School Based Management: Evidence from Kenya Michael Kremer Anthony Keats

School Based Management: Evidence from Kenya Background: education in Kenya The projects: design and preliminary results (Key outcome data not yet in) School Committees Project (SC) Extra Teacher Provision Program (ETP) and School Based Management Reinforcement (SBMR) Hypotheses Increased interest in school based management – based in part on the work of Jimenez and Sawada (1999) Jimenez, Emmanuel and Yasuyuki Sawada (1999) “Do Community-Managed Schools Work? An Evaluation of El Salvador’s EDUCO Program,” World Bank Economic Review, 13(3): 415-441. EDUCO schools in El Salvador allow local education committees to monitor teacher performance, hire and fire teachers, and manage school equipment and maintenance (Jimenez and Sawada, 1999). The EDUCO program in El Salvador is often cited as an example of the benefits of decentralization. Under the program, school committees are responsible for contracting and removing teachers and closely monitoring their performance and for equipping and maintaining the schools. All of their resources come from the central government and international organizations. An evaluation by Jimenez and Sawada (1999) finds that the program successfully expanded education in poor rural areas (its main objective) and also reduced student absences by 3 to 4 days in a 4-week period. No effect was found on student achievement. Not randomized Desire for RE, different contexts, how much change needed? We are conducting two randomized evaluations of school-based management programs in Western Kenya. In this presentation we will first provide a background on the education system in Kenya, describe some recent educational reforms, and briefly discuss the various roles of cental government and school committees in education Although we do not yet have data on test scores, one of the key outcome variables in both studies, we can review project design and discuss some other preliminary results. We will then present a tentative hypothesis based on our findings.

The education system in Kenya Government in charge of curriculum, national achievement exams, hiring/dismissing teachers School Committee – locally elected body Historically: de facto responsible for raising funds for non-teacher inputs – classroom construction, maintenance, etc. Sometimes hires extra teachers locally Limited influence on regular teachers/HT Often dominated by HT UPE – 2003 reform mandating free primary education Resulted in overcrowding, heterogeneous student background Less funds for SC While the Government of Kenya is responsible for many aspects of education in Kenya, including setting curriculum and the hiring and firing of teachers, school committees are designed to provide community-based participatory governance and management at each school. School committees are elected bodies composed of parents, school headmasters, school sponsors, and other members of the surrounding community. In practice these committees are often dominated by the Head Master, who is by default the school committee secretary. School committees are responsible for raising funds to pay for many school expenses not covered by government, including such things as classroom construction and maintenance. They are also responsible for communicating problems and needs to the Ministry of Education through their area education officers. In January 2003 the government of Kenya introduced the UPE, a reform that provided for free primary education for all Kenyans. This change has led to a large increase in enrollment, particularly in the earlier standards. Some schools have up to 220 pupils in first grade, and only one teacher assigned to the class. In the past, to address such problems, school committees sometimes hired unemployed teachers locally at a low salary. This simple initiative allowed schools to decrease the pupil-teacher ratio at low cost. However, because education is now officially free and schools cannot constrain parents to pay school fees, few school committees are in a position to mobilize the resources to employ local extra-teachers.

The School Committee Project (w/DeLaat, Vermeersch) Three major components: Provide school committees with training in financial administration and on their roles and responsibilities; Provide committees with opportunities to strengthen ties with Area Education Officers (AEO) Provide committees with opportunity to reward high-performing teachers with prizes to motivate improvements in teacher quality Randomized design 34 treatment schools, 34 comparison schools The School Committee Project consisted of three major components designed to address these issues as well as improve teacher quality: The first component of the project was aimed at improving the capacity of the school committees by providing training about roles and responsibilities, and about skills such as monitoring and financial management. School committee members were encouraged to think about the needs of their school, and to identify the school’s assets and weaknesses. The second component of the project featured guided meetings between school committees and Area Education Officers These meetings were designed to promote a closer relationship between the school committees and the AEO. During the meeting, school committee members participated in a structured discussion with the AEO about the needs of their school. Class representatives were also asked to briefly outline issues particular to the grade level they were representing. School committee members and the AEO then put together an action plan for the school. In the last component of the project, school committee members were given the opportunity to award high-performing teachers in their schools. At the end of the meeting with the AEO, committee members filled out written evaluations of each teacher in the school. The evaluations covered several criteria, including attendance, teaching methods, student discipline, and relations with parents. Committees next voted for 2 teachers in lower primary (grades 1 to 3) and 2 teachers from upper primary (grades 4 to 8) based on their assessment of overall teacher quality. The first prize in each school level was a bicycle worth approximately $40 – or about half a month’s salary. The second prize was worth about $13 and consisted of a set of cutlery the first year and a sheet and blanket set the second year. Head teachers were not eligible for the prize since, by default, they also serve as school committee secretary. The awarding of prizes based on overall teacher quality should provide an incentive for teachers to adopt behavior that is supportive of quality education but hard to measure, such as a positive attitude towards pupils, timeliness, and orderly conduct. Since four main prizes were awarded in each school, many teachers had a chance to win the prize. Both the School Committee Project and the Extra Teacher Provision Program were implemented by International Child Support, a Dutch NGO that has been conducting education programs in Western Kenya since 1994, and with the support of the Ministry of Education. 68 schools were randomly selected from Busia District in Western Kenya for participation in the project. They were split evenly into treatment and control schools, and stratified by geographical location and the presence of other school-based programs.

