1 MOSC Presentation Grid Collapse 2003 September 22/2004 Information is preliminary subject to ongoing investigations Certain material is from NERC and Hydro One sources

Grid Collapse Pre-disturbance events Ontario’s conditions prior to the disturbance Blackout sequence of events Aftermath Assessment Restoration plans and priorities The Ongoing Investigation

3 The Interconnections

4 Ontario’s Interties with our Neighbours Manitoba Minnesota Michigan New York Quebec

5 Ontario System Conditions Before the Blackout August 14, 2003, 3:06 PM EST Temperature31  C Ontario Demand24,050 MW Imports(New York, Michigan, Quebec, Manitoba, Minnesota) All flows on the transmission system were within limits, Demand was within expectations at the time of the event, All reserve criteria being met, All power system conditions were normal. Sufficient resources were scheduled to meet the demand and reserve obligations for the expected evening peak of 24, 400 MW.

6  Thursday, August 14, 2003 at approximately 03:11 PM EST  Northeastern United States and portions of Canada lost major portions of load, generation and transmission  Effects felt throughout the Eastern Interconnection centered around the Great Lakes  Approximately 61, 800 MW of customer load was lost affecting 50 million people. The Event

7 11:05: :31:34 PM EST Generator Trips 3 ONTARIO 2 1

8 1:02 PM EST Transmission Line Disconnects in Southwestern Ohio 4 ONTARIO

9 2:05:41 - 2:41:33 PM EST Transmission Lines Disconnect between Eastern Ohio and Northern Ohio ONTARIO

10 2:45:33 - 3:08:58 PM EST More Transmission Lines Disconnect from Eastern into Northern Ohio 8 9 Remaining Paths ONTARIO

11 3:08:58 – 3:10:27 PM EST Transmission Lines into Northwestern Ohio Disconnect, and Generation Trips in Central Michigan ONTARIO

12 3:10:00 – 3:10:38 PM EST Transmission Lines Disconnect across Michigan and Northern Ohio, Generation Trips Off Line in Northern Michigan and Northern Ohio, and Northern Ohio Separates from Pennsylvania Remaining paths into eastern Michigan ONTARIO 17

13 Summary of the Situation at 3:10:38 EST

14 Interface flows 3:10:38 PM EST

15 3:10:40 – 3:10:44 PM EST Four Transmission Lines Disconnect between Pennsylvania and New York Remaining Paths ONTARIO

16 3:10:41 PM EST Transmission Line Disconnects and Generation Trips in Northern Ohio

17 3:10:42 – 3:10:45 PM EST Transmission Paths Disconnect in Northern Ontario and New Jersey, Isolating the Northeast Portion of the Eastern Interconnection (North of Lake Superior) 30 ONTARIO

18 Interface flows 3:10:45 PM EST

19 3:10:46 – 3:10:55 PM EST New York Splits East-to-West. New England (except Southwestern Connecticut) and the Maritimes Separate from New York and Remain Intact ONTARIO

20 3:10:50 – 3:11:57 PM EST Ontario Separates from New York West of Niagara Falls and West of St. Lawrence. Southwestern Connecticut Separates from New York and Blacks Out ONTARIO 35

21 Interface Flows at 3:10:51 EST

22 The Ontario power system collapses 3:11:12 PM EST

23 Voltage Profile Ontario Voltages

24 3:13 PM EST Cascading Essentially Over ONTARIO Area affected by blackout (Service maintained in isolated “islands”)

25 Unstable Island remains Beginning of collapse Quickly reduces to ~ 1200 MW

26

MW Load 1200 MW Generation Smoky 30 MW 40 MW Load 720 Generation Des Joachims 20 MW 800 MW Load 480 MW Generation 320 MW 680 MW To New York 900 MW

28 Island #2 Beck 1 & Beck 2 generation: 300 Mw Ontario load 900 Mw NY load Island #1 Saunders generation: 50 Mw of Ontario load 680 Mw NY load Island #3 DesJoachims generation: 20 Mw local Ontario load Island #4 Smoky Falls generation providing 30 Mw at Spruce Falls. Ontario separates from Michigan. It is later confirmed that these 2 islands are connected through the NY system. North West Separation: 800 MW of load 480 Mw of generation Ontario NW remains attached to Manitoba and Minnesota

29 Post Disturbance Actions  Assessment of conditions  Emergency declaration  Market Suspension  Organization of manpower  Determining priorities  Ontario Power System Restoration Plan (OPSRP)

