Centrifugal and centripetal forces among regional actors: PA, Hamas, Jordan and Israel Martin Beck Amman, Jordan

Basic Assumptions 1. The Oslo approach of bilateral negotiations as set up by the Oslo Accords failed 2. The idea of a two-state settlement, however, is alive 3. Alternatives to the two-state settlement are not acceptable or not viable

Two-State Settlement from a normative perspective: Reservations? Actor Option IsraelPAHamasJordan 2 Statessomenostrongno 1 Statevery strong some Occupationsomevery strong

Two-State Settlement from an empirical/realistic angle: Reservations? Actor Option IsraelPAHamasJordan 2 Statesstrongnosome 1 Statevery strong some strong Occupationsomestrong

Implications regarding the positions of the actors Israel is the actor with the least clear idea of an option beyond occupation Yet, also a number of Arab actors have some reservations towards the two-state settlement Still, the two-state settlement is the only viable alternative to occupation

Hypotheses regarding the chances of a two-states settlement The regional actors are incapable of realising the two-state settlement Only if the international community is strongly committed to the two-state settlement, will there be a chance for realising it It would be necessary that this commitment includes the readiness to deal with Israeli resistance and to effectively contain illegitimate violence committed by any party

PA, Hamas, Jordan: The complexity of Intra-Arab Relations 1. PA/PLO and Hamas -Prior Interests: Preserving their respective governments -Incentive for re-unification depends on a concrete perspective for a Palestinian state -Secondary interests: Ending the occupation -Probability for achieving this aim depends on the engagement of the international community and Hamas‘ readiness to recognize Israel

PA, Hamas, Jordan: The complexity of Intra-Arab Relations 2. Jordan towards PA (and Hamas) -Prior Interest: Stable relations with Israel -Ambivalent Position: To get involved or not to get involved in West Bank affairs? -Secondary interest: Stable relations with the PA -Ambivalent Position: PA should be strong—but not too strong

Conclusive Hypotheses All regional actors (Israel, PA, Hamas, and Jordan) have at least some incentives to maintain the status quo The Arab actors lack sufficient capabilities to change the status quo The less intense interference from the outside, the higher the likelihood of prolonged occupation Since the Oslo Approach of bilateral negotiations failed, intense interference from the outside can only be effective if a Palestinian state is recognized Due to expected Israeli resistance, the international community would also have to be ready to empower the Palestinian state to effectively govern its territory.