Meet the Falcons Ciprian Marginean Aris Lambrianidis

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Presentation transcript:

Meet the Falcons Ciprian Marginean Aris Lambrianidis

What are the Falcons? A new pair of route servers Based on BIRD (Cisco does not scale easily nor support all features) Available only in Amsterdam (for now)

Why go to the trouble? Prefix hijack (or misconfiguration) mitigation “no mechanism has been specified within BGP to validate the authority of an AS to announce NLRI information (prefixes)” (RFC )

How do we do it? RPKI validation (RFC6480) BGP community tagging based on RPKI status (valid, invalid, unknown) IRRdb object filtering or tagging

What’s new to the Falcons? FeatureLegacyFalcon BGP community based routing policies IRRdb based routing policies Inbound Routing Policies RPKI prefix validation and filtering IRRdb prefix validation and filtering AS Path prepending

Is it difficult to configure?

One more click…

The stats Active peers: 35

Key take aways? Lower the barrier for customers needing more tools to make security focused decisions The routing policy is still controlled by the customer The Falcons are running in production in parallel with existing ones

Key take aways? Lower the barrier for customers needing more tools to make security focused decisions The routing policy is still controlled by the customer The Falcons are running in production in parallel with existing ones

Key take aways? Lower the barrier for customers needing more tools to make security focused decisions The routing policy is still controlled by the customer The Falcons are running in production in parallel with existing ones

Will there be anything else, sir? Highly flexible, per peer BGP attribute manipulation using communities: set MED set ORIGIN set prepend AS BGP ADD-PATH More configuration options: (IRRDB or Web portal)+ communities DDoS attack mitigation – L2 filtering

Any questions? This is still WiP, any feedback is welcome!