When Good Standards Go Bad IETF 83 | March 25, 2012 Chris Weber, Casaba Security.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
The OWASP Foundation Web Application Security Host Apps Firewall Host Apps Database Host Web serverApp serverDB server Securing the.
Advertisements

Analyzing Android Browser Apps for file:// Vulnerabilities Daoyuan Wu and Rocky Chang Oct 13, 2014 The Hong Kong Polytechnic University Information Security.
Protecting Browsers from Cross-Origin CSS Attacks Lin-Shung Huang, Zack Weinberg Carnegie Mellon University Chris Evans Google Collin Jackson Carnegie.
OWASP Periodic Table of Vulnerabilities James Landis
©2009 Justin C. Klein Keane PHP Code Auditing Session 5 XSS & XSRF Justin C. Klein Keane
17 th ACM CCS (October, 2010).  Introduction  Threat Model  Cross-Origin CSS Attacks  Example Attacks  Defenses  Experiment  Related Work 2 A Presentation.
Password Managers: Attacks and Defenses David SilverSuman JanaDan Boneh Stanford University Eric ChenCollin Jackson Carnegie Mellon University Usenix Security.
Introduction to JavaScript Module 1 Client Side JS Programming M-GO Sponsored By
EECS 354 Network Security Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
Password Managers: Attacks and Defenses David Silver, Suman Jana, Dan Boneh, Stanford University Eric Chen, Collin Jackson, Carnegie Mellon University.
Dynamic Pharming Attacks and Locked Same-Origin Policies For Web Browsers Chris Karlof, J.D. Tygar, David Wagner, Umesh Shankar.
Copyright © The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the OWASP License. The OWASP.
Server-Side vs. Client-Side Scripting Languages
New Computer Security Threat - ClickJacking Ehab Ashary CS591-F2010 University of Colorado, Colorado Springs Dr. C.Edward Chow.
Beware of Finer-Grained Origins
Web Privacy Topics Andy Zeigler Senior Program Manager, Internet Explorer Microsoft.
MWD1001 – Website Production Web Browsers Week 11.
Security of Mobile Applications Vitaly Shmatikov CS 6431.
Happy Hacking HTML5! Group members: Dongyang Zhang Wei Liu Weizhou He Yutong Wei Yuxin Zhu.
Frame isolation and the same origin policy Collin Jackson CS 142 Winter 2009.
1 Subspace: Secure Cross Domain Communication for Web Mashups Collin Jackson and Helen J. Wang Mamadou H. Diallo.
Subspace: Secure Cross-Domain Communication for Web Mashups In Proceedings of the 16th International World Wide Web Conference. (WWW), 2007 Collin Jackson,
Introduction to InfoSec – Recitation 10 Nir Krakowski (nirkrako at post.tau.ac.il) Itamar Gilad (itamargi at post.tau.ac.il)
Understanding SharePoint 2013 Add-In Security Vulnerabilities
And Mobile Web Browsers
HTML 5 New Standardization of HTML. I NTRODUCTION HTML5 is The New HTML Standard, New Elements New Attributes Full CSS3 Support Video and Audio 2D/3D.
XSS Without the Browser Wait, what? Toorcon Seattle, 2011.
HTML5 Group 3: Dongyang Zhang, Wei Liu, Weizhou He, Yutong Wei, Yuxin Zhu.
Origins, Cookies and Security – Oh My! John Kemp, Nokia Mobile Solutions.
AJAX By Steven Hernandez Research Analyst NIATEC.
Web Browsers And Mobile Web Browsers. Guiding Questions What is a mobile Web browser? Why do Web pages look differently on different Web browsers? What.
Copyright © The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the OWASP License. The OWASP.
GETTING FROM DESIGN TO IMPLEMENTATION How to get to the finish line with Responsive and Mobile Development.
MediMizer User Group  Users want an iPad application  Users want a web application  IT wants a no-installation client  Can be used anywhere.
2011/12/20 1 Tongbo Luo, Hao Hao, Wenliang Du, Yifei Wang, and Heng Yin Syracuse University ACSAC 2011.
Georgios Kontaxis‡, Michalis Polychronakis‡, Angelos D. Keromytis‡, and Evangelos P.Markatos* ‡Columbia University and *FORTH-ICS USENIX-SEC (August, 2012)
Copyright © The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the OWASP License. The OWASP.
SMash : Secure Component Model for Cross- Domain Mashups on Unmodified Browsers WWW 2008 Frederik De Keukelaere et al. Presenter : SJ Park.
Input Validation – common associated risks  ______________ user input controls SQL statements ultimately executed by a database server
Wijmo Troy Taylor. What is Wijmo? -Wijmo is a kit of over 40 UI widgets, optimized for client-side web development. -HTML5 -jQuery -CSS3 -SVG.
University of Central Florida The Postman Always Rings Twice: Attacking & Defending postMessage in HTML5 Websites Ankur Verma University of Central Florida,
Protecting Browsers from Extension Vulnerabilities Paper by: Adam Barth, Adrienne Porter Felt, Prateek Saxena at University of California, Berkeley and.
Cross-site request forgery Collin Jackson CS 142 Winter 2009.
Web Browsing *TAKE NOTES*. Millions of people browse the Web every day for research, shopping, job duties and entertainment. Installing a web browser.
Client Side Requirement Unity3d game engine web plug-in Browser, Firefox, safari, IE, opera.
CSRF Attacks Daniel Chen 11/18/15. What is CSRF?  Cross Site Request Forgery (Sea-Surf)  AKA XSRF/ One Click / Sidejacking / Session Riding  Exploits.
May 6, 2009 Browser Compatibility Testing Definition It is a non functional type of testing where web based applications are tested on various browsers(IE.
 AJAX technology  Rich User Experience  Characteristics  Real live examples  JavaScript and AJAX  Web application workflow model – synchronous vs.
Web Browsers. Overview Definition How a Browser Works? History Today – Browser Wars The Future.
JavaScript, Sixth Edition Chapter 11 Updating Web Pages with Ajax.
Browser code isolation John Mitchell CS 155 Spring 2016.
Will New HTTP headers save us? John Wilander, OWASP/Omegapoint, IBWAS’10.
Internet Basics 10/23/2012. What is the Internet? It’s a world-wide network of computer networks. It grows hourly and involves national governments, communities,
And Mobile Web Browsers
IT Security Awareness Day October 19, 2016
Web Technologies Computing Science Thompson Rivers University
ACE – Advanced Customer Experience Overview
Ofer Shezaf, CTO, Breach Security
HTML 5 By Michael Hurley.
Web Browsers & Mobile Web Browsers.
Introduction Web Environments
Web App vs Mobile App.
Archivist By Scott Selinger, Charles Gilliam, Dung Mai, Robert Edwards, and Tyler Boswell Stakeholder: Lorraine Richards Advisor: Rosina Weber Scott.
Password Managers: Attacks and Defenses
Internet Basics.
Browser Engine How it works…..
AMP Cache Sandeep Davu.
Web Technologies Computing Science Thompson Rivers University
And Mobile Web Browsers
Protecting Browsers from Extension Vulnerabilities
Presentation transcript:

