Ragnar Arnason: A Review of International Experiences with ITQs Background information United States is the 5 th largest fishing nation. Basic fisheries.

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Presentation transcript:

Ragnar Arnason: A Review of International Experiences with ITQs Background information United States is the 5 th largest fishing nation. Basic fisheries management law in US is Magnuson – Stevens Fishery and management act. (8 regional mgt. councils). ITQs established in 4 fisheries in 1990s with some degree of success, two more proposed in late 1990s, blocked by congress Currently only three ITQ managed fisheries in USA. Three fisheries are (1) Ocean quahog and surf clams fisheries (2) Atlantic wreckfish fishery (3) North Pacific Halibut/Sablefish fisheries

Discussion of (1) Ocean quahog and surf clams fisheries. Initial allocation based on historical catch record Ownership of a vessel is not a requirement for holding a quota ITQs are freely tradable, anyone can hold ITQ, no upper limits on size of ownership except to the extent it may violate US Antitrust Laws. Substantial trade in quotas => in first two years number of vessels reduced from 128 to 59, and then in next few years down to 35. Following intro of ITQ, enforcement costs plummeted. A lot of detailed conservation regulations became redundant, could be scrapped.

Discussion of (2) Atlantic Wreckfish fishery. ½ of initial allocation based on vessel owner catch record ½ divided equally to all that had a history of participation in fishery. ITQs are freely tradable Substantial trade in quotas => vessels reduced from 90 to 40 in first two years, and in next few years down to 9. Cost of enforcement reduced under ITQ. Coupons followed the landed fish through purchasing chain, thus making it possible to verify landing receipts. Question: What about the fact that only 1/10 the vessels remain? Author did not mention this.

Discussion of (3) North Pacific Halibut/Sablefish fisheries. Initial allocation only to vessel owners and lessors that had landings in at least one of the years Quota associated with a vessel. Owner has to be on vessel when quota is caught. Transferability restricted to the same vessel class. Question: When above restrictions diminish value of quotas, who’s interest do they serve? ITQ trade/holdings subject to a number of restrictions that are constantly evolving. Cost of enforcement decreased. Everyone gets a debit card.

Summary: Anecdotal evidence of increased compliance and increased resource stewardship under the three ITQ systems. e.g. Fisherman voluntarily removed bottom longlines known to damage corals from their arsenal. Question: Why does the US only have three ITQ managed fisheries?