Indicators The School Committee Project collected information on: Teacher and pupil attendance and transfers; Background information on teachers and school committee members; Classroom observations; Frequency of meetings and other visits with education officers; and Fundraising activities. Voting behavior of school committee members Teacher and pupil information included data on attendance through unannounced visits during each school term, as well as information on transfers and promotion. Background information included Information on ethnicity, religious affiliation, experience, and other personal factors. Classroom observations ranged from in class activities and frequency of assigned homework to the number of books per pupil and the type of construction of the classroom.

Preliminary Evidence No impact on pupil attendance No impact on teacher attendance No change classroom quality or number of textbooks per pupil Qualitative No observable change in responsiveness of AEO or in School Committee activity Teachers unhappy with process

ETP and SBMR (w/Duflo, Dupas) Provide evidence on Decentralization of teachers hiring and firing procedures Training school committee members on hiring and firing procedures Class size Tailoring by initial skill level The Extra Teacher Provision Program and the School Based Management Project were designed to shed light on the effects of 1) the decentralization and the local strengthening of teacher hiring and firing procedures; 2) changes in class size; and 3) splitting students into class streams based on initial skill level.

Extra-Teacher Provision Program (ETP) 140 treatment schools, 70 comparison schools Provide funds for school committees to hire locally an extra (trained but unemployed) teacher Hiring after announcement at PA meting and interview process $35/month (vs. $150/month+benefits for young TSC teachers) 2005: Grade 1 students split in 2 streams 70 schools: Random split 70 schools: Split according to initial attainment “Local teacher” randomly assigned to 1 stream 2006: Program continues in Grade 2. Local teacher moves to Grade 2 with students promoted Grade 2 repeaters randomly split between streams HIRING PROCEDURE: * Vacancy announced at PA Meeting  the whole community was informed. - The requirements for applying to the job were: have a teaching certificate and have not been dismissed by the Ministry of Education. - Anyone satisfying these requirements could apply. To apply, a candidate had to send a letter with credentials to the chairman of the school committee * SC told to request applications with resumes, to shortlist, and to conduct interviews with short-listed candidates. * On average, schools received 3 resumes (s.d.1.8) and interviewed 2.3 candidates (s.d. 1.3). Results of hiring process: Of the ETP teachers hired: 45% were related to someone at the school Only 5% were related to a school committee member. 66% reported that they lived in the area and 53% had always lived there. ETP teachers: all have graduated from teacher college, but unemployed since government doesn’t have funds to hire all of them right out of college  typically teachers have to wait 3-4 years between the time they graduate from teacher college and their first assignment. Most teachers try to volunteer in schools during that period, in order to gain experience. Direct goal of program: reduce class size But also: try to tackle teacher absenteeism. These extra-teachers are from within the community and may be more accountable than civil service teachers. Although: Past program run by ICS: showed that the headteachers side with teachers and are not good at monitoring attendance / enforcing rules (Chen and Kremer) SBM: inspired by World Development Report of 2004: “Making services work for the poor” Advocates strengthening beneficiary control  Directly monitored by school committees, extra teachers are likely to be present more often if they face credible threat of not having their contract renewed.

School-Based Management Reinforcement Program (SBMR) 70 schools randomly selected among 140 ETP treatment schools Training of school committee on hiring and local monitoring of local teacher Formal review meeting of SC before renewal of contract for local teacher at the end of first year Announced to local teacher at start of contract ETP schools: officially school committee is in charge of ETP teacher, but possible that head-teacher takes de facto all the decisions  In random half of ETP schools, school-based management reinforcement programs tries to ensure that the school committee is not entirely controlled by HT>

Preliminary Results: Teachers Performance No significant difference in presence at school ETP teachers were more likely to be found in class teaching SBMR increases performance of other PTA teachers * Local teachers absent as often as GoK teachers No significant impact of SBM reinforcement on local teachers’ attendance Local teachers more likely to be found in class teaching if present No impact of SBM reinforcement on local teachers “slack” effect of extra-teacher on GoK teachers in treatment schools This effect is cancelled by SBM program *: Average from two unannounced school visits made in Terms 2 and 3 of 2005 Total sample: 836 teachers

ETP Preliminary Results: Students’ Schooling (I) No difference in students’ attendance across treatment groups Tailoring by attainment seems to increase promotion rates * It’ *: Average from two unannounced school visits made in Terms 2 and 3 of 2005 Total sample: 18,838 students

Preliminary Results: Students’ Learning Success rate on math and literacy questions, 5 months after program inception ICS enumerators administered one-question tests to 60 randomly selected pupils in each class. \ The pupils were asked math and literacy questions ranging from counting and identifying letters to subtracting two-digit numbers and writing words. This table shows the success rate at these questions aggregated by treatment groups *Significantly different at 90% confidence level; **95%; ***99%.

Ongoing Work for ETP/SBM Classroom Observations Achievement Tests Final Results by June 2007

Hypothesis In Kenyan context, school committees need real hiring/firing power in order to have much influence

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Preliminary Results: Students’ Learning (I) Quick classroom-wide numeracy and literacy tests Results of OLS regression:  So far: Reduction in class size had no impact on learning

Preliminary Results: Students’ Learning (II)  Tailoring by attainment seems to have a positive impact on learning; no impact of SBMR so far.