Target Controls Introduction Linda R. Coney Group Leader – Target Safety and Controls Jülich Meeting 17 August 2015

Outline Controls at ESS – ICS & Target Divisions – Division of responsibility for the different control systems – Personnel – Scope of controls systems Target Safety System (TSS) – Target Division – Description & plan for development – Requirements determination – Hazard Analysis Target Controls – Integrated Control System Division – Process Controls – MPS (Machine Protection System) – PSS (Personnel Safety System) 2

The ESS Organisation 3 H. Carling

Top Level Requirements for Controls Provide the following to ESS: – Control system framework for monitoring and control of accelerator, target, instruments and conventional facilities – Timing service for generating events, synchronization of devices and time stamping (in the ns range) – Control system services and applications to perform commissioning and operations – IOC and Integration Support to stakeholders – Machine Protection (MPS) and Personnel Safety systems (PSS) – Control Room(s) Constraining requirements – High reliability and availability (>95%)!

ICS Organisation 5 Henrik Carling Head of Division SOFTWARE AND SERVICES Group Leader - vacant Leandro Fernandez Richard Fearn Ricardo Fernandes Emanuele Laface Karin Rathsman Jaka Bobnar (C) Jakob Battellino (C) Miha Vitorovič (C) Jure Krašna (C) Marko Kolar (C) Miroslav Pavleski (C) HARDWARE AND INTEGRATION Daniel Piso Fernandez - GL Lead Integrator, Accelerator (vacant) Target Lead Integrator vacant – Benedetto Gallese Javier Cerejo Garcia Nick Levchenko Klemen Strniša (C) Urša Rojec (C) Niklas Claesson (C) Alexander Söderqvist (C) Žiga Kroflič (C) Rok Štefanič (C) Gregor Cijan (C) PROTECTION SYSTEMS Annika Nordt – GL Manuel Zaera-Sanz Angel Montera Martinez Stuart Birch Denis Paulic M. Mansouri R. Andersson INFRASTRUCTURE Remy Mudingay (1/2015) (Infrastructure Technology ) Deputy Head of Division (vacant) Timo Korhonen – Chief Engineer Deputy Project Manager - vacant Thilo Friedrich – Systems & Standardization Eng, PhD Iñigo Alonso - Intern Solveig Aas – Team Assistant

ESS Control Systems – Objectives TSS - Limit transfer of radioactive contamination to the public, workers, and environment PSS - Suppress radiologic hazards by switching off the proton beam – Control access to restricted areas during operations MPS – Protect investment from damage due to beam losses and malfunctioning equipment – Optimize integrated machine performance – Stop beam – Beam Interlock System Process Control – operational control & monitoring of systems 6 TSS – Independent safety-qualified system  Not tied into other I&C systems Process Control

TSS – Purpose TSS is a safety critical system designed to protect the public and environment from radioactive release Active control and monitoring system – It is likely that the TSS will need to be able to shut down the proton beam – Actions not necessarily limited to beam shut down Safety-certified system – Essential to the certification process for the ESS – Working closely with the ES&H group on requirements 7

TSS – Preliminary Top Level Requirements Single failure criterion: – Redundancy, physical separation adapted to different aggressors (zoning) – Independence, electrical isolation Fail-safe principle – Safe state must be clearly identified – Loss of power  actuators default to safe position – Actuator commands ‘de-energize to trip’ Emergency power supply coverage Qualified for extreme operating conditions  seismic classification for a subset of functions No requirement on post-trip machine availability – Contrasts with MPS (Machine Protection System) – non-safety system designed to monitor machine parameters, shut down beam, and allow quick turn-around 8

TSS – Requirements Determination Perform Hazard Analyses on all Target Station systems Use this tool to: – Understand potential hazardous scenarios – Define necessary mitigations – includes possible TSS actions Qualitative Hazard Analysis procedure – Define the system under analysis – include drawings, schematics, etc. – Identify hazards – Radioactivity, stored energy, explosion, impact (load drop) – Identify initiating events and top events – circumstances lead to hazardous situation – Describe unmitigated consequences – Estimate probability and severity  unmitigated risk ranking – Define applicable mitigations – Reassess severity  mitigated risk ranking Includes confinement & safety barriers and associated triggers for active safety system Accident Analysis/Quantitative Hazard Analysis – Technical analysis to determine contamination path(s) and accident progression – Inventory and release factors – Calculate dose to public and/or workers – Determine appropriate mitigation – safety classified equipment and systems 9