When Good Standards Go Bad IETF 83 | March 25, 2012 Chris Weber, Casaba Security

Problem Statement The implementation of new browser features can counter-intuitively open applications and their users up to attacks that were not possible before…

Shouldn’t security be getting easier? Do you need to be a rocket scientist to build a Web application today? With security, you can think you’ve covered everything, but that one misplaced switch out of 1000 could short-circuit the entire operation. It seems that getting security right is becoming harder, or at least more confusing.

A mixed bag of mitigations Same-origin policy Content-Security-Policy iframe sandbox postMessage CORS toStaticHtml anti-CSRF anti-Clickjacking Cryptography X-Frame-Options X-Content-Type-Options HttpOnly, Secure cookies Cache-Control Strict-Transport-Security Access-Control-Allow- Origin Content-Type Content-Disposition

Web application, meet Web browser You don’t own your primary interface but you still have to balance allowing it and protecting against it… But you have to support lots of clients: – PC, Mac, Linux – IE 7/8/9, Firefox 5-10, Chrome, and Safari – Mobile smartphones and tablets And transition pains when Web browsers change.

Example: Facebook compromised using CORS A certain feature on Facebook would take a URL like: Then make an XmlHttpRequest (XHR) to “profile.php” and load the response content into the main document.

Example: Facebook compromised using CORS Before Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS), an attacker couldn’t do this: ple.org/foo ple.org/foo Because it would naturally be prohibited by the XHR same-origin policy but post-CORS, the attack works…

Example: Bypassing HTML sanitizers with HTML5 javascript:alert(1) Is now equivalent to javascript:alert(1)

Example: Inline SVG support opens up XSS

Some root causes Implementation quirks are not well-known. API security considerations may be documented but are not widely understood by application developers. Interoperability – “We can’t implement protection X because browser Y doesn’t support it yet, so we need to do Z for now” Transition pains while churning to new standards.

References The Tangled Web, by Michal Zalewski