SAMUEL J BIRK Role Preference in Electronic Bargaining Contexts

Background-Ultimatum Games $20 demonstration People typically prefer the proposer role

How I got Here Day 1 project  Sam can program  OBHDP R&R sounds great! Role preference reversed in Electronic Bargaining Games  Why?  Can we reverse it?

Trust Ability  The trustor’s perception of the trustee’s competencies and knowledge salient to the expected behavior Benevolence  The extent to which a trustee is believed to intend doing good to the trustor, beyond its own profit motive

Hypothesis 1 When consumers perceive that the e-commerce site is both capable and benevolent in regard to the transaction, consumers will prefer to defer to the e- commerce site and prefer the receiver role.

Intermediaries Vs Direct Buy Sites Intermediaries have more knowledge (Ability) Intermediaries economic interest is in-line with the consumers (Benevolence) Hypothesis 2: Consumers trust intermediaries more than direct-buy sites leading to a stronger preference to act as the proposer when interacting with direct buy sites and as the receiver when interacting with intermediaries.

Market Information The availability of market information influences preference for proposer role. This is especially true if you do not trust the service provider Hypothesis 3: The amount of market information available to the consumer will moderate the effect of trust on role preference, such that the influence of trust on role preference will be stronger when market information is available.

Model

Design Four Conditions  Intermediaries Vs Direct Buy  No Market Info Versus 10 Similar Hotel Prices

Procedures Assume the role of a consumer interested in a hotel in Miami Go to site Option to view market information Explain that they can either propose a price to site or the site can propose a price to them. If the price is accepted the transaction is completed, otherwise no hotel. Would you rather propose the price or have the site propose a price to you?