Critical Theory and Society “To the degree that the established society is irrational, the analysis in terms of historical rationality introduces into the concept the negative element— critique, contradiction and transcendence” Herbert Marcuse, “The Catastrophe of Liberation,” 103

2 The narrative of progress The narrative of progress: “we have it much better than before” (104). What does “we have it much better than before” commit us to? Various features of society appear to be necessities; we have to recognize them as part of reality. The story of progress then admits economic and political madness—and we accept it as reality even though it is irrational (103).

3 Critical Theory: the negative element Why does Marcuse state that his analysis is focused on the ‘negative’? The negative (irrational) elements cannot ultimately be harmonised with the positive tone of the narrative. Are we really better off now? Irrational? In what sense? Various features of society—the economy, technology, etc.—appear to be ‘independent’ from and have power over individuals. These process have control over our lives, and not the other way around.

4 Critique The task of critique challenges such ‘truths of necessity’: “Critical thought strives to define the irrational character of the established rationality … and to define the tendencies which cause this rationality to generate its own transformation” (104). Marcuse believes that at this moment in history human beings have developed the necessary technological capabilities to overcome the irrational elements.

5 Critique and a ‘new’ reason What we need is a new technology: a technology that recognises that the telos (i.e. end) of technology is to overcome the struggle for existence (105). If this direction were to be adopted, it would lead to a “catastrophic transformation” of the prevailing rationality in economics and technology. Why call it catastrophic? We would give them up for a new approach: “The function of Reason is to promote the art of life” (ibid).

6 What is the art of life? Marcuse borrows the idea from A.N. Whitehead: it is to live, to live well and to live better (105). Reason discerns the discrepancy between the ‘real’ and the possible. Because Reason is no longer merely instrumental reasoning, it can imagine other possibilities. Critique is akin to art: it “creates another universe of thought and practice against and within the existing one” (111). And the role of ‘art’ is no longer to “beautifying [the business of the prevailing rationality] and its misery” (ibid).

7 The Reason of science Marcuse argues that prevailing concept of reason as manifested in established science and technology is truncated because it excludes the importance of the imagination. Marcuse: in the past science demonstrated its ‘superiority’ over philosophy and metaphysics with the instrumental domination of nature. Scientific claims can be easily verified. But he believes that metaphysical propositions about human flourishing, the good life, may now be verified.

8 Philosophy and Metaphysics “Like all propositions that claim truth, [metaphysical propositions] must be verifiable; they must stay within the universe of possible experience. This universe [however] is never co- extensive with the established one but extends to the limits of the world which can be created by transforming the established one. … Thus the speculations about the Good Life, the Good Society … obtain an increasingly realistic content; on technological grounds, the metaphysical tends to become physical.” (italics added, 106)

9 the metaphysical tends to become physical What does “the metaphysical tends to become physical” mean? Those concepts can now be made concrete, for it is now possible for “the translation of values into technical tasks” (107). “Industrial society has reached the point where … the scientific abstraction from final causes becomes obsolete in science’s own terms. Science itself has rendered it possible to make final causes the proper domain of science” (ibid).

10 Scientific enterprise as political We can quantify “the available range of freedom from want” (107). In this way, the formerly philosophical ideas of ‘the good life’, ‘liberation’ etc. may become the proper object of science. In so doing, science becomes political: “For the transformation of values into needs, of final causes into technical possibilities is a new stage in the conquest of oppressive, unmastered forces in society as well as in nature” (108).

11 Critique and technology The “technical mastery of final causes” is significant because it “is the … development and utilization of resources … freed from all particular interests which impede the satisfaction of human needs and the evolution of human faculties” (108). Notice that all the talk about translating values into needs and the technical mastery of final causes require “the continued existence of the technical base itself” (107). What is different is the recognition of different ends.

12 Critique and the mastery of ‘nature’ Marcuse: “there are two kinds of mastery: a repressive and a liberating one” (109). What is the liberating sense of mastery? “The reduction of misery, violence and cruelty” (ibid). How plausible is this claim as a notion of mastery of nature? Here is one way in which it may be plausible: our society tolerates the ill-treatment of animals “the work of a human society whose rationality is still the irrational” (110).

13 The arrogance of reason? But Marcuse adds that “civilization produces the means for freeing Nature from its own brutality, its own insufficiency, its own blindness, by virtue of the cognitive and transforming power of Reason” (110). Why describe the interaction between say a lion and an antelope as blind or brutal? What may some of the consequences be if we intervened?

14 Liberation from what then? Liberation from “affluent society” (113). What does liberation mean? It is not a romantic return: a return “to healthy and robust poverty, moral cleanliness and simplicity” (113). Rather it is the elimination of “profitable waste” in affluent, consumerist society (ibid). One of the main obstacles: “comfort, business and job security … may serve as a universal example of enslaving contentment” (114).

15 The affluent society The affluent society is “overdeveloped;” it is not a suitable model for sustainable development (113). A suitable model would involve rational population control (114) and a “redefinition of needs” (115). The more ‘false needs’ become “the individual’s own needs and satisfactions, the more would their repression appear to be an all but fatal deprivation” (ibid).

16 Dare to use your own reason What is the possibility of using one’s own reason in contemporary society? Is there such a ‘space’? This sort of ‘space’—this kind of privacy—is available only to few in contemporary society, and most of them don’t take advantage of it (114). What about the rest? The rest of us face the force of conforming to mass society. Here think about the role of media.

17 Dare to use your reason “The mere absence of all advertising and of all indoctrinating media of information and entertainment would plunge the individual into a traumatic void where he would have the chance to wonder and to think, to know himself … and his society. Deprived of his false … representatives, he would have to learn his ABC’s again” (115).

18 What does the catastrophe of liberation mean? For Marcuse, liberation from false needs has the consequence of overcoming the established technological and social order. The catastrophe of liberation is ironic. It is saying goodbye to an irrational society.