Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 1 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience zR. Douglas Geivett. “The Evidential Value of Religious Experience.” In The Rationality of Theism. Ed. Paul Copan & Paul Moser. New York: Routledge, zWhat evidential weight does religious experience have? What weight does it have for those who have had religious experiences, and for those who have not? How do we know that the religious experiences which someone reports (testimony) are genuine?

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 2 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience âSwinburne’s argument for the veridicality of religious experiences y1. Appeals to the principle of credulity with respect to sense experience y2. Religious experience resembles sense experience y3. Therefore, religious experiences of- God are veridical; they are genuine yExtension of this argument to the testimony of others about religious experiences using the principle of testimony

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 3 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience âThe principles of credulity & testimony yP. of credulity: “It is a principle of rationality that (in the absence of special considerations) if it seems (epistemologically) to a subject that x is present, then probably x is present; what one seems to perceive is probably so. How things seem to be is good ground for belief about how things are.” (Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (NY: Oxford University Press, 1979): 254)

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 4 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience âExplanation of the principles of credulity & testimony yP. of testimony: “Other things being equal, we think that what others tell us that they perceived, probably happened“ (Swinburne 271). yOr “In the absence of special considerations, the experiences of others are (probably) as they report them” (Swinburne 272).

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 5 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience âPremise 1 of the preceding argument. yIt is a fact that many persons in different religious traditions claim to have had religious experiences. äThe problem: Are these “of-God experiences” really from God? äThe standard defense of the authenticity of these experiences.

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 6 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience åAppeal to the p. of credulity as it applies to sense experiences. åThen argue that religious experiences are very similar to sense experiences. åTherefore we ought to accept that religious experiences are really from God.

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 7 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience yFirst examination of premise 2: But do religious experiences really closely resemble sense experience? (The parity thesis) äWilliam Alston defends the parity thesis with the claim that religious experiences and sense experience have the same basic the basic structure— namely, both experiences are presentational.

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 8 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience yFinal piece of the standard argument: those who have not had religious experiences are epistemologically justified in appealing to those who have had such experiences on the basis of the P. of Testimony.

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 9 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience zChallenges to the Swinburne-Alston version of the argument from religious experience âChallenges to the parity thesis yThere seem to be significant differences between the two types of experiences äThere are standards tests for sense perception; there are no standard tests for religious experience äSense perception is insistently and unavoidably present when I am awake; awareness of God is much more rare.

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 10 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience äSense perception is vivid & richly detailed; experience of God is dim, meager, & obscure. äSense perception is shared by all human beings; experience of God is not universal, although nearly so. yAlston replies to all of these challenges that the basic character of both sense perception & religious experience is presentational. He appears to regard this as sufficient for support of the parity thesis.

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 11 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience yGeivett is less sure. The parity thesis may be “overdrawn” by Swinburne & Alston. zChallenges to the p. of testimony âSwinburne defense of this principle: yA vast amount of what any of us knows is based on the testimony of others (191). There is no special reason why we should not trust the testimony of others when it comes to experiences of God. ySecondly, there is a great deal of testimonial evidence about experiences of God.

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 12 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ySecondly, there is a great deal of testimonial evidence about experiences of God. âAdditional challenges to the authenticity of religious experiences y1. Are great variety of religious beliefs all tethered to religious experience. äGeivett explains this variety by background beliefs äConsider the alternative: metaphysical naturalism. This comes in as many varieties as religious beliefs.

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 13 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience äThus is no justification for privileging naturalism over religions traditions when it comes to issue of the authenticity of religious experiences (194). y2. There are other explanations for of- God experiences than that they are from God. Among the most popular is metaphysical naturalism. The most sellable of these appeals is the appeal to science. äReligious experiences can be explained as psychological pathologies (194).

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 14 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience äGeivett’s counter-challenge: Sift through all of the of-God experiences which can be explained by pathologies. Geivett proposes that a substantial body of religious experiences will remain (195).

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 15 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience y3. Can’t religious experiences be explained away by background beliefs? äGeivett’s response: The same objection can be raised against those who reject the authenticity of religious experiences. Cannot their beliefs be explained by their background belief in naturalism?

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 16 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience zGeivett’s revised position â1. Evidence of religious experience should not be isolated from other kinds of evidence. Religious experience is one piece of a cumulative case for theism (196). â2. The parity thesis needs to be relaxed. yReligious experiences are sui generis. Religious experiences are experiences of a personal being; they have an I-Thou character (198).

Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience ~ slide 17 Geivett on the evidential value of religious experience â3. The p. of testimony needs to take into account the credibility of the witnesses— their character & expertise.