Pilot TSS Hazard analysis process is on-going & long term Move forward with TSS design work – create Pilot TSS – Make assumptions based on events most likely to require mitigation – Recognize that requirements on TSS may change if need identified in Hazard Analyses Chosen events 1.Target wheel stops 2.Target wheel loss of helium cooling (high temp or low flow) 10

Pilot TSS – Design Concepts Monitor target systems Target cooling system – He flow, He temperature or pressure Target wheel – shaft speed, drive load, wheel motion (monitoring plug?) Defining optimal detection methods & interfaces with system owners Two shutdown mechanisms to stop beam Ion source and possibly RFQ Direct access/priority to shutdown mechanisms Defining interfaces with accelerator and MPS/PSS Use safety-rated PLCs Two separate TSS rooms in Target building – Identified in CF plan Independent paths to each beam shut-off system Defining cable paths with CF Separate from ICS controls – cable-trays, UPS, shutdown mechanisms Satisfy requirements & protect public with as-simple-as-possible system 11

ICS Control Systems for Target Process Controls – Operational monitoring and control for Target equipment – No safety related to radiation within process controls Machine Protection System (MPS) – Optimize operational efficiency, machine availability, & reliability – Requirements Stop the proton beam in case of failures Prevent damage to elements in the accelerator & target Provide tools for failure-tracing throughout machine – Objectives Protect the machine Protect the beam – avoid unnecessary beam-stops Personnel Safety System (PSS) – Protect personnel against unnecessary exposure to hazards from the machine, including radioactivity, electromagnetic radiation, oxygen deprivation hazards – Support multiple operational modes of facility – Primarily access control & radiation monitoring and alarm systems 12

Target – ICS Interfaces Systems necessary for control, monitoring, and operations of Target equipment – Yellow = Target owned, Blue = ICS owned – Green hashed = Building area, not Target equipment – Lines/arrows indicate flow of information/data 13 Target wheel systems Monolith systems Fluid systems Remote Handling Systems Control BoxEPICSTarget PSS Timing system PSS global Human machine interface (HMI) Target MPS MPS global Target Instrum- entation TSS Accelerator Utility Rooms Beam Dump Active Cells Facility Target building areas

ICS and Target responsibility EPICS Domain Target responsibility ICS responsibility (EPICS integration) EPICS = Experimental Physics and Industrial Control System Specific to each case

Target subsystem documentation Procedure of work ICS – Target Internal target subsystem intro meeting ICS (Benedetto) - Target subsystem intro meeting Target subsystem document update if needed Introduce ICS design team Weekly meetings ICS design team – target subsystem PDRCDR Target subsystem documentation ICS subsystem design specification

Controls – Protection and Safety Systems ICS MPSPSS TSS Target

MPS (Machine Protection System) – Target Beam Interlock System (BIS) – Terminates beam production when failure detected – Establishes a global BEAM PERMIT – Determines permissible operational modes Machine configuration + beam parameters Fast response-time system – 10  sec Sensors – BLMs, BCMs, BPMs – Response for slower time-scale sensors & systems < 70 msec 17 BIS for Target – Time scale of response ~100msec – Ongoing Risk Analyses will provide information on input Ex. Movement of target wheel – position synchronized with proton beam arrival – Preliminary example: Input signals for Target Slave as part of Beam Interlock System Beam Permit given if all conditions met

PSS (Personnel Safety System) – Target Under development now – Preliminary requirements/design discussions under way Controlled access systems for rooms next to target station (red) on all floors – Beam-off triggered Remote Handling galleries/Maintenance cell area require access control tied to radiation monitoring – Not tied to accelerator operations or beam interlock 18

Conclusion Shown brief overview of controls for Target systems Contacts for each system: – Integrated Controls Systems Division In-kind contact – Henrick Carling Responsible for standard control & monitoring for Target – Acting Target Lead Integrator – Benedetto Gallese Responsible for Machine Protection System (MPS) – Annika Nordt Responsible for Personnel Safety System (PSS) – Stuart Birch Responsible for Global Timing System – Timo Korhonen – Target Responsible for Target Safety System (TSS) – Linda Coney 19

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