SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY Regulatory preparations for the next NPP projects in Finland Finnish Energy Conference 08 Tampere, 29 October 2008 Lasse Reiman Director STUK - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Olkiluoto NPP (TVO) 2 operating units - ABB BWRs EPR under construction EIA done for Olkiluoto 4 Loviisa NPP (Fortum) 2 operating units - VVERs EIA done for Loviisa 3 Fennovoima Ltd EIA ongoing on 3 alternative sites for a new plant Nuclear power plants in Finland

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Feasibility studies Licensing Steps - Olkiluoto 3 schedule Decision in Principle Construction License Operating License Bidding & site preparation Construction May 1998 – – May 2002 – February 2005 ? energy policy nuclear safety Siting including EIA

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Feasibility Studies: Design issues that are chosen by the license applicant are discussed between the vendor, licensee, and regulator (STUK) objective of these three party discussions is to identify of possible “show stoppers” from licensing point of view and discuss key safety issues of each design 2.Decision in Principle: Basic design requirements and main safety features of each proposed alternative design are reviewed by STUK STUK’s conclusions are formally presented in its preliminary safety assessment 3.Bidding phase: Conclusions in STUK’s preliminary safety assessment are clarified as necessary, and the positions of the respective vendors are discussed between the three parties Regulatory review of the NPP design is conducted in several phases – in gradually increasing depths

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Construction License: Design criteria and conceptual design of the plant, safety related systems and systems integration are reviewed before STUK presents it safety assessment – review covers also deterministic safety analysis and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) main design features are assessed at this stage 5.During construction: Detailed design features of systems, structures and components are reviewed − review covers also deterministic safety analysis and PRA revised for “as built” design. safety assessment for Operating License is based on review and inspections conducted throughout the construction phase Regulatory review of the NPP design is conducted in several phases – in gradually increasing depths

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR For Decision in Principle: Strength of license applicants’ and vendors’ organisations for construction and operation of a nuclear power plant. 2.For Construction License: Plans for organising the safety and quality management during the project (licensee, vendor, major contractors, interactions between key organisations). 3.During construction: Performance of the organisations in managing safety and quality issues. Oversight of manufacturing and construction to verify that QA and QC activities of licensee, vendor, and the manufacturers are properly conducted Regular audits to assess licensee’s and vendor’s safety relevant management processes STUK reviews also capabilities and management of the involved organisations

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Feasibility studies Feasibility study precedes the actual licensing and is done in parallel with siting process –Nuclear Energy Act (§ 55): STUK may, upon request by anyone planning to use nuclear energy, check the plan drawn up by them and issue preliminary instructions on what should be taken into account with respect to safety, physical protection and emergency planning. –The Act thus gives STUK a mandate to discuss key safety issues before formal license application a possibility to charge utilities for the assessment work

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Feasibility studies Important aspects to be considered in the feasibility study phase –It is not a licensing phase (there are no formal decisions, unless explicitly requested by the utility) –Equal treatment of different designs and vendors - interpretation of safety requirements in different designs –Meetings are carefully documented to avoid misunderstandings –Open items to be discussed in the future steps of the licensing are listed

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Feasibility study phase - topics under discussion regarding new reactor projects (1) External threats –protection against air craft crashes - loads to be considered in the design (penetration, vibrations, fires) –malevolent acts –severe weather conditions Design basis accidents –Identification of most limiting accident(s) for the design, for example 2ALOCA as a design basis accident (environmental qualification, capacities of core cooling systems, loads to be considered in the design of containment and primary components) –Identification of Design Extension Conditions Severe accidents –independent systems and components for severe accident management –hydrogen management and containment design –containment filtered venting system for long term accident management

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Feasibility study phase - topics under discussion regarding new reactor projects (2) Safety classification of systems, structures and components –scope of SC2 (frontline and their support systems) –use of standardised components in higher safety classes Safety systems - application of redundancy, diversity and separation principles –fulfilment of N+2 failure criteria in SC2 systems –diversification of safety functions - diverse means for shutdown, cooling and radioactivity control in case of loss of dedicated frontline systems –separation requirements between redundancies and between diverse functions within one redundancy Plant layout –physical separation - internal and external hazards Design and manufacturing of primary circuit components

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Feasibility study phase - topics under discussion regarding new reactor projects (3) Principles of Electrical and I&C systems design –architecture - application of defence in depth within the design and fulfilment of independence requirements between different systems –standards to be applied in the design –safety classification Passive plants –safety classification of passive systems and active systems needed to bring the plant into cold shutdown –criteria and application of failure criteria in a passive plant –definition of controlled state Requirements for the use and scope of PRA Application of national civil construction codes in Finland (size of accepted steel rebar) Capabilities and experience of the utility and vendor –resources and tools for engineering, procurement and construction –special attention to the subcontractor management Licensing and oversight activities Siting issues

