Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Standards) FERC Order 693 FRCC Handbook Review Task Force.
Reliability Requirements Bill Blevins Manager of Operations Support ERCOT.
SPS policy – Information Presentation Presentation to ROS June 16, 2004.
CRR Auction Scope John Moseley. To outline aspects of the CRR market process to assure that these proposed CRR market protocols (as interpreted by ERCOT.
Enhancing Reliability of the North American Transmission Grid Enhancing Reliability of the North American Transmission Grid Presented By Dejan J Sobajic.
SIMPLE TRANSMISSION OUTAGE. Nodal Protocol Definition 2.26 Simple Transmission Outage A Planned Outage or Maintenance Outage of any Transmission Element.
Generation assets important to the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System What does this mean?
ERCOT PUBLIC 4/21/ RTP: Cascade Analysis April 21, 2015.
Chad Thompson, ERCOT Special ROS PGRR011 Workshop October 21 st, 2011 SCED Overview and Results.
Responding to post contingency overloads, IROL’s and SOL’s Art Gardiner – CPS Energy Steve Rainwater - LCRA 1.
Transmission Outage Process April Purpose In compliance with the Protocols and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) Operating Guides,
© Property of ERCOT /17/20041 RTCA, CAM, and SFT Presented by: John Adams November 17, 2004.
– 1Texas Nodal Texas Nodal Electrical Buses – 2Texas Nodal Electrical Bus Definition as Proposed in NPRR 63 Electrical Bus A physical transmission element.
Distributed Generation Registration June 30, 2008.
TRANSMISSION CONSTRAINTS KENNETH A. DONOHOO, P.E. Manager of System Planning, Technical Operations
NDSWG Report June 16, NDSWG Report Regular meeting held May 16 in Taylor Telemetry / State Estimator Update Naming Convention Electrical Bus Designation.
ERCOT Guideline for Interim Updates to the Network Operations Model Excerpted from the “Modeling Expectations” whitepaper D.W. Rickerson.
October 29, 2012 RARF Workshop 2 Introduction to ERCOT Modeling Process Jay Teixeira Manager, Model Administration.
Current Operational Challenges Computing the West – North Limits Potential IROLs Local Voltage & Thermal issue (OOME) High Voltage Outages.
ERCOT ROS Planning Working Group (PLWG) Scope Approved at ROS Meeting.
Scheduling and Operating Transmission Devices in the Nodal Environment.
© CONSTELLATION ENERGY GROUP, INC. THE OFFERING DESCRIBED IN THIS PRESENTATION IS SOLD AND CONTRACTED BY CONSTELLATION NEWENERGY, INC., A SUBSIDIARY.
Planning for Texas’ Energy Future Select Committee on Electric Generation Capacity and Environmental Effects Bob Kahn President & CEO February 6, 2008.
Role of Account Management at ERCOT 2006 TAC Subcommittee Review ERCOT Board February 21, 2006.
OPSTF – Issue 7 Long-term unavailability of autotransformers.
POWER SYSTEM PLANNING CHARTER AND PROCESSES Presentation to TAC May 6, 2004 Transmission Services Ken Donohoo, Manager of System Planning Dan Woodfin,
Joint PLWG/CMWG Assignment Update to ROS September 15, 2011.
ERCOT Transmission Planning Process Overview and Recommendations November 6, 2002.
Transition Plan Network Operations Model Change Requests 5/26/2010.
Current Nodal OS Design 1.The NMMS database will have an OWNER and an OPERATOR designation for each piece of equipment in the model. The OWNER and OPERATOR.
1 CenterPoint Energy presentation to TAC regarding the NMMS April 7, 2006.
June 26, 2008 Technical Advisory Committee American Electric Power Service Corporation Presidio Area Reliability Improvements Project James Teixeira Manager,
Day-Ahead Market Discussion/Clarification TPTF April 24, 2006.
Voltage Control Brad Calhoun Consultant, Sr. Trainer Spring 2016.
ROS Meeting – 06/12/081Texas Nodal Program - TPTF Update Texas Nodal Transition Plan Task Force ROS Meeting Stacy Bridges, ERCOT Thursday, 06/12/08.
TPTF Update Trip Doggett TAC March 9, TPTF Update Meetings February 6 & 7, February 20 Attendance approximately 40 Completed review of ERCOT’s clarification.
1 NPCC – A-2 Dr. Mayer Sasson Transmission Planning Consolidated Edison of New York June 1, 2006 Presented to the NYSRC-RRS.
Texas Nodal Electrical Buses and Outage Scheduling.
Nodal Planning Go Live Austin, TX February 3, 2011
Project WECC-0100 Standards Briefing WECC-0100 SDT April 7, 2016 W ESTERN E LECTRICITY C OORDINATING C OUNCIL.
Information Needed By All Market Participants To Facilitate Transmission Congestion Studies In ERCOT Presented to the ERCOT ROS by Shannon Caraway, P.E.
Reliability Must Run Workshop RMR Study Process May 24, 2016.
Modeled Load Levels in the Valley
Transmission Planning in ERCOT- Overview
Barrilla Junction Area Transmission Improvements Project
PLWG Review 6.9 and the Interconnection process
Southern Cross Directives Planning Items
Phase Angle Limitations
Modifications to Planning Charter
Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC
Grid Integration of Intermittent Resources
Reliability and Operations Subcommittee Report
Project WECC-0100 Update Load Modeling Task Force
Presenter: Peter Heidrich, FRCC – BES Drafting Team Chair
TONBRIDGE POWER GREEN LINE
Project WECC-0100 Update Load Modeling Task Force
Presentation transcript:

