Meeting the Challenges of Representation and Accountability in Multi-party Governments Wolfgang C. Müller and Thomas M. Meyer Anna Marta Zaremba

A plan of the presentation 1. Introduction 2. Delegation and decision process within coalitions 3. Control mechanisms and their relative strength 4. Effects of the control in a spatial model 5. Costs and constraints

How can coalitions hold their ministers accountable?

Delegation Lupia defines delegation as ‘an act where one person or group, called a principal, relies on another person or group, called an agent, to act on the principal’s behalf’ The ‘chain of delegation’ voters parliament cabinet specific ministers civil servants

Delegation within the coalition government 1. Parties playing as principals delegate to party leaders and MP’s (agents) who are supposed to pursue the goals of their parties in government and parliament. 2. The coalition delegates to the cabinet which is supposed to follow the objectives of the coalition.

DELEGATON AND DECISION PROCESSES WITHIN COALITIONS

Control mechanisms 1. Ex ante: Screening Contract design 2. Ex post: Monitoring Institutional checks

Screening A mechanism which scans potential candidates for ministerial office Joint selection of the candidates for the sensitive departments like a justice. Parties are free to choose a candidate but the second party has a possibility to veto him/her

Contract design The more detailed the policy agreement is, the lower the probability of ministers pursuing policies that are not acceptable by the coalition partners. Coalitional discipline Election rule- parties agree to call new elections if the coalition fails

Monitoring Committees, including MP’s inspect legislative proposals and in that way find out which ministers deviate from the coalition line. Reduction of hidden action problem

Institutional checks More or less permanent bodies including the representatives from all the coalition parties which are allowed to make institutional checks on ministers and veto or change ministerial proposal. ‘Watchdog’ junior minister- control the activity of a minister and report a deviation of the common policy line to their own party.

Policy positions of three parties in a two- dimensional policy space including winsets

Ex ante control in a coalition

Ex post coalition control mechanisms

Constraints and Costs (1) 1. Due to learning effect, the use of control mechanisms increase over time 2. Control mechanisms are more likely to be used if: the cabinet controls the majority of the seats in parliament and there is considerable time until the next election. 3. Coalition uses control mechanisms if the parties’ policy preferences are different and the parliamentary median party is a member of the cabinet.

Constraints and Costs (2) 1. Institutional prerogatives of the prime minister lead to more often use of control mechanisms. 2. Existence of external veto players makes ex ante agreements between parties less likely. 3. If the coalition players agree on common program, external veto players lead coalition to use control mechanisms more often.

Constraints and Costs (3) Control mechanism are used more often by the coalition if: 1. The previous cabinets broke up due to the policy conflicts 2. There is high electoral volatility 3. Critical events terminated former cabinets