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Ongoing Feasibility Studies Teollisuuden Voima Ltd –Environmental Impact Assessment process for OL4 almost finalised (reactor MWe) - Statement of the contact authority, Ministry of Employment and the Economy (TEM) has been issued. –Feasibility studies are ongoing including negotiations between plant vendors and STUK –Application for Decision in Principle submitted to the Ministry (TEM) in April. –Designs in the application ABWR, Toshiba Westinghouse (TWE) APWR, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (MHI) AP1400 Korean Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) EPR (Areva) ESBWR, GE Hitachi (GEH)

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Ongoing Feasibility Studies Fortum Power and Heat Ltd –Feasibility studies ongoing - negotiations between Fortum, Vendors and STUK begun in May 2008 –Schedule: EIA done in autumn 2008, Readiness to submit the application for Decision in Principle to the Ministry during second half of 2008 –Feasibility Studies for following designs: ABWR Toshiba Westinghouse (TWE) AES2006 Atomstroyexport (ASE) EPR (Areva) ESBWR GE Hitachi (GEH)

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Ongoing Feasibility Studies Fennovoima Ltd –Fennovoima is a new Finnish nuclear power company that aims at constructing one or two 1000–1800 MW nuclear power plant units in Finland –Feasibility studies are ongoing - negotiations between Fennovoima, Vendors and STUK begun in May 2008 –EIA conducted during 2008, application for Decision in Principle to be submitted to the Ministry (TEM) by the end of 2008 or early 2009 –Feasibility Studies for following designs: ABWR Toshiba Westinghouse (TWE) EPR (Areva) SWR1000 (Areva)

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Site characterization Geology and seismology Hydrology Meteorology Transport routes (sea, land and air routes, pipelines) –oil and hazardous substances Industrial activities –production, storage Population Information on the following topics is required for assessing site suitability and for determining plant design values for external events

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Meteorology and hydrology Phenomena considered in design of OL3 Highest and lowest outdoor air temperature –instantaneous, short term, long term Air humidity Extreme wind speed –including tornadoes (trombs) and downbursts Seawater temperature –high temparature –subcooling, frazil ice formation Seawater level, extreme high and low –all sites are coastal Ice conditions Precipitation Snow load Lightning peak current, rise time etc. Combinations of correlated events are potentially important –snow and wind: potential for loss of offsite power and simultaneous failure of diesel generators due to combustion air intake blockage

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Principles of emergency zoning YVL 1.10 Siting criteria –site area, about 1 km radius –protective zone, 5 km radius the essential question is the possibility to evacuate the population no hospitals or other facilities difficult to evacuate no activities that could cause danger to the plant –detailed emergency planning area, about 20 km radius

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Simo, Karsikkoniemi 18

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Pyhäjoki, Hanhikivi 19

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Ruotsinpyhtää, Kampuslandet and Gäddbergsö 20

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Overall reform of Finnish nuclear safety regulations The Nuclear Energy Act is revised basic safety requirements are moved from the old Government Decisions to the Act reflecting the new Finnish constitution of 2000 the Act is completed with physical protection related requirements requirements on decommissioning added new Advisory Committee for security issues established no changes in the licensing process The new Government Decrees will replace the old Government Decisions some existing requirements in the YVL Guides moved to the Decrees requirements concerning Management Systems revised experiences from OL 3 project taken into account –Design Extension Conditions introduced into Finnish regulations

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Design Extension Conditions Design Extension Conditions refer to events in which a common-cause failure or a complex combination of failures occurring in the safety systems are related to an initiating event, and which the NPP is expected to withstand without severe fuel damages Examples of DECs ATWS loss of a safety injection system in connection with a small leakage loss of grid connection and normal emergency electrical power supply in connection with a small leakage loss of normal ultimate heat sink (3 days) loss of digital I&C system/systems loss of fuel ponds cooling system rupture of several SG tubes stuck-open safety relief valve in connection with a primary to secondary circuit leakage extreme weather conditions (cliff-edge effects) airplane crash

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Overall reform of the STUK-YVL guidance approach Initiated in 2006 and continues until 2011 structure of the whole system has been re-evaluated standard format for single guides has been developed consistent terminology / full coherence with the new Government Decrees and between different guides will be ensured experiences from OL3 project will be taken into account consideration of IAEA safety standards and WENRA reference requirements STUK-YVL Guides are to be applied as such to new NPPs, application to operating plants or plants under construction is considered case by case (no changes in this policy)

