Automatic and Precise Client-Side Protection against CSRF Attacks.

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Presentation transcript:

Automatic and Precise Client-Side Protection against CSRF Attacks

Road Map  Background / Example  Problem of Current Countermeasures  Main Ideas  Evaluation the Assumption

Background  CSRF: Cross Site Request Forgery  Two domains A and B. Content of origin B initiate requests to origin A, and the browser will treat these requests as being part of the ongoing session with A.  The problem is: if the session with A is authenticated session, B can initiate privileges requests to A, without the user being involved.

Example POST /auth/390/NewUserStep2.ashx HTTP/1.1 Host: mdsec.net Cookie: SessionId=8299BE6B260193DA076383A2385B07B9 Content-Type: application/x-www-form- urlencoded Content-Length: 83 realname=daf&username=daf& userrole=admin&password=letmein1& confirmpassword=letmein1 <form action=” method=”POST”>Chapter 13 Attacking Users: Other Techniques 505 document.forms[0].submit();

Problem of Current Countermeasures  Server-Side:  Require server-side modifications on source code level and it may take a very long time.  Client-Side:  Too strict  Server-Proxy:  Have not published

Main Idea  Except expected request, client-side state is stripped from all cross-origin requests.  Expected Request: A cross-origin request from A to B is expected if B previously delegated to A.  B delegates to A if  B issues a POST request, or  B redirects to A with parameters Conclusion: When origin A trying to send request to origin B, client-side state is stripped, Unless, B trust A.

Main Idea  Two reasons:  Non-malicious collaboration scenarios follow this pattern.  It is hard for attacker to bypass the countermeasure.

Filtering Algorithm

Evaluating the Trusted-Delegation Assumption  Assumption: An origin won’t be attacked by a “ trusted ” origin.  Origin A trust origin B only if A post message to B or A redirect to B with parameters.  10 out of 23 hundred origins are left unprotected by the countermeasure.

Redirecting Search Engines sa=t&rct=j&q=books&source=w eb&cd=3&ved=0CFAQFjAC&url =http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bookdep ository.co.uk%2F&ei=Y_2RT7LLA pKQ8wSn8bDvAw&usg=AFQjC NF8hAxvKCjeraYiftw74cony0jTk Q GET Redirect [Trust]

URL shorteners hrain-f1-explainer/index.html?hpt=wo_c2 Redirect hrain-f1-explainer/index.html?hpt=wo_c2

Questions