Click to edit Master title style © 20101 by Nat Sakimura. Coping with Information Asymmetry SESSION G: Managing Risk & Reducing Online Fraud Using New.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Recruitment Booster.
Advertisements

Security by Design A Prequel for COMPSCI 702. Perspective “Any fool can know. The point is to understand.” - Albert Einstein “Sometimes it's not enough.
Digital ID and Authentication as a Platform Peter Watkins.
Grid Security Infrastructure Tutorial Von Welch Distributed Systems Laboratory U. Of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory.
OpenID RP Reputation in Trusted Exchange NRI 2008/06/10.
Netiquette Rules.
1 Authentication Trustworthiness The Next Stage in Identity-Based Access and Security Tom Board, NUIT.
Mar 12, 2002Mårten Trolin1 This lecture Diffie-Hellman key agreement Authentication Certificates Certificate Authorities SSL/TLS.
1 Cryptography and Network Security Third Edition by William Stallings Lecturer: Dr. Saleem Al_Zoubi.
 Guarantee that EK is safe  Yes because it is stored in and used by hw only  No because it can be obtained if someone has physical access but this can.
1 Key Establishment Symmetric key problem: How do two entities establish shared secret key in the first place? Solutions: Deffie-Hellman trusted key distribution.
Mar 4, 2003Mårten Trolin1 This lecture Diffie-Hellman key agreement Authentication Certificates Certificate Authorities.
EEC 693/793 Special Topics in Electrical Engineering Secure and Dependable Computing Lecture 7 Wenbing Zhao Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering.
© 2010, University of KentPrimeLife Vienna, 10 Sept CardSpace in the Cloud David Chadwick, George Inman University of Kent.
EEC 688/788 Secure and Dependable Computing Lecture 7 Wenbing Zhao Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Cleveland State University
Information Security of Embedded Systems : Algorithms and Measures Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik und Fraunhofer FIRST.
Cryptography and Network Security Third Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown.
Long-term Archive Service Requirements draft-ietf-ltans-reqs-00.txt.
Individual User Logins
Digital Signature Xiaoyan Guo/ Xiaohang Luo/
1 Lecture 18: Security issues specific to security key management services –privacy –integrity/authentication –nonrepudiation/plausible deniability.
Page 1 Secure Communication Paul Krzyzanowski Distributed Systems Except as otherwise noted, the content of this presentation.
Digital Cash By Gaurav Shetty. Agenda Introduction. Introduction. Working. Working. Desired Properties. Desired Properties. Protocols for Digital Cash.
Cong Wang1, Qian Wang1, Kui Ren1 and Wenjing Lou2
Part Two Network Security Applications Chapter 4 Key Distribution and User Authentication.
Cardea Requirements, Authorization Model, Standards and Approach Globus World Security Workshop January 23, 2004 Rebekah Lepro Metz
Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 14 Fifth Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown.
Eng. Wafaa Kanakri Second Semester 1435 CRYPTOGRAPHY & NETWORK SECURITY Chapter 1:Introduction Eng. Wafaa Kanakri UMM AL-QURA UNIVERSITY
1 Addressing security challenges on a global scaleGeneva, 6-7 December 2010.
SAML Right Here, Right Now Hal Lockhart September 25, 2012.
7-Oct-15 Threat on personal data Let the user be aware Privacy and protection.
Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham October 2006 Trustworthy Semantic Webs Lecture #16: Web Services and Security.
© Synergetics Portfolio Security Aspecten.
ArcGIS Server and Portal for ArcGIS An Introduction to Security
