1 SNAP and SPAN Barry Smith
2 Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science Faculty of Medicine University of Leipzig
3 Reality
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7 is complicated
8 What is the best language to describe this complexity?
9 Formal ontology formalized + domain-independent
10 Formal Ontology Examples of categories: Substance, Process, Agent, Property, Relation, Location, Spatial Region Part-of, Boundary-of
11 Material Ontology = regional or domain-specific e.g. GeO Examples of categories: River, Mountain, Country, Desert … Resides-In, Is-to-the-West-of
12 Realist Perspectivalism There is a multiplicity of ontological perspectives on reality, all equally veridical i.e. transparent to reality vs. Eliminativism: “Only my preferred perspective on reality is veridical”
13 Need for different perspectives Double counting: 3 apples on the table 7 x molecules at spatial locations L1, L2 and L3 Not one ontology, but a multiplicity of complementary ontologies Cf. Quantum mechanics: particle vs. wave ontologies
14 Cardinal Perspectives Formal vs. Material Micro- vs. Meso- vs. Macro SNAP vs. SPAN
15 A Network of Domain Ontologies BFO BFO = Basic Formal Ontology
16 A Network of Domain Ontologies BFO MedO
17 A Network of Domain Ontologies BFO MedOGeO
18 A Network of Domain Ontologies BFO MedOGeOLexO
19 A Network of Domain Ontologies BFO MedOGeOLexOMilO
20 A Network of Domain Ontologies BFO MedOGeOLexOMilOEcO
21 AgrO PsychO
22 Cardinal Perspectives Formal vs. Material Ontologies Granularity (Micro vs. Meso vs. Macro) SNAP vs. SPAN
23 Ontological Zooming
24 Ontological Zooming medicine cell biology
25 Ontological Zooming both are transparent partitions of one and the same reality
26 Cardinal Perspectives Formal vs. Material Ontologies Granularity (Micro vs. Meso vs. Macro) Time: SNAP vs. SPAN
27 Ontology seeks an INVENTORY OF REALITY Relevance of ontology for information systems, e.g.: terminology standardization taxonomy standardization supports reasoning about reality
28 Semantic Web Ontoweb OWL DAML+OIL … these are standardized languages only – not themselves ontologies
29 Ontology research marked by ad hoc-ism
30 IFOMIS Strategy get real ontology right first and then investigate ways in which this real ontology can be translated into computer- useable form later DO NOT ALLOW ISSUES OF COMPUTER- TRACTABILITY TO DETERMINE THE CONTENT OF THE ONTOLOGY IN ADVANCE
31 a language to map these Formal-ontological structures in reality
32 a directly depicting language ‘John’ ‘( ) is red’ Object Property Frege
33 Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Propositions States of affairs are pictures of
34 The Oil-Painting Principle in a directly depicting language all well-formed parts of a true formula are also true A new sort of mereological inference rule – the key to the idea of a directly depicting language – presupposes that parthood is determinate
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36 A directly depicting language may contain an analogue of conjunctio n p and q _______ pp
37 but it can contain no negation pp _______ pp
38 and also no disjunction p or q ______ pp
39 The idea of a directly depicting language suggests a new method of constituent ontology: to study a domain ontologically is to establish the parts of the domain and the interrelations between them
40 Basic Formal Ontology = a formal ontological theory, expressed in a directly depicting language, of all parts of reality (a great mirror) BFO
41 The Problem John lived in Atlanta for 25 years
42 The Problem John lived in Atlanta for 25 years substances, things, objects PARTHOOD NOT DETERMINATE
43 The Problem John lived in Atlanta for 25 years process state
44 Substances and processes exist in time in different ways substance t i m e process
45 SNAP and SPAN Substances and processes Continuants and occurrents In preparing an inventory of reality we keep track of these two different categories of entities in two different ways
46 A Popular Solution
47 Fourdimensionalism – time is just another dimension, analogous to the three spatial dimensions – only processes exist – substances are analyzed away as worms/fibers within the four- dimensional process plenum
48 Parts of processes (1) c c: boundary a a a: scattered part b b: temporal slice
49 Parts of processes (2) a a: sub-process b b: phase
50 There are no substances Bill Clinton does not exist Rather: there exists within the four- dimensional plenum a continuous succession of processes which are similar in Billclintonizing way
51 4-Dism –>There is no change That the water boils means: Not: the water is colder at one time and hotter at another time Rather: that one phase of the boiling process is cold and another hot as one part of a colored ribbon is red and another blue
