Maryville CSX Train Derailment August 2015 Oak Ridge Emergency Management Forum Oak Ridge, TN

Federal On-Scene Coordinators The OSC (NCP §300.5) is the lead Federal official pre-designated by EPA or the USCG to coordinate and direct responses to discharges of oil, or the government official designated by the lead agency to coordinate and direct removal actions for releases of hazardous substances. There are only about 250 EPA OSCs nation-wide Currently Region 4 has 23 OSCs based out of Regional Office in Atlanta Four (5) OSCs stations at outpost locations: Tallahassee, Florida Louisville, Kentucky Raleigh, North Carolina Jackson, Tennessee Mobile, Alabama

Federal On-Scene Coordinators

Response Notification Receives all reports of releases involving hazardous substances and oil that trigger federal notification requirements Over 30,000 reports per year Including terrorist threats Notifies Federal On-scene Coordinator and other federal agencies Links caller to chemical, biological, radiological, and terrorism experts National Response Center 1-800-424-8802

Unified Command Structure Generalized Emergency Response Process Incident Occurs Notification National Response Center Initial Assessment/First Response Federal/State/Local/RP Notification/Response Measures as per section 300.180 Notification Natural Resource Trustees Phone Duty Office Evaluation Federal Assistance Required? No State/Local/RP2 Response Yes NRT section 300.110 RRT section 300.115 Special Forces section 300.145 NSF ERT RERT SSC NPFC DRG SUPSALV FOSC State/ RP Local Unified Command Structure 1. Includes local representation as well. 2. Resources available to support OSC/RPM upon request.

OSC Resources Immediate access to technical assistance and clean up contractors if the RP cannot adequately handle the problem; Immediate access to Superfund and the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF); EPA OSCs are individually authorized up to $250,000 for emergency responses with reach-back for additional funds; Technical expertise; Special equipment; Trained and experienced Type 1 and 2 Incident Management Team

OSC Resources: Contractor Support ERRS - Emergency and Rapid Response Services (ERRS) is the primary vehicle for labor, equipment, and materials. This contract is comprised of four separate contractors. Unknown cylinder sampling Contaminated soil excavation Emergency Response

OSC Resources: Contractor Support START - Superfund Technical Assessment and Response Team (START) provides site documentation, ERRS oversight, health and safety, air monitoring, multi-media sampling, technical support, and other services. Emergency Response Field Haz-Cat Air Monitoring

EPA Region 4 Regional Readiness Center Air Monitoring Equipment Area RAEs Multi-RAE Pros PPB RAEs TVA 1000’s (PID/FID) DATARAMS Single Point Monitors LUMEX Hg Monitors Draeger CMS Units Ludlum Radiation Dose and Survey Meters Field Screening Tools HAZMAT ID SAM 9000s HAZCAT Kits APD2000s and AP2CEs

EPA Region 4 Regional Readiness Center Air Sampling Media PPE Cache (all levels) SCBA/SAR Cache Mobile Command Post Portable Satellites and 800mhtz Tower/Repeater System Mobile Breathing Air System Trailer 32’ Foot Gooseneck Mobile Warehouse 125 KW Mobile Generator DECON Tents and Equipment BIOWatch Response Trailer ATVs and UTVs Multiple response vehicles

CSX Maryville Derailment Around 11:00 p.m. a train derailment, and fire, occurred in Maryville, TN. Authorities issued an evacuation in a 0.5 mile radius of the site. During initial evacuation activities, the radius was increased to 1.5 miles. Including ~5,000 people.

Derailment Information Rail car carrying ~26,000 gallons of Acrylonitrile was breached and partially derailed. Acrylonitrile, highly flammable, caught fire as the railcar was leaking, providing a constant source of fuel and making extinguishing the fire dangerous and difficult.

Incident Management

Firefighting Operations Firefighters utilized water spray to cool adjacent Acrylonitrile cars. Two buffer cars were between the Acrylonitrile cars and the LPG cars.

Evacuation Operations Residents were evacuated the morning of July 2 within 1.5 miles of the derailment Businesses were also shut down within the evacuation zone. Over 5,000 people were evacuated. Evacuation was lifted on July 3 at 12:00 pm, based on air monitoring results and response progress.

Air Monitoring Operations EPA and 45th CST focused their air monitoring efforts on the community, through mobile air monitoring. CSX focused on monitoring in the exclusion zone.

Acrylonitrile Transfer A second unbreached car, carrying Acrylonitrile was damaged by the fire but the contents were not lost. Acrylonitrile was transferred to a new car for shipment, via a closed-loop system. Community and worker air monitoring was carefully planned and conducted during the transfer to ensure no exposure.

Acrylonitrile Flaring Some residual remained in the breached car. Prior to being shipped off-site, all contents had to be purged. To limit possible exposure, CSX flared the volatiles. Note the rippling on the rail car and that the flare picture is small because the flare was small. Not as much fun, or awe inspiring, as it sounded like it would be.

Acrylonitrile Flaring

Rail Car Decontamination Following flaring, the rail car was further decontaminated prior to being shipped off-site.

Surface Water Sampling Following initial firefighting efforts, it was unclear if nearby Culton Creek was impacted by the release. Surface water samples revealed elevated levels of Acrylonitrile in the creek. Samples were collected daily from the same locations to monitor the concentrations and aid in decision making within Unified Command.

Results indicating contamination and discovery of a fish kill caused: Additional water samples from further downstream Installation of bubbling system at 3 points near the site Issuance of a public advisory Inventory of dead fish/animals

Surface Water Remediation Bubblers catalyze the natural breakdown of Acrylonitrile through additional volatilization and agitation. Acrylonitrile supposedly has a half life in the environment of approximately 3 days.

Soil Removal Soil under the railway was determined to be contaminated with Acrylonitrile and had to be removed prior to opening the rail line.

Soil Stockpiles Two soil stockpiles were established near the derailment site. Air monitoring was conducted at each stockpile during response activities

Ground Water Contamination On the final day of the response, groundwater sample results from an on-site well, indicated elevated concentrations of Acrylonitrile in the groundwater. Acrylonitrile is notorious for it’s ability to pass through soil and get into groundwater. It does not wet things very easily so a majority will pass through. During the fire, it was hoped/supposed that the fire was consuming most of the leaked acrylonitrile. It is still unclear how true that is.

Ground Water Contamination Private well testing was initiated immediately One private well at the derailment site was contaminated Completed a door to door survey to identify all wells. Established a private well advisory. Installed groundwater monitoring wells TDEC provided oversight of the remediation.

Community Involvement Center The community was informed throughout the response and when the evacuation was lifted, residents were encouraged to come to the Community Involvement Center to better understand what happened

Questions