The 1973 War The Yom Kippur War, or the Ramadan War, or the October War or the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

War Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War, October War or the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Fought by a coalition of Arab States led by Egypt and Syria against Israel. The 1973 war was vital in spurring both sides to accept peace talks as a solution to the conflict in the Middle East. Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War, October War or the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Fought by a coalition of Arab States led by Egypt and Syria against Israel. The 1973 war was vital in spurring both sides to accept peace talks as a solution to the conflict in the Middle East.

Goals Sadat did not set out to destroy Israel. The IDF was too strong, and the United States would never let its ally fall. Rather, he wanted to deliver a blow that would shake the IDF's sense of invincibility—inflated by its quick victory in the 1967 war—and persuade Israel and its allies that the negotiating table offered the best chance for security. "If we could recapture even four inches of Sinai territory," he reasoned, "then the whole situation would change—east, west, all over." Sadat did not set out to destroy Israel. The IDF was too strong, and the United States would never let its ally fall. Rather, he wanted to deliver a blow that would shake the IDF's sense of invincibility—inflated by its quick victory in the 1967 war—and persuade Israel and its allies that the negotiating table offered the best chance for security. "If we could recapture even four inches of Sinai territory," he reasoned, "then the whole situation would change—east, west, all over."

Strategy The key, Sadat believed, was to quickly retake as much land as possible to give Egypt a strong bargaining position in negotiations that would undoubtedly follow. "He who wins the first 24-hour encounter," Sadat said, "will surely win the entire war." To achieve his goals, Sadat would have to rely on powerful allies. The Soviets backed the Egyptians, providing cutting edge planes, anti-air batteries, and political support. The key, Sadat believed, was to quickly retake as much land as possible to give Egypt a strong bargaining position in negotiations that would undoubtedly follow. "He who wins the first 24-hour encounter," Sadat said, "will surely win the entire war." To achieve his goals, Sadat would have to rely on powerful allies. The Soviets backed the Egyptians, providing cutting edge planes, anti-air batteries, and political support.

Israeli overconfidence Strutting with confidence after the Arab collapse in the 1967 war, Israel's military leaders underestimated their foes. "Put all [the Arabs'] paratroops... on a hill," one major general crowed, "and I'll wipe them out with two tanks." Zvi Zamir, head of Mossad, Israel's secret service, later admitted: "We scorned them." Strutting with confidence after the Arab collapse in the 1967 war, Israel's military leaders underestimated their foes. "Put all [the Arabs'] paratroops... on a hill," one major general crowed, "and I'll wipe them out with two tanks." Zvi Zamir, head of Mossad, Israel's secret service, later admitted: "We scorned them."

Campaign of deception The Arabs built up their armies, and some Israeli officials urged a preemptive strike. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister Golda Meir were worried that Israel would be seen as the aggressor. "War is imminent," Mossad spies reported on October 5, but the head of Israeli military intelligence dismissed the warning. Dayan and Meir expected an attack, but not the military, political, and economic war that the Arabs had prepared. The Arabs built up their armies, and some Israeli officials urged a preemptive strike. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister Golda Meir were worried that Israel would be seen as the aggressor. "War is imminent," Mossad spies reported on October 5, but the head of Israeli military intelligence dismissed the warning. Dayan and Meir expected an attack, but not the military, political, and economic war that the Arabs had prepared.

Opening Days of the WAr With the element of surprise, and excellent planning, the Egyptians and Syrians experienced massive successes in the first few days of the invasion

By 5 o'clock, some 32,000 infantry had landed. Within 24 hours, more than 1,000 tanks, 13,500 vehicles, and 100,000 men were safely across the canal. "The whole operation," Egyptian General Shazly claimed, "was a magnificent symphony played by tens of thousands of men." Egypt's losses: just 208 killed. In the Golan Heights, the Israelis fared better. They concentrated their forces there, because they could use the Sinai peninsula as a natural barrier. The Syrians were soundly defeated. By 5 o'clock, some 32,000 infantry had landed. Within 24 hours, more than 1,000 tanks, 13,500 vehicles, and 100,000 men were safely across the canal. "The whole operation," Egyptian General Shazly claimed, "was a magnificent symphony played by tens of thousands of men." Egypt's losses: just 208 killed. In the Golan Heights, the Israelis fared better. They concentrated their forces there, because they could use the Sinai peninsula as a natural barrier. The Syrians were soundly defeated.

Opening week of the war It was a victory, the most outstanding feat of Arab arms in modern times. On October 6, 1973, the Egyptian army boiled across the Suez Canal, took the Israelis by surprise, broke through the seemingly unbeatable earthworks on the far bank, overwhelmed their defenders and marched into Sinai.

Israeli defeat The Israelis expected the Egyptians to act the same as they had in the 1967 war. Then, the Egyptians had been unprepared for a modern war. Now, in 1973, the Egyptians were bristling with anti-tank weapons and were covered of anti-aircraft missiles. The Egyptian divisions pushed ahead on a broad front, virtually the entire length of the canal, dug in and waited. As expected, the Israelis threw their tanks and aircraft into battle and broke them on the Arabs' ring of steel. The Israelis expected the Egyptians to act the same as they had in the 1967 war. Then, the Egyptians had been unprepared for a modern war. Now, in 1973, the Egyptians were bristling with anti-tank weapons and were covered of anti-aircraft missiles. The Egyptian divisions pushed ahead on a broad front, virtually the entire length of the canal, dug in and waited. As expected, the Israelis threw their tanks and aircraft into battle and broke them on the Arabs' ring of steel.