52 The Parable of Little Tommy’s Christmas Present
53 Eliminativism 1.a sort of adolescent rebellion 2.a product of physics envy 3.we must simplify reality for the sake of the software
54 Fourdimensionalism rests on a misunderstanding of physics (both of relativity theory and of quantum mechanics) and on a misunderstanding of the status of Newtonian physics
55 Confession Some of my best friends are fourdimensionalists Fourdimensionalism is right in everything it says But incomplete
56 Realist Perspectivalism There is a multiplicity of ontological perspectives on reality, all equally veridical = transparent to reality
57 Need for different perspectives Not one ontology, but a multiplicity of complementary ontologies Cf. Quantum mechanics: particle vs. wave ontologies
58 Two Orthogonal, Complementary Perspectives SNAP and SPAN
59 Substances and processes exist in time in different ways substance t i m e process
60 Snapshot Video ontology ontology substance t i m e process
61 SNAP and SPAN Substances and processes Continuants and occurrents In preparing an inventory of reality we keep track of these two different categories of entities in two different ways
62 SNAP and SPAN stocks and flows commodities and services product and process anatomy and physiology
63 SNAP and SPAN the lobster and its growth the nation and its history a population and its migration the ocean and its tide(s)
64 SNAP and SPAN SNAP entities - have continuous existence in time - preserve their identity through change - exist in toto if they exist at all SPAN entities - have temporal parts - unfold themselves phase by phase - exist only in their phases/stages
65 SNAP vs. SPAN 1.SNAP: a SNAPshot ontology of endurants existing at a time 2.SPAN: a four-dimensionalist ontology of processes
66 SNAP vs. SPAN Substances vs. their lives
67 You are a substance Your life is a process You are 3-dimensional Your life is 4-dimensional
68 Change Adding SNAP to the fourdimensionalist perspective makes it possible to recognize the existence of change (SNAP entities are that which endure, thus providing identity through change) SNAP ontologies provide perspective points – landmarks in the flux – from which SPAN processes can be apprehended as changes
69 Substances do not have temporal parts The first 5-minute phase of my existence is not a temporal part of me It is a temporal part of that complex process which is my life
70 How do you know whether an entity is SNAP or SPAN?
71 Three kinds of SNAP entities 1.Substances 2.SPQR… entities 3.Spatial regions, contexts, niches, environments
72 SPQR… entities States, powers, qualities, roles … Substances are independent SPQR entities are dependent on substances, they have a parasitic existence: a smile smiles only in a human face
73 Other SPQR… entities: functions, dispositions, plans, shapes SPQR… entities are all dependent on substances one-place SPQR entities: temperature, color, height
74 Substances and SPQR… entities Substances are the bearers or carriers of, SPQR… entities ‘inhere’ in their substances
75 one-place SPQR… entities tropes, individual properties (‘abstract particulars’) a blush my knowledge of French the whiteness of this cheese the warmth of this stone
76 relational SPQR… entities John Mary love stand in relations of one-sided dependence to a plurality of substances simultaneously
77 Ontological Dependence Substances are that which can exist on their own SPQR… entities require a support from substances in order to exist Dependence can be specific or generic
78 Generic dependence of relational SPQR… entities legal systems languages (as systems of competences) religions (as systems of beliefs)
79 Ontological Dependence Substances are such that, while remaining numerically one and the same, they can admit contrary qualities at different times … I am sometimes hungry, sometimes not
80 Substances can also gain and lose parts … as an organism may gain and lose molecules
81 Dependence cannot exist without a thinker a thought process substance
82 Spatial regions, niches, environments Organisms evolve into environments SNAP Scientific Disciplines Atomic physics Cell biology Island biogeography
83 SPAN scientific disciplines Thermodynamics Wave Mechanics Physiology Also FIELD disciplines: Quantum Field Theory
84 each SNAP section through reality includes everything which exists (present tense)
85 each section through reality is to be conceived in presentist terms each section includes everything which exists at the corresponding now
86 mereology works without restriction in every instantaneous 3-D section through reality
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88 Problem of identity over time for substances What is it in virtue of which John is identical from one SNAP ontology to the next?
