Instructor: Shengyu Zhang 1. Resource allocation General goals:  Maximize social welfare.  Fairness.  Stability. 2.

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Presentation transcript:

Instructor: Shengyu Zhang 1

Resource allocation General goals:  Maximize social welfare.  Fairness.  Stability. 2

Cake cutting 3

4

1. Alice cuts the cake into two equal pieces  by her measure 2. Bob chooses a larger piece  by his measure 3. Alice takes the other piece 5

6

envy-free Theorem. The outcome is envy-free (and thus fair). Proof.  Alice: gets exactly half, no matter which piece Bob chooses.  Bob: gets at least half, no matter how Alice cuts the cake. 7

Stage 0: Player 1 divides into three equal pieces  according to his valuation. Player 2 trims the largest piece s.t. the remaining is the same as the second largest. The trimmed part is called Cake 2; the other form Cake 1. 8

Stage 1: division of Cake 1 9

Stage 2 (division of Cake 2) 10

Whole process 11 Cake 2

Envy-freeness The division of Cake 1 is envy-free: Player 3 chooses first so he doesn’t envy others. Player 2 likes the trimmed piece and another piece equally, both better than the third piece. Player 2 is guaranteed to receive one of these two pieces, thus doesn’t envy others. Player 1 is indifferent judging the two untrimmed pieces and indeed receives an untrimmed piece. 12

Envy-freeness of Cake 2 13

14

Fairness 15

Moving Knife protocols 16

Fairness and complexity 17

Resource allocation The previous example of cake cutting is to allocate divisible resource. Similar examples include time, memory on a computer, etc. But sometimes resources are indivisible.  Pictures, cars, … in heritage.  Baby, house, … in a divorce 18

Assignment 19

Assignment Note that each person has a different valuation of the four rooms.  Someone prefers a large room with private bathroom.  Someone prefers small room with low price. 20

General setup 21

General setup 22

General setup 23

General setup Question 1: Does there exist an envy-free solution ?  Sounds too good to be true. Question 2: If there exists envy-free solutions, can we find one efficiently?  Seems pretty hard… 24

General setup Question 1: Does there exist an envy-free solution ?  Yes! Question 2: If there exists envy-free solutions, can we find one efficiently?  Yes! 25

General setup Question 1: Does there exist an envy- free solution?  Yes! Question 2: If there exists envy-free solutions, can we find one efficiently?  Yes! 26 That’s the power of linear program!

Item owner’s utility 27

LP 28

LP 29

Surprise 30

31

32

dual 33

34

Complementary slackness 35

algorithm 36

Summary Resource allocation naturally arises in many applications. Main goal is to achieve high social welfare as well as fairness. Examples:  Divisible: cake cutting  Indivisible: assignment game 37