European Interoperability Architecture e-SENS Workshop : Collecting data for the Cartography Tool 7-8 January 2015.
Patient Data Security and Privacy Lecture # 7 PHCL 498 Amar Hijazi, Majed Alameel, Mona AlMehaid.
SAML CCOW Work Item HL7 Working Group Meeting San Antonio - January 2008 Presented by: David Staggs, JD CISSP VHA Office of Information Standards.
4 th lecture.  Message to be encrypted: HELLO  Key: XMCKL H E L L O message 7 (H) 4 (E) 11 (L) 11 (L) 14 (O) message + 23 (X) 12 (M) 2 (C) 10 (K) 11.
Introducing the Common App Online For First-Year Admission Last updated:
Key Management. Session and Interchange Keys  Key management – distribution of cryptographic keys, mechanisms used to bind an identity to a key, and.
Data Warehousing Data Mining Privacy. Reading Bhavani Thuraisingham, Murat Kantarcioglu, and Srinivasan Iyer Extended RBAC-design and implementation.
12 Developing a Web Site Section 12.1 Discuss the functions of a Web site Compare and contrast style sheets Apply cascading style sheets (CSS) to a Web.
Government Online Copyright © 2007 Credentica Inc. All Rights Reserved. February 15th - 16th, 2007 Mobile Showcase.
A Data-Reachability Model for Elucidating Privacy and Security Risks Related to the Use of Online Social Networks S. Creese, M. Goldsmith, J. Nurse, E.
(c) Mitsubishi Electric Corp. 1 User Scenarios & Security Considerations in APPAGG part 2/ Nobuhiro Electric.
Reputation Based Trust The using of reputation to accomplish trust between users on the Internet M.Vološin, R.Gore, Ibe2roč. PF UPJŠ, Košice, Slovakia.
SAML FTF #4 Workitems Bob Blakley. SAML “SenderVouches” SubjectConfirmation Method: A Proposed Alternative to Bindings 0.5 Proposals.
Topic 1 – Introduction Huiqun Yu Information Security Principles & Applications.
Payment in Identity Federations David J. Lutz Universitaet Stuttgart.
Security fundamentals Topic 5 Using a Public Key Infrastructure.
FriendFinder Location-aware social networking on mobile phones.
FriendFinder Location-aware social networking on mobile phones.
Computer Science and Engineering 1 Mobile Computing and Security.
FriendFinder Location-aware social networking on mobile phones.
Chapt. 10 – Key Management Dr. Wayne Summers Department of Computer Science Columbus State University
Andrew J. Hewatt, Gayatri Swamynathan and Michael T. Wen Department of Computer Science, UC-Santa Barbara A Case Study of the WS-Security Framework.
Fall 2006CS 395: Computer Security1 Key Management.
Authentication Presenter Meteor Advisory Team Member Version 1.1.
Doc.: IEEE /0098r0 Submission July 2010 Alex Reznik, et. al. (InterDigital)Slide Security Procedures Notice: This document has been.
Csci5233 Computer Security1 Bishop: Chapter 14 Representing Identity.
NIMAC for Accessible Media Producers: February 2013 NIMAC 2.0 for AMPs.
SECURITY. Security Threats, Policies, and Mechanisms There are four types of security threats to consider 1. Interception 2 Interruption 3. Modification.
Dr. Nermi hamza.  A user may gain access to a particular workstation and pretend to be another user operating from that workstation.  A user may eavesdrop.
FIRE1000S - Self-Paced FIREBIRD Training Training on the Federal Investigator Registry of Biomedical Informatics Research Data (FIREBIRD) for Clinical.
Open Reputation Systems. Overview OASIS ORMS (Open Reputation Management Systems) introduction Use cases, requirements and model ENISA Paper on Security.
Key management issues in PGP
Lan Zhou, Vijay Varadharajan, and Michael Hitchens
StudentTranscripts Service Overview
9/14/2018 2:22 AM THR2026 Set up secure and efficient collaboration for your organization with Office 365 Joe Davies Senior Content Developer Brenda Carter.
Office 365 Development.
Presentation transcript:

Click to edit Master title style © by Nat Sakimura. Coping with Information Asymmetry SESSION G: Managing Risk & Reducing Online Fraud Using New Security Technologies Nat Sakimura Nomura Research Institute

© by Nat Sakimura. 2 IdPRP Alice How can I trust this RP that it will treat my data as promised? How can I trust that the user is Alice? Is the data provided accurate? Can I trust this RP? Can I trust Alice?

© by Nat Sakimura. 3 Market Failure

© by Nat Sakimura. 4 Empirical Study n Funded by Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC) n n=117, distributed same as the population. n Observed testing combined with F2F interviews Source: Based on the Report on Identity Federation Substantial Experiment

© by Nat Sakimura. 5 n Restaurant Search Engine + Restaurant Sites (Both Mobile and PC) n Users are told to find the restaurants they want to go and reserve. n Registration requires various user information depending on the site. l Some are traditional “Form Submission” l Some are using Identity Federation and attribute sharing.

© by Nat Sakimura. 6 IdP ② AuthZed Attrs Sent to RP User AuthN + Attr AuthZ RP No need to fill in the info that the user authzed to be sent Attribute Sharing AuthZed Attrs is being sent from IdP to RP - Results - How It looked like Users needed to fill-in the attrs not sent by IdP Name Post Code Address Telephone Mail Address Sex Occupation Age Source: Based on the Report on Identity Federation Substantial Experiment

© by Nat Sakimura. 7 (N=177) Without Attr. Sharing With Attrs Sharing 1’33”0’19” 19.6%7.1% Time Req. to complete registration Input Error Rate ( Down 80% ) ( Down 65% ) Both Time Required to complete And the Error Rate were reduced. - Results - Attribute Sharing Greatly improves the user experience IdP ② AuthZed Attrs Sent to RP User AuthN + Attr AuthZ RP No need to fill in the info that the user authzed to be sent Attribute Sharing Source: Based on the Report on Identity Federation Substantial Experiment

© by Nat Sakimura. 8 -User Feedback - 94% Answered that they want to use Attribute Sharing Services. Do yo want to use such Attribute Sharing Services? Source: Based on the Report on Identity Federation Substantial Experiment

© by Nat Sakimura. 9 Additional Features Wanted by the Users Assist users to find out if the RP is trustworthy Selectively Send the attributes (e.g., not sending telephone no.) Automatically notify/update the selected RPs when Attrs changed. Select one from Multiple “profiles” when sending attrs. -User Feedback - 97% Users wanted to have a way to find out the trustworthiness of the RP Additional Features Requested Source: Based on the Report on Identity Federation Substantial Experiment

© by Nat Sakimura. 10 How? n Third Party Audit l E.g., Open Identity Trust Framework n Reputation “ Reputation is a subjective evaluation of the assertion about an entity being true based on factual and/or subjective data about it, and is used as one of the factors for establishing trust on that subject for a specific purpose. Reputation can be aggregated by rolling up opinions from smaller sets like individuals. ” Open Reputation Management Systems (ORMS) TC

© by Nat Sakimura. 11 ORMS Reference Model Input data collection/ generation Individual & demographic data – entity E Oberved data – Entity E Real-world data: entity E Inferred data: Entity E subjective data – Entity E Input data collection/ generation … Reputation Computer Context Reputation System Reputation of Input entities (local) Reputation Portable Reputation Computation of Trust by (external) Consuming party Pub-Sub Portable Reputation Data Input Computation of Trust by (external) Consuming party Source: ORMS TC, “Use Cases”

© by Nat Sakimura. 12 Reputation Format Requirements 1.Reputation result XML needs to have an identifier of somebody being scored. lIt may include PII (e.g., Social Security Number), so it may be wise to mandate that this be a hash(identifier, salt)?=>Protocol Consideration 2.The same for who is scoring, and sometimes for who is receiving. 3.For what criteria, this reputation score was made. 4.Input Data Range 5.For the reputation to be aggregatable, it has to have a distribution that we know about the aggregated distribution (such as normal distribution). 6.The information about the distribution, including what distribution, mean, and standard deviation must be published together with the score. 7.Display score should be intuitive for an average person. 8.Date that score was made 9.Signature by the score maker so that it will be tamper proof. Source: ORMS TC, “Use Cases”

© by Nat Sakimura. 13 Protocol Requirements n PR1.The reputation consumer SHOULD be able to obtain the reputation file by specifying the assertion including the subject identifier. n PR2.Since the reputation data itself is often an sensitive data including PII, it SHOULD have the following security considerations: l SubjectID SHOULD be represented so that it cannot be traced back to the Subject, e.g., sha256(SubjectID, salt). This implies that the protocol should be a request-response protocol since otherwise the receiver cannot map the file to the Subject. l Be able to make the source detectable in the case of the leakage, the file should contain the requester ID. l To make the request forgery-proof, the request should contain the digital signature of the requesting party. l To protect from eavesdropping and MITM attacks, the response should be encrypted using a content encryption key (session key) which in turn is encrypted by the requesting party’s public key. l Considering that the mere fact that an entity is requesting a reputation representation of the subject may be a privacy risk, the request probably should be encrypted in the same manner as the response, with reputation authority’s public key. Source: ORMS TC, “Use Cases”

© by Nat Sakimura. 14 Example Reputation Display Last Login, How Many Times in the Past. Reputation Authorize Source: Based on the Report on Identity Federation Substantial Experiment