89 Many SNAP Ontologies t1t1 t3t3 t2t2 here time exists outside the ontology, as an index or time-stamp
90 SNAP ontology = a sequence of snapshots
91 Examples of simple SNAP ontologies space
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94 Examples of simple SNAP ontologies
95 Examples of simple SNAP ontologies
96 The SPAN Ontology t i m e
97 here time exists as part of the domain of the ontology The SPAN ontology
98 Processes demand 4D-partonomies t i m e
99 SNAP ontology many sharp boundaries SPAN ontology many smeered boundaries
100 Substances Mesoscopic reality is divided at its natural joints into substances: animals, bones, rocks, potatoes
101 The Ontology of Substances Substances form natural kinds (universals, species + genera)
102 Processes Processes merge into one another Process kinds merge into one another … few clean joints either between instances or between types
103 boundaries are mostly fiat t i m e everything is flux
104 mereology works without restriction everywhere here t i m e clinical trial
105 Some clean joints derive from the fact that processes are dependent on substances (my headache is cleanly demarcated from your headache)
106 Some clean joints in realms of artefactual processes: weddings chess games dog shows ontology tutorials sharp divisions imputed via clocks, calendars
107 Clean joints also through language = fiat demarcations Quinean gerrymandering ontologies are attractive for processes not for substances Quine: there are no substances
108 SNAP entities provide the principles of individuation/segmentation for SPAN entities No change without some THING or QUALITY which changes identity-based change
109 Processes, too, are dependent on substances One-place vs. relational processes One-place processes: getting warmer getting hungrier
110 Examples of relational processes kissings, thumps, conversations, dances, Such relational processes join their carriers together into collectives of greater or lesser duration
111 Example: the Ontology of War needs both continuants (army, battle- group, materiel, morale, readiness, battlespace …) and occurrents (manoeuvre, campaign, supply, trajectory, death …)
112 t i m e invasion Battalion moves from A to B
113 Processes, like substances, are concrete denizens of reality My headache, like this lump of cheese, exists here and now, and both will cease to exist at some time in the future. But they exist in time in different ways
114 Each is a window on that dimension of reality which is visible through the given ontology SNAP and SPAN ontologies are partial only (Realist perspectivalism)
115 SNAP: Entities existing in toto at a time
116 Three kinds of SNAP entities 1.Substances 2.SPQR… entities 3.Spatial regions, Contexts, Niches
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119 SNAP
120 SPAN: Entities extended in time
121 SPAN: Entities extended in time
122 SPAN: Entities extended in time
123 3-dimensional and 4-dimensional environments “Lobsters have evolved into environments marked by cyclical patterns of temperature change” The Afghan winter The window of opportunity for an invasion of Iraq
124 Relations between SNAP and SPAN SNAP-entities participate in processes they have lives, histories
125 Participation x y substances x, y participate in process B time B x y SNAP-t i. time SPAN B
126 SPQR… entities and their SPAN realizations the expression of a function the exercise of a role the execution of a plan the realization of a disposition the application of a therapy the course of a disease
127 SPQR… entities and their SPAN realizations function role plan disposition therapy disease SNAP
128 SPQR… entities and their SPAN realizations expression exercise execution realization application course SPAN
129 instruction and operation score and performance algorith and execution
130 SNAP entities provide the principles of individuation for SPAN entities
131 Movement from location x ends begins movement to location y
132 Creation t1 R SNAP-t 1 t2>t1 R SNAP-t 2 process P initiates a, a's birth at t2 a's life overlaps process P
133 Some ontological consequences
134 Granularity spatial regionsubstance parts of substances are always substances
135 Granularity spatial regionsubstance parts of spatial regions are always spatial regions
136 Granularity process parts of processes are always processes
137 MORAL Relations crossing the SNAP/SPAN border are never part-relations
138 Relations crossing the SNAP/SPAN border are never part-relations John’s life substance John physiological processes sustaining in existence
139 problem cases traffic jam forest fire anthrax epidemic hurricane Maria waves shadows
140 forest fire: a process a pack of monkeys jumping from tree to tree the Olympic flame: a process or a thing? anthrax spores are little monkeys
141 hurricanes why do we give an entity a proper name? because it is 1) important, 2) such that we want to re-identify it when it reappears at a later time
142 How do we glue these two different sorts of entities together mereologically? How do we include them both in a single inventory of reality
143 How do we fit these two entities together within a single system of representations? within a directly depicting language?
144 Substances and processes form two distinct orders of being Substances exist as a whole at every point in time at which they exist at all Processes unfold through time, and are never present in full at any given instant during which they exist. When do both exist to be inventoried together?
145 Main problem English swings back and forth between two distinct depictions of reality … imposing both 3-D partitions (yielding substances) and 4-D partitions (yielding processes) at the same time
146 Main problem There is a polymorphous ontological promiscuity of the English sentence, which is inherited also by the form ‘F(a)’ of standard predicate logic
147 Against Fantology For the fantologist “(F(a)”, “R(a,b)” … is the description language for ontology The fantologist sees reality as being made up of atoms plus abstract (1- and n-place) ‘properties’ or ‘attributes’ … confuses logical form with ontological form
148 Formalizing time F(a,b) at t F(a,b,t)
149 John lived in Atlanta for 25 years
150 Formalizing time F(a,b) at t – SNAP F(a,b,t) – Eternalism(?) – stage ontology
151 Two alternative basic ontologies both of which are able to sustain a directly depicting language plus a system of meta-relations for building bridges between the two ontologies via: dependence participation initiation etc.