30 Restoration Plan Priorities  Restore Class IV AC power to all nuclear sites  Restore power to critical transmission and generating station, station service loads  Restore critical utility owned telecom facilities  Restore customer loads only to the extent necessary to control voltages and secure generating units  Synchronize islands together and/or to adjacent power systems

31 Restoration Paths

32 Complexities of the Restoration Process  Equipment Problems  Communications  Balancing generation/load and maintaining frequency and voltage  Using load to control high voltage during the line restoration process  Assessing available generation to support restoration  Post Contingency conditions

33 Nine Days of Emergency Operations  Over the week, assessment of insufficient internal and external generation to meet the normal Ontario demand  August 14 Provincial Government declares a Provincial Emergency  August 17 Government requests industrial, commercial and residential customers to reduce load by 50% over peak hours.  Reliable supply maintained at reduced demand level due to:  Customer response to requests for curtailment and conservation  dispatch of emergency generators  emergency purchases from Ontario’s neighbours

34 Nine Days of Emergency Operations Aug-03 1:00 14-Aug-03 13:00 15-Aug-03 1:00 15-Aug-03 13:00 16-Aug-03 1:00 16-Aug-03 13:00 17-Aug-03 1:00 17-Aug-03 13:00 18-Aug-03 1:00 18-Aug-03 13:00 19-Aug-03 1:00 19-Aug-03 13:00 20-Aug-03 1:00 20-Aug-03 13:00 21-Aug-03 1:00 21-Aug-03 13:00 22-Aug-03 1:00 22-Aug-03 13:00 Demand (MW) Normal Forecast ActualEstimated Demand Response

35 Observations Power System Protections Protections intended to isolate equipment from damage worked as designed. These protections provided a safe and orderly shut down for generators, transformers, and transmission lines. Emergency Power Supply to Control Centre Back-up battery/diesel systems worked seamlessly at the IMO’s Control Centre, providing electrical power to enable the IMO to direct the restoration of Ontario’s power system. Public Telephone System With the exception of cell phones that were overloaded early in the event, the public telephone network was generally available to the Control Centre. Subsequently, the heavy traffic made arranging large conference calls difficult.

36 Observations System Restoration and Crisis Management Processes  Efficient and effective assignment of accountabilities within the control room  Good cooperation from field staff of generators and transmitters  Good cooperation with neighbouring area operators  Successful restoration plan Large-scale restoration is inherently complex, and our control room staff adapted to changing circumstances as the restoration proceeded, modifying approaches as necessary to achieve objectives. The overall restoration and crisis management processes proceeded in an orderly fashion and met their objectives.

37 A Communications Centre was set up to brief media on status of system restoration in Ontario and to provide information as to how customers can assist in the restoration effort. Press conferences, scheduled twice daily, were coordinated with Provincial officials. Provincial government officials were continuously briefed on power restoration priorities to ensure coordination with other government agencies. Communication Centre / Provincial Decision Support

38 1.We confirmed that the devices that are in place to protect equipment operated as planned 2.We confirmed that maintaining a well- documented restoration plan, supported by training and rehearsals involving the IMO, market participants and government, was and will continue to be a key investment 3.We confirmed that close cooperation amongst the IMO, the interconnections, and Ontario Transmitters, Generators, market participants and government is essential to achieving an orderly restoration. Early Lessons Learned

39 4.Effective communications is paramount to reliable operation. 5.The extreme speed at which events can cascade across the system increases the significance of timely information. Early Lessons Learned

40 1. Maintain and enhance the integration of systems and markets through robust interconnections with our neighbours Prevention of Future Incidents 2. Reliability standards for the interconnected North American grid should be mandatory. 3.The industry should build on the strong institutional and regulatory foundations already in place

41 4.The industry should continue to pursue the three part strategy of Prevention, Containment and Minimization of Impact: Prevention of Future Incidents Prevention: Through good planning and operations, adequate investments and putting in place mandatory enforceable standards. Containment: Through monitoring capabilities, communication protocols, as well as equipment and processes that are set to limit the scale of disturbances. Minimization of Impact: Through good restoration plans, practical training, education and communications.

42 The Ongoing Investigation

43 IMO Follow-up Tasks in Progress Restoration Issues EPTF (Emergency Preparedness Task Force)  Forming a special group, RWG (RestorationWorking Group) to evaluate and make recommendations on the restoration process and plan Infrastructure Issues - IMO and Market Participants Technical Analysis Issues - IMO and Market Participants Industry Issues - IMO/NPCC/NERC

44 Thanks to all of you for aiding in a successful restoration of the IMO Controlled Grid