BT/BP AB/CO/MI 17 th September 2008 Safe Machine Parameters Status & Update.

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Presentation transcript:

BT/BP AB/CO/MI 17 th September 2008 Safe Machine Parameters Status & Update

Safe Machine Parameters System 2 System Status Energy Intensity (10 8 ) Intensity (10 10 ) Inputs: Direct Outputs: E400_FLAG linked to BA4 E450_FLAG linked to BA4 SPS_PROBE_BEAM_FLAG linked to BA4 SPS_PROBE_BEAM_FLAG linked to BA6 SPS_SAFE_BEAM flag SPS SYSTEM Energy Intensity-1 (fast) Intensity-1 (slow) Intensity-2 (fast) Intensity-2 (slow) Machine Mode Inputs: Direct Outputs: BEAM_PRESENCE_FLAG_1 linked to BA6 BEAM_PRESENCE_FLAG_2 linked to BA4 SAFE_BEAM_FLAG_1 linked to BA6 SAFE_BEAM_FLAG_2 linked to BA4 ENERGY INTENSITY 1 INTENSITY 2 All Flags above + STABLE_BEAMS flag MOVEABLE_DEVICES_ALLOWED_IN flag LHC SYSTEM Serial Outputs (through GMT): DONE READY BY 24 th September

Safe Machine Parameters System 3 System Status Energy Intensity (10 8 ) Intensity (10 10 ) Inputs: Direct Outputs: E400_FLAG linked to BA4 E450_FLAG linked to BA4 SPS_PROBE_BEAM_FLAG linked to BA4 SPS_PROBE_BEAM_FLAG linked to BA6 SPS_SAFE_BEAM flag SPS SYSTEM Energy Intensity-1 (fast) Intensity-1 (slow) Intensity-2 (fast) Intensity-2 (slow) Machine Mode Inputs: Direct Outputs: BEAM_PRESENCE_FLAG_1 linked to BA6 BEAM_PRESENCE_FLAG_2 linked to BA4 SAFE_BEAM_FLAG_1 linked to BA6 SAFE_BEAM_FLAG_2 linked to BA4 ENERGY INTENSITY 1 INTENSITY 2 All Flags above + STABLE_BEAMS flag MOVEABLE_DEVICES_ALLOWED_IN flag LHC SYSTEM Serial Outputs (through GMT): DONE READY BY 24 th September

Safe Machine Parameters System 4 System Status Energy Intensity (10 8 ) Intensity (10 10 ) Inputs: Direct Outputs: E400_FLAG linked to BA4 E450_FLAG linked to BA4 SPS_PROBE_BEAM_FLAG linked to BA4 SPS_PROBE_BEAM_FLAG linked to BA6 SPS_SAFE_BEAM flag SPS SYSTEM Energy Intensity-1 (fast) Intensity-1 (slow) Intensity-2 (fast) Intensity-2 (slow) Machine Mode Inputs: Direct Outputs: BEAM_PRESENCE_FLAG_1 linked to BA6 BEAM_PRESENCE_FLAG_2 linked to BA4 SAFE_BEAM_FLAG_1 linked to BA6 SAFE_BEAM_FLAG_2 linked to BA4 ENERGY INTENSITY 1 INTENSITY 2 All Flags above + STABLE_BEAMS flag MOVEABLE_DEVICES_ALLOWED_IN flag LHC SYSTEM Serial Outputs (through GMT): DONE READY BY 24 th September * *

Safe Machine Parameters System 5 btw… STB and MDI Flags… E_LHC MODE_LHC SMP system E_PHYSICS_LOWER & E_PHYSICS_UPPER “Threshold” Values written through FESA.. can only be changed by expert…‘soft’ process… Not as safe as specification requires -good compromise for coming weeks / months

Safe Machine Parameters System 6 In Summary -Agreed 16 th September = Change Stable Beams and Moveable Devices -Should take 4-5 days… … functional system online afterwards (E / I1 / I2 / all flags as specified) … We’re studying I1 / I2 – big influence on availability DON’T FORGET: This is not the final SMP, next year we will supply the specified system: 1.Add full redundancy – different sources and processing 2.Add timing cross-check 3.Add interlock to LHC BIS when fault detected

Safe Machine Parameters System 7 FIN

Safe Machine Parameters System 8 The basic function of the SMP…

Safe Machine Parameters System 9 The first step is to accommodate multiple data sources to increase dependability…

Safe Machine Parameters System 10 Then duplicate the critical processes

Safe Machine Parameters System 11 The transmitter must then arbitrate the data from the two sources

Safe Machine Parameters System 12 The transmitter must then arbitrate the data from the two sources Finally the output GMT must be cross-checked with the original data Finally the output GMT must be cross-checked with the original data

Safe Machine Parameters System 13 Finally the output GMT must be cross-checked with the original data

Safe Machine Parameters System 14 Main Features Produces -LHC Safe Beam Flags -Stable Beam Flag -Movable Dev. Allowed in Flag Retransmits: -LHC Energy -( Beam Intensities) -Beam Presence Flags LHC system: Produces -SPS Beam Flags Retransmits: -Beam Intensity Produces “Direct Flags”: ( not sent to GMT) - SPS Probe Beam Flag - CNGS Beam Flag - LHC Beam Flag SPS system:

Safe Machine Parameters System 15 Reminder SMP system - Hardware Process (VHDL) - VME system: One for LHC another for SPS - Multiple data sources to increase dependability - Duplication of critical process - Arbitration of the data from the two sources - GMT output cross-checked with the original data - FESA class for monitoring and MODE

Safe Machine Parameters System 16 Flag Generation – Today E_LHC MODE_LHC E_PHYSICS_UPPER& E_PHYSICS_LOWER Stored in I2C FLASH, can only be changed by expert… (dis-assemble SMP system to access) Redundant… Check sum… very robust! SMP system

Safe Machine Parameters System 17 Functionality STABLE_BEAM & MOVEABLE_DEVICED_ALLOWED_IN flags need: -Machine Energy: E_LHC -Machine Mode: MODE_LHC -Upper Limit of “Physics Energy”: E_PHYSICS_UPPER -Lower Limit of “Physics Energy”: E_PHYSICS_LOWER STABLE BEAM FLAG = “TRUE” when ( E_PHYSICS_LOWER < E_LHC < E_PHYSICS_UPPER ) AND MODE_LHC = “STABLE” MOVEABLE DEVICES ALLOWED IN FLAG = “TRUE” when ( E_PHYSICS_LOWER < E_LHC < E_PHYSICS_UPPER ) AND ( MODE_LHC = “STABLE” OR MODE_LHC = “UNSTABLE” )

Safe Machine Parameters System 18 What it will take… To do this we need: -add FESA property -Re-write VHDL -Re-program thresholds board -Re-write test sequences -Full Lab test -Re-program, re-commission 2 x CISG LHC -Agreed 16 th September = Now is the time to do this -Should take 4-5 days… … full system online afterwards (E / I1 / I2 / all flags as specified) …