152 Three views/partitions of the same reality
153 siamese mammal cat organism substance species, genera animal instances frog
154 Common nouns pekinese mammal cat organism substance animal common nouns proper names
155 siamese mammal cat organism substance types animal tokens frog
156 Accidents: Species and instances substance animal mammal human Irishman types tokens this individual token man
157 There are universals both among substances (man, mammal) and among processes (run, movement)
158 Substance universals pertain to what a thing is at all times at which it exists: cow man rock planet VW Golf
159 Note use of ‘substance’ in the sense of ‘thing’, ‘object’ count sense of substance vs. mass sense of substance (‘milk’, ‘gold’)
160 Quality universals pertain to how a thing is at some time at which it exists: red hot suntanned spinning Clintophobic Eurosceptic
161 Qualities, too, instantiate genera and species Thus quality universals form trees
162 quality color red scarlet R232, G54, B24
163 qualities too are distinguished as between tokens and types which is to say: between genera and species on the one hand,... and instances on the other
164 Accidents: Species and instances quality color red scarlet R232, G54, B24 this individual accident of redness (this token redness – here, now)
165 One plus Nine Categories (AQL) quid? substance quale? quality quantum? quantity ad quid? relation ubi? place quando? time in quo situ? status/context in quo habitu? habitus quid agit? action quid patitur? passion
166 Not in a Subject Substantial In a Subject Accidental Said of a Subject Universal, General, Type Second Substances man, horse, mammal Non-substantial Universals whiteness, knowledge Not said of a Subject Particular, Individual, Token First Substances this individual man, this horse this mind, this body Individual Accidents this individual whiteness, knowledge of grammar
167 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular
168 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular
169 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular
170 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular
171 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular
172 Refining the Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular
173 Refining the Ontological Square Substantial Dependent Entities Exercise of power Exercise of function Movement Action Substances Collectives Undetached parts Substantial boundaries Powers Functions Qualities Shapes Occurrents Continuants
174 Refining the Ontological Square Substantial Moments (Dependent) Exercise of power Exercise of function Movement Action Substances Collectives Undetached parts Substantial boundaries Powers Functions Qualities Shapes Occurrents Continuants
175 Refining the Ontological Square Substantial Dependent Entities Exercise of power Exercise of function Movement Action Processes? Substances Collectives Undetached parts Substantial boundaries Powers Functions Qualities Shapes Moments? Occurrents Continuants
176 Refining the Ontological Square Substantial Dependent Entities John‘s reddening John‘s blushing John‘s bruising 4-D Substances Collectives Undetached parts Substantial boundaries John‘s redness John‘s blush John‘s bruise 3-D Occurrents Continuants
177 Refining the Ontological Square Substantial Dependent Entities John‘s reddening John‘s blushing John‘s bruising 4-D (perduring) Stuff (Blood, Snow, Tissue) Mixtures Holes John‘s redness John‘s blush John‘s bruise 3-D (enduring) Occurrents Continuants
178 A Refined Ontological Square Substantial Dependent Entities John‘s reddening John‘s blushing John‘s bruising 4-D (perduring) Stuff (Blood, Snow, Tissue) Mixtures Holes John‘s redness John‘s blush John‘s bruise 3-D (enduring) Occurrents Continuants
179 Aristotle’s Ontological Square SubstantialAccidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular
180 Some philosophers accept only part of the Aristotelian multi-categorial ontology
181 Standard Predicate Logic – F(a), R(a,b)... SubstantialAccidental Attributes F, G, R Individuals a, b, c this, that Universal Particular
182 Bicategorial Nominalism SubstantialAccidental First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular
183 Process Metaphysics SubstantialAccidental Events Processes “Everything is flux” Universal Particular
184 An adequate ontology of geography has to have three components: SNAP GeO SPAN GeO FIELD GeO
185 GeO
186 SNAP GeO
187 SPAN GeO
188 FIELD GeO
189 A good formal ontology must divide into two sub-ontologies: 1. a four-dimensionalist ontology (of processes) cf. Quine 2. a modified presentist ontology cf. Brentano, Aristotle, Chisholm (takes tense seriously)
190 These represent two views of the same rich and messy reality, the reality captured promiscuously by natural language sentences