The hidden reform of the ‘unmovable’ objects: from workers’ insurance provision to individualised ‘in-work’ benefits Minna van Gerven

worker’s insurance benefit programmes the least obvious subject to policy change ? -New politics of welfare State (Pierson) -Institutional rigidities (Esping-Andersen, Korpi) -Reforms only at the margins/within certain regimes Shooting down the theoretical ‘straw man’

Qualitative inventory of benefit rules In three welfare regimes, UK, NL, FI A long time period Insurance programmes (against unemployment) – Both Bismarckian and Beveridgean programmes VAN GERVEN, M. (2008a) The Broad Tracks of Path Dependent Benefit Reforms. A longitudinal study of social benefit reform in three European countries, , Helsinki, Social Security Institution. Data

CountryBenefit programmes included Benefit type (Beveridgean BE or Bismackian BI) AdministrationFinancingArena of action UK Contribution-based JSA Flat-rate insurance (BE) PublicContributionsPolitics Income-based JSA Flat-rate assistance with a means-test PublicTaxesPolitics NL Unemployment Insurance Benefit (Werkloosheidsuitkering, WW) Income-related insurance (BI) Public (since 2002, previously bipartite) Contributions Politics/Labour market FI Basic Unemployment Benefit Työttömyysturvan Peruspäiväraha Flat-rate insurance (BE) Public Taxes (and some contributions) Politics Earnings-related Unemployment Benefit Työttömyysturvan Ansiopäiväraha Income-related insurance (BI) Bipartite Contribution (employer, employee, state) Politics/Labour market Labour Market Assistance Työmarkkinatuki Flat-rate assistance with a means-test PublicTaxesPoliticsa Table 1 Unemployment benefit programmes and their institutional characteristics as they existed in 2006

The hidden reform of the ‘unmovable’ objects Country characteristics relatively stable: – The UK: a minimum provision – The NL: smaller group of workers protected against loss of income, – Finland: basic security preserved Findings 1/ 3

BUT: a clear intention of benefit programmes to view the eligibility of each claimant individually – Case to case review – Willingness to co-operate essential – Defacto individualisation rather than de jure individualisation Findings 2/3

National differences: – FI less, UK and NL more drastic changes Programmatic differences: – Basic UB more drastic changes – Yet, Workers insurances also underwent drastic reforms (ref. NL) Findings 3/3

Certainly no unmovable objects De facto individualisation of benefit rules: hidden transformation Workers insured only if willing to participate and do their utmost best to return to employment:‘in-work’ benefit or benefit in between two jobs rather than traditional insurance/income replacement benefits Conclusion

Thank you for your interest! Weishaupt (2009) ‘Constructive comments very welcome’