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Nuclear materials and nuclear waste 5.1 Procurement of nuclear fuel (V/YMO) 5.2 Safeguards control (II/YMA) 5.3 Transportation of nuclear materials and nuclear waste (IV/YMA) 5.4 Storage of nuclear fuel (III/YMO) 5.5 Waste management and decommissioning (IV/YJÄ) 5.6 Disposal of nuclear waste (II/YJÄ) 6 Structures and components of nuclear facilities 6.1 Fabrication and operation of nuclear fuel (V/MEK) 6.2 Mechanical structures and components (III/MEK) 6.3 Structures of construction engineering (IV/VLT) 6.4 Electrical and automation equipment (IV/VLT) 1 General Safety Requirements 1.1 Regulatory oversight of nuclear facilities (II/VR) 1.2 Definitions applied in STUK-YVL Guides (I/VR) Structure of new STUK-YVL Guidance Approach 4 Radiation safety of nuclear facilities 4.1 Radiation protection of personnel (III/SÄT) 4.2 Environmental releases from NPPs (IV/SÄT) 4.3 Measurement of environmental releases (IV/SÄT) 4.4 Constructive arrangements for radiation safety in nuclear facilities (V/SÄT) 2 Safety management of nuclear facilities 2.1 Management systems (IV/NiK) 2.2 Personnel (II/NiK) 2.3 Construction operations (III/PT) 2.4 Operating operations (II/TiE) 2.5 Safety assessment (IV/REA) 2.6 Risk management (I/RV) 2.7 Manufacturing, inspection and technical support (III/MEK) 2.8 Management of modifications (II/TV) 2.9 Condition monitoring, maintenance and ageing management (I/PK) 2.10 Physical protection (II/RO) 2.11 Emergency preparedness (I/TS) 2.12 Nuclear liability (V/VR) 2.13 Reporting (V/OKA) 2.14 Operating experience and feedback (III/OKA) 3 Plant and system level design 3.1 General design criteria (II/REA) 3.2 Safety classification of systems, structures and components (I/KV) 3.3 Reactor and nuclear fuel (IV/REA) 3.4 Primary circuit (IV/MEK) 3.5 Safety systems (III/REA) 3.6 Containment (III/REA) 3.7 Internal and external threats (III/VLT) 3.8 Fire protection (V/VLT) Stage I, Pilot study, four guides and definitions, Stage II, Eight guides, Stages III - V, seven to eight guides in each stage

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Organization and Resource Management Change of the NRR organization effective 1 April, 2008 several goals, among them –to enable growing of the organization –to enable succession planning –to make the organization less vulnerable –to expand the knowledge of superiors –to increase co-operation between the basic organizational units –to spread decision-making to assistant directors –to develop internal reporting

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Organization

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Organization and Resource Management STUK’s strategy and long-term action plan ( ) of NRR renewed in the beginning of this year Action plan includes for example basic principles for –development of activities –knowledge management –resource management –actions to promote well-being of the staff In addition a separate long-term resource plan of NRR ( ) is made and updated yearly Use of TSOs and consultants for short-term activities an important part of RM Changes in the regulations and practices need to be considered, too –safety classification –inspections in lower safety classes

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Organization and Resource Management Short-term RM as a part of the yearly planning process the work of each inspector is allocated to different projects for each quadrant of the year work-load of inspectors is followed in several ways Long-term RM long-term plan takes into account future tasks and retirements, updated yearly replacement recruitments typically 1-2 years in advance essential issue is the scheduling of new NPP projects in addition to oversight activities, resources are needed for renewing regulations

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Organization and Resource Management Net-budgeting is a pre-requisite for flexible practices Long-term plan does not yet take into account resources needed for construction of more than one NPP at the same time Plan includes about 30 recruitments of which about half are replacements due to retirements Three main sources in recruitments –Technical Universities –Technical Research Center of Finland (VTT) –conventional industry For each new inspector a personal development plan is made –Basic Professional Training Course on Nuclear Safety (YK) –on-the-job training –mentoring National research programs (SAFIR2010) produce experts and basic capabilities into the nuclear field in Finland

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR NRR long-term resource plan

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Age distribution of NRR

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Number of Documents Received

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR OL3: Number of Documents Received

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Conclusions (1) Regulator’s role in bidding phase The licensee and the regulator need to discuss early enough on how national safety requirements should be included in the call for tenders, to ensure that requirements are clearly defined and accurate – just making reference to national regulatory guides is not adequate.

SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY LR Conclusions (2) Preparedness for project implementation Planning of the project management resources and the assessment of preparedness of each party to implement a major project in proposed schedule is necessary to avoid unexpected delays –overall human resources, expertise, experience, and organisation (including QA arrangements) available to the licensee and vendor –capability of each potential vendor to implement the project –status of each design which is considered as true alternative The regulator should verify that the licensee has adequate in-house capabilities and has properly evaluated the state of the design, and the design and engineering, manufacturing and constructing resources available to the vendor.