Political Science Eric Keels Ph.D. Candidate Department of Political Science University of North Texas Post-War Electoral Reform and Peace Duration Following Negotiated Settlements

Political Science Building Peace after Civil Wars  Negotiated settlements are often unstable  Post-civil war peacebuilding and civil war recurrence o Peacebuilding security objectives o Successful Agreements  Reduce Commitment Problems (Walter 2002; Fortna 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003)  Share Information (Mattes and Savun 2010)  Raise costs for Defection (Mattes and Savun 2009) o Peacebuilding and democratization  Incompatibility between security and democracy objectives

Political Science War-to-Democracy Dilemma  Democratization may generate post-civil war instability o Paris (2004), Jarstad and Sisk (2008), Autesserre (2009), Brancati and Snyder (2013)  Democracy objectives may undermine post-war security  Security objectives may undermine post-war democracy  How can post-war governments maintain security while instituting democratic reforms?

Political Science False Dichotomy  Post-Civil War Democratization and Security o Joshi et al (2015)  Primary focus on elections rather than democracy more broadly o Democracy Requires:  Broad participation  Open competition  Meaningful translation of votes into national representation

Political Science Theory: Electoral Reform and Peace Duration  Revisions to electoral laws act as a signal to opponents that the incumbent government is committed to the peace process  Revisions to electoral laws make it more difficult for dissidents to renege on peace process

Political Science Theory: Electoral Laws  Electoral laws have historically been a way for governments to limit political competition  Laws determine who is allowed to participate (vote or run for office) and how votes are translated into representation (electoral systems)  Post-war elections may occur under the old electoral system which limits competition

Political Science Theory: Reform as a Signal  Electoral reforms are costly for elites in the incumbent government o Past systems may have ensured access to goods and services o Elites shoulder considerable risk by alienating their supporters  Implementing these reforms act as a costly signal that elites are interested in the peace process  H1: The implementation of electoral reforms called for in peace agreements reduces the risk of civil war recurrence.

Political Science Theory: Reform as a Deterrent  Electoral reforms should make the initial post-civil war election more stable o Armed militant groups have an incentive to abandon the peace process after losing (Brancati and Snyder 2013) o Militant groups rely on some civilian support o Electoral reforms make conventional participation more attractive than supporting violent dissent  H2: First post-war elections that occur after electoral reforms are implemented reduce the risk of civil war recurrence as compared to first post-war elections that occur when no electoral reform has taken place.

Political Science Research Design  Post-Civil War Comprehensive Peace Agreements from o UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz 2010) o UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011) o Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi and Darby 2012)  Dependent Variable: Civil War Recurrence (0,1)  Independent Variable: Electoral Reform o 0=No reform implemented, 1= Reform initiated, 2=Partial implementation, 3=Fully implemented  Independent Variable: First Post-War Election*Electoral Reforms

Political Science Research Design cont.  Controls o Agreement Provisions: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. Transitional Power-Sharing and Peacekeeping o Conflict Variables: Conflict Intensity, Conflict Duration, Ethnic Conflict, Incompatibility with Government o Government Controls: Polity II o Economic Controls: Logged GDP Per Capita  Unit of Analysis: Post-war Country Year  Model: Weibull Duration Model o Robustness checks with Cox Proportional Hazard Models and LogLogistic Duration Models o Used Selection Models for robustness

Political Science Results: Electoral Reforms after Full Implementation Substantive Results Predicted Impact on Recurrence Actual Impact on Recurrence Statistically Significant? Reduction in Risk of Recurrence H1 Electoral Reforms Negative Negative Yes (Reject H0 by 95%) 97.2% H2 Electoral Reforms *First Election Negative Negative Yes (Reject H0 by 99%) 99.9%

Political Science Impact of Electoral Reforms cont. Table II: Hazard Ratios for each stage of implementation Electoral Reforms Initiated Electoral Reforms Mostly Implemented Electoral Reforms Fully Implemented Electoral Reform Implementation Reduced Risk by 69.7% Reduced Risk by 90.9% Reduced Risk by 97.2%

Political Science Graphical Illustration  Figure I: The Impact of Electoral Reforms on the Survival of Peace Following Negotiated Settlements

Political Science Further Robustness Checks  Examine rates of Pro-Government and Antigovernment violence after civil wars o SCAD dataset (Salehyan et al 2011) o Peace agreements in Africa and Latin America o Measured simple inclusion of Electoral Reform in peace agreements o Reduced rates pro-government violence by 76.8% o Reduced rates of antigovernment violence by 81% o Results remain robust when only looking at election violence

Political Science Substantive Findings and Conclusion  Post-Civil War Electoral Reforms o Reduce the risk of civil war recurrence  Implementing these costly reforms signals a willingness to abide by the peace process o Ensures that post-war elections are stable  Reduces the ability of dissidents to abandon the peace process by allowing conventional participation o Results remain robust when looking at post-war event data

Political Science Thank you for your time  Questions?  Eric Keels Ph.D. Candidate Department of Political Science University of North Texas

Political Science Descriptive Statistics Total Peace AgreementsElectoral Reform Inclusion Average Implementation Minimum Implementation Maximum Implementation 3757%1.3703

