IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Technical Meeting on the Demonstration of Operational and Long Term Safety of Predisposal Management Facilities for Radioactive Waste – 5-9 Oct Phil Metcalf Considerations in the safety case for the conceptualisation, siting, design, operation and decommissioning of RW management facilities

IAEA THE SAFETY CASE FOR PREDISPOSAL Role of the safety case Integrating relevant scientific (and other) information in a structured, traceable and transparent way, developing and demonstrating an understanding of the potential behavior and performance of the facilities Demonstrating that consideration has been given to the subsequent steps of management and their compatibility. Both short medium and long term aspects should be considered and the possible need for future handling and treatment of the waste and the risks and doses that may be associated with these activities. 2

IAEA THE SAFETY CASE FOR PREDISPOSAL Role of the safety case (cont.) Compatibility with a disposal option should be demonstrated, in the event that a disposal option has not been identified at that stage, assumptions should be made about the likely options and clearly set down. Identifying uncertainties in the performance of the facilities, describing the possible significance of the uncertainties, and identifying approaches for the management of significant uncertainties 3

IAEA THE SAFETY CASE FOR PREDISPOSAL Role of the safety case (cont.) Demonstrating operational safety and providing reasonable assurance that the facilities will perform in a manner that protects human health and the environment, and fulfil relevant criteria. Aiding decision making on the authorization / licensing of the facilities. Facilitating communication amongst stakeholders on issues relating to the facilities. 4

IAEA Regulatory process Establishment of standards, regulations, guidance Evaluation of “safety case” Determination of conditions for authorisation Authorisation Compliance assurance – routine reports, incident reports, inspection (routine, reactive, announced, unannounced) Licence termination 5

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StageConceptSitingDevelopment – design, construct Commission, operate DecommissionSite release Gover nmen t Establish operator and regulator Legislation Decision Oversight Custodianship? Assign responsibility Opera tor Establishment Identify options Start SC Develop siting process Investigate/rese arch Stakeholder Generic SC Propose site(s) R & D Design, construct, commissioning plan SA + SC for licence Stakeholder Commission Operate Surveillance Reporting Periodic safety review Finalise decommissioning plan Decommission Decommissioning report Terminate Care and maintenance Regul ator Establishment Input to legislation Standards Develop process Comment Interaction Guidance Comment Review SC Approve? Interaction Guidance Comment Review SC Approve Compliance assurance Approve modifications Review periodic safety review Approve Approve decommissioning plan Compliance assurance Release from regulatory control Terminate Advise to responsible authority Monitoring Safet y Case Structure Process to develop (+MS) Initial – basic elements Inform Site identified Concept design Safety assessment Management system Design, construction, commissioning Safety assessment Management system Update on the basis of modifications Present periodic safety review Decommissioning plans MS Decommissioning plan Waste management Site release Safety assessment MS Preserve knowledge Care and maintenance programme Safety case evolution 8

IAEA Concept ElementConsiderations Safety case contextLaws, licensing process, assessment approach Safety strategyPrinciples, design concept, waste product System descriptionConcept – site requirements Radiological impactStyalised Site/engineeringApproach; site investigation and facility design Non rad operationalStyalised Non rad environmentalStyalised Management systemOrganisation, resources, processes Limits controls conditionsConceptual – some generic Management uncertaintyApproach Iteration & design optimisationApproach Stakeholder / regulatory processesApproach Application of management system Arrangements 9

IAEA Site ElementConsideration Safety case contextSiting approach Safety strategySite influences System descriptionDegree of characterisation Radiological impactSite specific + styalised Site/engineeringCompatibility, suitability Non rad operationalSite + styalised Non rad environmentalSite + styalised Management systemFeedback, evolution Limits controls conditionsSite influence Management uncertaintyApplication to site investigation Iteration & design optimisationSite implications Stakeholder / regulatory processesInitiation and implementation Application of management systemOutcomes, feedback 10

IAEA Design ElementConsideration Safety case contextDesign approach constraints Safety strategyProven design, codes, innovation System descriptionFull description Radiological impactNormal, accidents, worker, public, environ Site/engineeringCompliance with requirements – waste product, operational safety, decommission Non rad operationalNormal, accidents, worker, public, environ Non rad environmentalNormal, accidents, worker, public, environ Management systemFeedback, evolution Limits controls conditionsFor commissioning and operation Management uncertaintyApplication to design Iteration & design optimisationImplementation Stakeholder / regulatory processesImplementation Application of management systemImplementation and feedback 11

IAEA Commissioning and operation ElementConsideration Safety case contextOperation – normal, incident, accident Safety strategyConfirmation – adequacy, compliance System descriptionFull description + operation + modification Radiological impactNormal, accidents, worker, public, environ Site/engineeringSurveillance (monitoring, testing, inspection), maintenance, upgrades Non rad operationalNormal, accidents, worker, public, environ Non rad environmentalNormal, accidents, worker, public, environ Management systemImplementation, feedback, evolution Limits controls conditionsOperating specifications, procedures, normal, incidents, emergencies - wac Management uncertaintyApplication full assessment Iteration & design optimisationModifications, periodic review Stakeholder / regulatory processesOn-going implementation Application of management systemImplementation and feedback 12

IAEA Decommissioning and site release ElementConsideration Safety case contextLegal/regulatory, policy, end state, finance Safety strategyImmediate, deferred, end state, WM strategy System descriptionEnd of life state – radiological status, proposed D & D Radiological impactNormal, accidents, worker, public, environ Site/engineeringProgressive system removal, new systems Non rad operationalNormal, accidents, worker, public, environ Non rad environmentalNormal, accidents, worker, public, environ Management systemModified organisation, implementation Limits controls conditionsFor decommissioning Management uncertaintyApplication to decommission & site release Iteration & design optimisationImplementation Stakeholder / regulatory processesImplementation Application of management systemImplementation and feedback 13

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