The Sybil attack “One can have, some claim, as many electronic persons as one has time and energy to create.” – Judith S. Donath.

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Presentation transcript:

The Sybil attack “One can have, some claim, as many electronic persons as one has time and energy to create.” – Judith S. Donath

The Sybil attack A B M

Terminology  Entity Collection of material resources, of specifiable minimal size, under control of a single agency E.g., one mobile node E.g., one mobile node  Identity Persistent informational abstraction provably associated Persistent informational abstraction provably associated with a set of communication events with a set of communication events E.g., a public key E.g., a public key  Validation Determination of identity distinctness Determination of identity distinctness

The Sybil attack  One entity presents multiple identities for malicious intent.  Disrupt geographic and multi-path routing protocols by “being in more than one place at once” and reducing diversity.  Relevant in many context: P2P network P2P network Ad hoc networks Ad hoc networks Wireless sensor networks Wireless sensor networks

Validation  Goal: accept all legitimate identities, but no counterfeits.  Verify identities: Direct validation Direct validation Indirect validation Indirect validation

Direct validation Validate the distinctness of two entities by asking them to perform task that one entity can not do:  If the communication resource is restricted, the verifier broadcasts a request for identities and then only accepts replies that occur within a given time interval.  If the storage resource is restricted, the verifier can challenges each identity to store large amount of unique data. The verifier verifies by keeping small excerpts of the data.  If the computation resource is restricted, the verifier challenges each identity to solve a unique computational problem.

Direct validation  Assumption: all entities have identical resource constraints. all entities have identical resource constraints. all involved entities are verified simultaneously. all involved entities are verified simultaneously. Extreme and unrealistic!

Indirect validation  Accept identities that have been validated by a sufficient count of other identities that it has already accepted.  Danger: a group of faulty entities can vouch for counterfeit identities.

Discussion  A centralized identification authority is important, but not enough.  Identity verification.  Authenticated broadcast.  Link-layer encryption and authentication.