Political Science Full Model Table I Weibull Hazard Model on Risk of Peace FailureModel 1Model 2Model 3Model 4 Implemented Disarmament ***-8.835***-8.788*** (0.453)(0.456)(0.472) Implemented Demobilization 1.883***1.872**1.660** (0.702)(0.753)(0.713) Implemented Reintegration ***-9.193***-8.167*** (1.305)(1.846)(0.716) Implemented Transitional Political Power-Sharing (0.343)(0.344)(0.342) lnGDP Per Capita (0.470)(0.457)(0.450) Major War *1.768* (1.070)(1.067)(1.059) War Duration ***-1.299***-1.305*** (0.111)(0.113)(0.106) Government Incompatibility (0.753)(0.765)(0.760) Polity II **-0.162** (0.0627)(0.0653)(0.0650) Peacekeeping Operation (0.721)(0.725)(0.720) First Post-war Election (1.180)(1.200) Implementation of Electoral Reforms-1.156**-1.231**-1.214**-1.193** (0.470)(0.598)(0.594)(0.599) Electoral Reform*First Election *** (1.012) Ethnic War (0.762)(0.766)(0.765) Constant-2.170*** (0.310)(3.292)(3.260)(3.224) P ** *** *** *** Observations329 Coefficients Listed. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Political Science DDR Robustness Check Table IV DDR Index CheckModel 1 DDR Index-69.73*** (3.645) Transitional Political Power-Sharing (0.342) lnGDP Per Capita (0.450) Major War1.768* (1.059) War Duration-1.328*** (0.104) Government Incompatibility0.150 (0.760) Polity II-0.162** (0.0650) Peacekeeping Operation0.248 (0.720) First Post-war Election0.690 (1.200) Implementation of Electoral Reforms-1.193** (0.599) Electoral Reform*First Election-7.247*** (1.012) Ethnic War (0.765) Constant2.643 (3.224) Chi Squared *** P1.24 Observations329 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Political Science Selection Model (whether reforms are implemented) Log Logistic Regression Selection Model Selection Stage (Probit Predicting Implementation) Full Model (Log Logistic Duration Model) Integrated Army1.700**-2.009** (0.705) (0.931) DDR (0.764) (1.435) GDP per Capita-4.60e ** (6.60e-05) ( ) Peacekeeping Operation2.326** (0.928) (3.009) Polity II (0.254) Major War *** (0.651) War Duration 0.354** (0.145) Ethnic Fractionalization (1.078) Electoral Reforms 12.19*** (3.032) Inverse Mills Ratio ** (0.739) Monopoly Ethnic Group-2.570* (1.413) Political Power-Sharing0.121 (0.760) Constant-2.992***11.40*** (1.128)(3.981) Observations ***381.62*** Gamma 0.54 (0.30) Robust standard errors in parentheses. Inverse Mills Ratio measures degree of selection effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Political Science Selection Model (Whether reforms are included in peace agreement) Bivariate Probit Model Predicting a) Choice to Include Electoral Reform and b) Choice to Return to Civil War Model I Equation Predicting Return to Violence Implementation of Electoral Reforms (0.41)** GDP Per Capita (0.0001)*** War Duration 0.10 (0.04)** Major War 0.86 (0.32)*** Peacekeeping Operation 0.16 (0.45) Polity II (0.03)** Transitional Power-sharing Government 0.38 (0.36) Ethnic War 0.44 (0.37) T (0.04)*** T (0.05) T (0.03) Constant (113.6)** Equation Predicting the Inclusion of Electoral Reforms in Peace Agreements Peacekeeping Operation 1.09 (0.49)** GDP Per Capita ( ) Ethnic War (0.50)*** Polity II (0.04)* Past Experience with Democracy 0.28 (0.44) Constant 0.55 (0.44) Rho-0.23(Not statistically different) 77.32*** N357 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Political Science SCAD Data TABLE I Negative Binomial Regression Total Violence vs. Election Related Violence Total Antigovernment Violence Election Antigovernment Violence Total ProGovernment Violence Election ProGovernment Violence Model 1Model 2Model 3Model 4 Lagged Antigovernment Violence0.274**0.149 (0.114)(0.161) Electoral Reform-1.660*-4.359**-1.460**-5.152*** (0.858)(2.050)(0.590)(1.339) Disarmament *** *** (0.201)(0.339)(0.244)(0.353) First Election ** *** (0.547)(0.785)(0.724)(1.115) Peacekeeping Operation ***-2.683** (0.631)(1.854)(0.517)(1.109) Ongoing Civil War ** (0.378)(0.789)(0.512)(1.191) Transitional Power-Sharing0.430**1.579***0.780***1.517*** (0.204)(0.540)(0.241)(0.431) Infant Mortality Rate ( )(0.0267)(0.0119)(0.0222) Total Casualties1.48e-06**2.98e e-06***3.62e-06* (6.10e-07)(2.72e-06)(5.40e-07)(2.08e-06) Duration e-05 ( )( )( )( ) Lagged Polity II *** (0.0408)(0.0633)(0.0372)(0.0754) Lagged Pro-Government Violence (0.343)(0.231) Constant *-3.066* (1.122)(2.921)(1.571)(2.608) 75.00***188.62***56.79***516.46*** Alpha Observations260 Coefficients listed. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1