Stockholm, June 1, 2004 Halldór Matthías Sigurðsson P2P Aided Streaming in a Future Multimedia Framework Stockholm, June 1, 2004 Halldór Matthías Sigurðsson Presentation of Course Paper 2G5569 Pricing for Communication Networks

Stockholm, June 1, 2004 Halldór Matthías Sigurðsson Motivation STREAMING SERVER ISP1ISP2ISPN... PEERS... PEERS... PEERS BACKBONE NETWORK ISP1ISP2ISPN... PEERS... PEERS... PEERS BACKBONE NETWORK Client / ServerPeer-to-Peer Expensive Resource Demanding Bandwidth wastage Congestion prone Unreliable Slow Uncontrolled Illegal content

Stockholm, June 1, 2004 Halldór Matthías Sigurðsson Server Initiated Peer-to-Peer (SIP2P) STREAMING SERVER ISP1ISP2ISPN... PEERS... PEERS... PEERS BACKBONE NETWORK Expensive Resource Demanding Bandwidth wastage Congestion prone Unreliable Slow Uncontrolled Illegal content Unreliable Slow Uncontrolled Illegal content

Stockholm, June 1, 2004 Halldór Matthías Sigurðsson Conceptual Model SERVICE LAYER CONNECTIVITY LAYER ACCESS LAYER SEEDING SERVER ACCOUNTING SERVER META SERVER DRM SERVER ISP SUPER NODE SUPER NODE SUPER NODE... PEERS... PEERS... PEERS MANAGEMENT BACKBONE NETWORK Seeding Server Accounting Server DRM Server Meta Server Future Multimedia Framework Legal Content SIP2P competes Why use SIP2P?

Stockholm, June 1, 2004 Halldór Matthías Sigurðsson Competitiveness HYPOTHESIS SIP2P will only prevail if it offers higher utility to both peers and service providers than traditional streaming services, given the same quality level SIP2PNGNP2P

Stockholm, June 1, 2004 Halldór Matthías Sigurðsson Economic Analysis Peer's utility (u) α Inducement factor β Opportunity cost factor u Utility v Price Key equations Low Opportunity cost of underutilised resources Inexpensive to increase utility Cut-over Explains current P2P

Stockholm, June 1, 2004 Halldór Matthías Sigurðsson Economic Analysis Service Provider's cost (C) q License fee O Operational Cost γ Depreciation factor I Investment α Inducement factor Key equations Profit maximising Same functionality Same cost Different Investment Number of users Total Cost TRAD SIP2P profit User reward Number of users Unit Cost TRAD SIP2P α

Stockholm, June 1, 2004 Halldór Matthías Sigurðsson Simulation Service Investment pr. concurrent user TRAD server has capacity of 100 SIP2P server has capacity of 20 Profit / Reward must be adjusted Number of users Total Cost TRAD SIP2P α

Stockholm, June 1, 2004 Halldór Matthías Sigurðsson Conclusion Number of users Total Cost TRAD SIP2P profit User reward Number of users Unit Cost TRAD SIP2P α Sever Initiated Peer-to-Peer (SIP2P) Hybrid of Client/Server and Peer-to-Peer Increases user’s utility Decreases service provider’s cost Split Profit / Reward Decreases total cost Is it bandwidth efficient? Do users react to small rewards? Is it technically possible Which cooperative platform to use

Stockholm, June 1, 2004 Halldór Matthías Sigurðsson Questions