A Study of the United States Supreme Can we assume the Supreme Court wants unanimous decisions?

The Supreme Court desires and tries to maintain agreed decisions. The Supreme Court desires and tries to maintain agreed decisions. 40% of modern Supreme Court decisions are agreed; however the ground of court politics lacks a reliable theoretical foundation upon which to build explanations of this experience. 40% of modern Supreme Court decisions are agreed; however the ground of court politics lacks a reliable theoretical foundation upon which to build explanations of this experience.

Subjective Evidence The Subjective Evidence for the hypothesis that Justices desire unanimous decisions is available but mixed. The Subjective Evidence for the hypothesis that Justices desire unanimous decisions is available but mixed. Brown v. Topeka Kansas Board of Education Brown v. Topeka Kansas Board of Education Subjective evidence suggests that Justices desire unanimous opinions to the extent where the cost is not too high. Subjective evidence suggests that Justices desire unanimous opinions to the extent where the cost is not too high.

Coalition Theory What determines whether or not a Justice will join the Court’s majority coalition? What determines whether or not a Justice will join the Court’s majority coalition? Theories of coalition behavior Theories of coalition behavior Office-seeking theory Office-seeking theory Policy-seeking theory Policy-seeking theory

Coalition Ordeshook defined coalition as, a response to an agreement on the part of two or more players to coordinate their actions so as to bring about an outcome that is more useful to members of the coalition than the outcome that prevails from uncoordinated action. Ordeshook defined coalition as, a response to an agreement on the part of two or more players to coordinate their actions so as to bring about an outcome that is more useful to members of the coalition than the outcome that prevails from uncoordinated action.

JOINING THE MAJORITY vs. NOT JOINING THE MAJORITY JOINING THE MAJORITY NOT JOINING THE MAJORITY COST  Loss of the ability to define personal preference  Potentially contributing to lessen legitimacy  Other justices view you as fixed BENEFIT  Potentially bolsters authority of the court  Member of the opinion of the court  Other justices see you as flexible  Ability to express personal preference

Why the Court has so many agreed decisions?

Why groups might prefer agreed decisions? It attempts to uphold and strengthens the authority of the Court and so that Justices can engage trade voting. It attempts to uphold and strengthens the authority of the Court and so that Justices can engage trade voting. agreed decisions contribute to the authority of the Court because they communicate a unified decision to the political community and the American public at large. agreed decisions contribute to the authority of the Court because they communicate a unified decision to the political community and the American public at large. agreed decisions, especially on significant or notorious cases, deliver a sense of positive assurance from the highest Court to the American people and the government that the decision must be followed. Delivering unanimous decisions which the public respects strengthen the Court's authority. agreed decisions, especially on significant or notorious cases, deliver a sense of positive assurance from the highest Court to the American people and the government that the decision must be followed. Delivering unanimous decisions which the public respects strengthen the Court's authority.

Frequency of agreed decisions on the Supreme Court?

Frequency of votes at the conference and final stages ( ) Conference Votes Frequency of Conference Decisions (%) Final Vote Frequency of Final Decisions (%) Difference (%) /2294 (22.1%) /3668 (38.9%) +16.8% /2294 (13.4%) /3668 (12.49%) -.91% /2294 (17.3%) /3668 (14.45%) -2.85% /2294 (19.7%) /3668 (16.88%) -2.82% /2294 (27.5%) /3668 (17.28%) %

9-0 Conference Votes Yield FINAL VOTESFREQUENCY /507 (80.47%) 8-136/507 (7.10%) 7-226/507 (5.13%) 6-38/507 (1.58%) 5-429/507 (5.72%) 7-2 Conference Votes Yield FINAL VOTESFREQUENCY 9-078/397 (19.65%) 8-167/397 (16.88%) /397 (44.58%) 6-358/397 (14.61%) 5-417/397 (4.28%) 5-4 Conference Votes Yield FINAL VOTESFREQUENCY 9-047/631 (7.45%) 8-123/631 (3.65%) 7-247/631 (7.45%) /631 (22.82%) /631 (58.64%) 8-1 Conference Votes Yield FINAL VOTESFREQUENCY /308 (40.26%) /308 (43.51%) 7-227/308 (8.77%) 6-317/308 (5.52%) 5-46/308 (1.95%) 6-3 Conference Votes Yield FINAL VOTESFREQUENCY 9-072/451 (15.96%) 8-128/451 (6.21%) 7-265/451 (14.41%) /451 (49.22%) 5-464/451 (14.19%)

CONCLUSIONS This study supports the assumption that Supreme Court Justices desire and attempt to obtain agreed decisions. This study supports the assumption that Supreme Court Justices desire and attempt to obtain agreed decisions. I have demonstrated support for three conclusions. I have demonstrated support for three conclusions. First, when conference decisions are unanimous, they overwhelmingly tend to stay unanimous. First, when conference decisions are unanimous, they overwhelmingly tend to stay unanimous. Second, more decisions are decided unanimously than any other single type of vote. Second, more decisions are decided unanimously than any other single type of vote. Third, the larger the conference majority the greater the frequency of unanimous final decisions. Third, the larger the conference majority the greater the frequency of unanimous final decisions. Only when authoring Justices have determined that unanimity is impossible do they accept a lesser vote. In short, yes, we can assume the Supreme Court wants unanimous decisions. Individual Justices use a cost-benefit analysis to decide whether or not to join the majority opinion. It seems that the congressional theories of universalism and fairness apply to the Court because the organization of the Supreme Court and the personnel structure allow Justices to use unanimous decisions to try to obtain their most preferred policy outcomes. Additional research needs to be done on this particular theory. Only when authoring Justices have determined that unanimity is impossible do they accept a lesser vote. In short, yes, we can assume the Supreme Court wants unanimous decisions. Individual Justices use a cost-benefit analysis to decide whether or not to join the majority opinion. It seems that the congressional theories of universalism and fairness apply to the Court because the organization of the Supreme Court and the personnel structure allow Justices to use unanimous decisions to try to obtain their most preferred policy outcomes. Additional research needs to be done on this particular theory.

The United States Supreme Court