Persuasion & Authority

2 Milgram experiment Subjects believe they are participants in a study of effects of punishment on learning They are asked to shock a partner (stooge) when the partner makes learning mistakes Dependent variable is number of subjects who “go all the way”, delivering 300+ volts of electricity Strapping the learning in Teacher experiences shock Teacher refuses Milgram video

3 Obedience to authority In Milgram shock experiments, all teacher subjects did some shocking and 65% shocked at the maximum level (450 volts), even when thinking the learner was suffering a heart attack Experts predicted 1-2% compliance rate Effects greater When "commander" is an authority figure When "commander" is physically & psychologically close to the teacher When victim is physically & psychologically distant from the teacher

4 Compliance decreased as closeness to victim increased Compliance increased as closeness to authority increased Variations

5 Social pressure defining the situation? Authority & expertise? Willing suspension of disbelief? Reward & punishment  compliance? Social contract & embarrassment? Teacher's personality Evilness Uncaringness What produces this effect?

6 Other examples of authority (Cialdini) Higher manuscript acceptance rates when coming from a high-prestige university Less horn honking at luxury car vs. economy model Greater compliance to a request when requester wears a security uniform than when dressed in civvies Innovations flow through a group faster when introduced by high status member (e.g., Michael Jordan & Energy Booster bars) Deference to doctors – 21/22 Nurses would give harmful medicine to a patient, when it is prescribed over the phone by a strange “doctor” – Ear drops in R(ight) ear

7 Latane’s Social Impact Theory Impact of social influence attempt on an individual increases with – Number of influencers Up to a point – Strength Status Ability Relationship to target – Immediacy Proximity in time Proximity in space ModalityEffectiveness In person canvassing 1 new voter per 14 contacts=$18.67/new voter Personal phone calls 1 new voter per 50 contacts=$45/new voter Robo-phone calls No discernable effect=infinite cost Direct mail 1 new voter per 200 contacts=$100/new voter No discernable effect=infinite cost Effectiveness of Get Out the Vote Techniques

8 Challenger Disaster, 1985 Video Jan 28, 1986, Space Shuttle Challenger takes off from Kennedy Space Center Explodes 73 seconds after take-off Dead: – Francis R. (Dick) Scobee, pilot Michael J. Smith; specialists Judith A. Resnik, Ronald E. McNair and Ellison S. Onizuka; payload specialist Gregory B. Jarvis, a Hughes Aircraft Corp. employee. Resnick, BS in EE, CMU 1970.

9 Crew From left to right are Ellison Onizuka, Mike Smith, Christa McAuliffe, Dick Scobee, Greg Jarvis, Ron McNair and Judy Resnick. Resnick, BS in EE, CMU 1970.

10 Background O-rings seal sections of booster rocket Morton Thiokol had evidence since Jan, 1985 of damage to O- rings (Flight 51E)

11 Memo Excerpt "Subject: SRM O-Ring Erosion/Potential Failure Criticality. This letter is written to insure that management is fully aware of the seriousness of the current O-ring erosion problem in the SRM joints from an engineering standpoint. The mistakenly accepted position on the joint problem was to fly without fear of failure and to run a series of design evaluations which would ultimately lead to a solution or at least a significant reduction of the erosion problem. This position is now drastically changed as a result of the SRM 16A nozzle joint erosion which eroded a secondary O-ring with the primary O-ring never sealing." "If the same scenario should occur in a field joint (and it could), then it is a jump ball as to the success or failure of the joint because the secondary O-ring cannot respond to the clevis opening rate and may not be capable of pressurization. The result would be a catastrophe of the highest order---of of human life."

12 Damage to O-rings & link to cold weather noted by March, 1985 No problems at 100F, loss of seal for 2.4 sec at 75 o F & for 10 sec at 50 o F 7/1/1985, M-T provides results of weather tests to NASA 7/31/1985, M-T engineer writes memo to VP of Engineering “Management at Thiokol and NASA shows no interest in planning a design change”

13 Dramatization of final teleconference, night before launch Weather on launch day predicted to be 18 o F Two teleconferences btw Kennedy Space Center, Marshal Space Flight Center & Morton Thiokol to determine whether to lauch Video Roger Boisjoly M-T Engineer reporting failures

14 Discussion Why did this decision happen? –...failures in communication... resulted in a decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers (Rodgers Commission) What should the engineers have done?

15 What should the engineers have done? Engineering notebook: – The caucus constituted the unethical decision- making forum resulting from intense customer intimidation. NASA placed MTI in the position of proving that it was not safe to fly instead of proving that it was safe to fly. Also, note that NASA immediately accepted the new decision to launch because it was consistent with their desires and please note that no probing questions were asked.