Operating Guide and Planning Guide Revision Requests Blake Williams, ROS Chair September 13, 2012

Agenda Credible Single Contingency Operations Studies/Analyses Operations Contingencies Operations Reliability Criteria Redundant Security Criteria Outage Coordination Requirements TSP Provision of Contingencies Directives

“Credible Single Contingency” Credible Single Contingency for Transmission Planning (1)A single facility, comprised of transmission line, auto transformer, or other associated pieces of equipment. This includes multiple equipment Outaged or interrupted during a single fault (SFME). Credible Single Contingency for Operations Planning (1)A single facility, comprised of transmission line, auto transformer, or other associated pieces of equipment. This includes multiple equipment Outaged or interrupted during a single fault (single fault multiple element (SFME)).

“Credible Single Contingency” Credible Single Contingency for Transmission Planning (2)The Forced Outage of a DCKT in excess of 0.5 miles in length (either without a fault or subsequent to a normally-cleared non-three-phase fault) with all other facilities normal. Credible Single Contingency for Operations Planning (2)The Forced Outage of a double-circuit transmission line (DCKT) in excess of 0.5 miles in length will always be considered a credible single contingency for all security constrained unit commitment decisions. The Forced Outage of a DCKT in excess of 0.5 miles in length will only be considered a credible single contingency for energy deployment decisions for any of the following operating conditions characterized by high DCKT Outage probability or consequence: (a)High Outage Probability: (b)High Outage Consequence:

“Credible Single Contingency” Credible Single Contingency for Transmission Planning (3)Any Generation Resource: (a)A combined-cycle facility shall be considered a single Generation Resource; or (b)Each unit of a combined-cycle facility will be considered a single Generation Resource if the combustion turbine and the steam turbine can operate separately, as stated in the Resource registration on the Market Information System (MIS) Public Area. Credible Single Contingency for Operations Planning (3)Any Generation Resource: (a)A combined-cycle facility shall be considered a single Generation Resource; or (b)Each unit of a combined-cycle facility will be considered a single Generation Resource if the combustion turbine and the steam turbine can operate separately, as stated in the Resource registration on the Market Information System (MIS) Public Area.

“Credible Single Contingency” Credible Single Contingency for Transmission Planning (4)With any single Generation Resource unavailable, and with any other generation preemptively redispatched, the contingency loss of a single Transmission Facility (either without a fault or subsequent to a normally- cleared non-three-phase fault) with all other facilities normal. Credible Single Contingency for Operations Planning (4)With any single Generation Resource unavailable, and with any other generation preemptively redispatched, the contingency loss of a single Transmission Facility (either without a fault or subsequent to a normally- cleared non-three-phase fault) with all other facilities normal should not cause the following: (a) Cascading or uncontrolled Outages; (b)Instability of Generation Resources at multiple plant locations; or (c) Interruption of service to firm demand or generation other than that isolated by the transmission facility, following the execution of all automatic operating actions such as relaying and Special Protection Systems (SPSs). Furthermore, the loss should result in no damage to or failure of equipment and, following the execution of specific non-automatic predefined operator- directed actions (i.e., RAPs) such as generation schedule changes or curtailment of interruptible Load, should not result in applicable voltage or thermal ratings being exceeded.

“Credible Single Contingency” Transmission Facilities (1)Power lines, substations, and associated facilities, operated at 60 kV or above, including radial lines operated at or above 60 kV; (2)Substation facilities on the high voltage side of the transformer, in a substation where power is transformed from a voltage higher than 60 kV to a voltage lower than 60 kV (DISTRIBUTION SUBSTATION) or is transformed from a voltage lower than 60 kV to a voltage higher than 60 Kv (GENERATION SWITCHYARD); and (3)The direct current interconnections between ERCOT and the Southwest Power Pool or Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE).

“Credible Single Contingency” Credible Single Contingency for Transmission Planning (5)Single contingency conditions defined in North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Reliability Standards and any subsequent revisions.

Operations Studies/Analyses operational ERCOT Transmission Grid reliability studies load flows and security analyses reliability planning contingency analyses planning and engineering studies Day-Ahead studies Real-Time security analyses sound engineering studies Real-Time and short term planning

Operations Contingencies Credible Single Contingency first contingency conditions “Contingency” (N-1) conditions

Operations Reliability Criteria as needed to maintain reliability credible N-1 criteria N-1 criteria maintain reliable operations post-contingency voltages within post contingency limits “First Contingency” (N-1) transfer limits severely overloaded significant impact on the reliability “First Contingency” (N-1) Criteria security criteria established in the Protocols and these Operating Guides

Redundant Security Criteria Security Criteria (1)Technical limits established for the operation of transmission equipment shall be applied consistently in planning and engineering studies, Congestion Revenue Rights (CRRs), Day-Ahead studies, Real-Time security analyses, and operator actions. (2)Unless an Emergency Condition has been declared by ERCOT, the ERCOT System shall be operated in such a manner that the occurrence of a Credible Single Contingency will not cause any of the following conditions: (a)Uncontrolled breakup of the ERCOT Transmission Grid; (b)Loading of Transmission Facilities above defined Emergency Ratings that cannot be eliminated in time to prevent damage or failure following the loss through execution of specific, predefined operating procedures; (c)Transmission voltage levels outside system design limits that cannot be corrected through execution of specific, predefined operating procedures before voltage instability or collapse occurs; or (d)Customer Outages, except for high set interruptible and radially served loads. 4.3Operation to Maintain Transmission System Security (1)ERCOT Operators are responsible for operating the ERCOT System within “First Contingency” (N-1) transfer limits so that there is no overload of any significant Transmission Element whose loss could jeopardize the reliability of the ERCOT System. Whenever the ERCOT System is not engaged in emergency operation, it will be operated in such a manner that the occurrence of a Credible Single Contingency will not cause any of the following: (a)Uncontrolled breakup of the transmission system; (b)Loading of Transmission Facilities above defined Emergency Ratings which can not be eliminated in time to prevent damage or failure following the loss through execution of specific, predefined operating procedures; (c)Transmission voltage levels outside system design limits which can not be corrected through execution of specific, predefined operating procedures before voltage instability or collapse occurs; or (d)Customer Outages, except for high set interruptible and radially served loads.

Outage Coordination Requirements 2.4Outage Coordination For Outage coordination details, reference Protocol Section 3.1, Outage Coordination and the ERCOT Market Information System (MIS) Secure Area.

TSP Provision of Contingencies 5Network Operations Modeling Requirements 5.1System Modeling Information Information on existing and future ERCOT System components and topology is necessary for ERCOT to create databases and perform tests as outlined in these criteria. To ensure that such information is made available to ERCOT, the following actions by Market Participants are required:

ROS Chair Directive to PLWG Continue efforts to reformat the Transmission Planning Criteria in Section 4 of the Planning Guide: Credible Single Contingency – Eliminate the use of Credible Single Contingency for Transmission Planning by explicitly stating system conditions, contingencies and performance requirements in the Planning Guide; or – Modify the definition to accurately state the contingencies. Consider renaming the defined term from Credible Single Contingency… to Planning Contingencies. Structure the criteria such that it is clearly understood and can easily be modified to incorporate ROS-directed OPSTF Issues. Only substantive changes to reflect current practices should be included.

ROS Chair Directive to NDSWG Work with ERCOT and OWG to revise the Nodal Operating Guides: Modify the definition of Credible Single Contingency for Operations Planning to accurately state the contingencies. Consider changing the defined term from Credible Single Contingency… to Credible Contingencies… or Operations Contingencies. Explicitly state applicable operations studies or analyses. Consider use of defined terms. Also consider revising applicable sections of the Nodal Protocols for consistency. Explicitly state applicable operations contingencies or use newly defined Credible Single Contingency term. Also consider revising applicable sections of the Nodal Protocols for consistency. Explicitly state applicable reliability criteria or reference Section – Security Criteria. Also consider revising applicable sections of the Nodal Protocols for consistency. Consider removing the redundantly stated security criteria in Section 4.3 – Operation to Maintain Transmission System Security. Consider expansion of Section 2.4 – Outage Coordination to provide guidance/requirements for outage studies. Consider addition of requirements for TSP provision of contingencies in Section 5.1 – System Modeling Information. Only substantive changes to reflect current practices should be included.