Soviet Gear The Egyptians had the latest weaponry from the Soviet Union. Before hostilities, the Algerian government offered the Russians 200 million to buy the Egyptians and Syrians advanced weaponry. The two most important game changing pieces of technology were the ‘sagger’ anti-tank missile systems and advanced anti-air missile systems. The Egyptians had the latest weaponry from the Soviet Union. Before hostilities, the Algerian government offered the Russians 200 million to buy the Egyptians and Syrians advanced weaponry. The two most important game changing pieces of technology were the ‘sagger’ anti-tank missile systems and advanced anti-air missile systems.

Israeli Disbelief Major General Ariel Sharon recalled: "These were soldiers who had been brought up on victories….It was a generation that had never lost. Now they were in a state of shock….How was it that [the Egyptians] were moving forward and we were defeated?" Panic swept through the Israeli government; unless the Egyptians could be turned, the entire country was at risk. In an October 9 meeting with Prime Minister Meir, Dayan discussed using the country's nuclear arsenal—at least 13 bombs deliverable via Jericho missiles. Major General Ariel Sharon recalled: "These were soldiers who had been brought up on victories….It was a generation that had never lost. Now they were in a state of shock….How was it that [the Egyptians] were moving forward and we were defeated?" Panic swept through the Israeli government; unless the Egyptians could be turned, the entire country was at risk. In an October 9 meeting with Prime Minister Meir, Dayan discussed using the country's nuclear arsenal—at least 13 bombs deliverable via Jericho missiles.

American Support Unwilling to let their major ally in the region fail, the Americans intervened. Congress approved 2.2 billion dollars worth of military aid. The U.S. Air Force would airlift some 22,000 tons of jet aircraft, tanks, ammunition, and other equipment to Israel. Another 33,000 pounds of materiel arrived by sea. This was more than military aid; it was life support. Unwilling to let their major ally in the region fail, the Americans intervened. Congress approved 2.2 billion dollars worth of military aid. The U.S. Air Force would airlift some 22,000 tons of jet aircraft, tanks, ammunition, and other equipment to Israel. Another 33,000 pounds of materiel arrived by sea. This was more than military aid; it was life support.

Israeli Resourcefulness. Even before the Americans intervened, the Israeli commanders changed tactics. Instead of launching head-on assaults, they struck at the enemy's flanks and used heavy machine guns to knock out infantry armed with antitank weapons. Soon, the Egyptian advance slowed and stopped. But already parts of the army had pushed as far as nine miles into the Sinai. Sadat had won his "four inches of territory." Even before the Americans intervened, the Israeli commanders changed tactics. Instead of launching head-on assaults, they struck at the enemy's flanks and used heavy machine guns to knock out infantry armed with antitank weapons. Soon, the Egyptian advance slowed and stopped. But already parts of the army had pushed as far as nine miles into the Sinai. Sadat had won his "four inches of territory."

The tide Turns The Egyptians made a strategic error. They sent a huge number of tanks out into the Sinai, mirroring their tactics in the 1967 war. The Israelis pounced, destroyed the army, and counterattacked. The Soviets showed Sadat images of the Israeli counterattack. He refused to send troops back across the canal to fight them. As a result, the Israelis encircled and were in a position to destroy the Egyptian 3rd Army. The Egyptians made a strategic error. They sent a huge number of tanks out into the Sinai, mirroring their tactics in the 1967 war. The Israelis pounced, destroyed the army, and counterattacked. The Soviets showed Sadat images of the Israeli counterattack. He refused to send troops back across the canal to fight them. As a result, the Israelis encircled and were in a position to destroy the Egyptian 3rd Army.

Arab Oil Boycott Saudi Arabia and the other oil producing nations stopped selling oil to any nation that supported Israel. The boycott was successful, and ushered in an era where Arab nations were able to use oil as political leverage. The price of oil quadrupled, and put pressure on the Western powers to find a diplomatic solution. Saudi Arabia and the other oil producing nations stopped selling oil to any nation that supported Israel. The boycott was successful, and ushered in an era where Arab nations were able to use oil as political leverage. The price of oil quadrupled, and put pressure on the Western powers to find a diplomatic solution.

Ceasefire The Americans and the Soviets arranged a ceasefire. The Israelis agreed to allow food and medical supplies to the battered Third army. The casualty counts for Egypt and Syria topped 60,000, with more than 2,000 tanks destroyed. Though Israel saw losses of fewer than 12,000 men, the Arab attacks had delivered a body blow to its military might. The war cost Israel the equivalent of its gross national product for a year. In the Sinai alone, the Egyptians had destroyed 110 helicopters and aircraft, about a quarter of Israel's air power. The Americans and the Soviets arranged a ceasefire. The Israelis agreed to allow food and medical supplies to the battered Third army. The casualty counts for Egypt and Syria topped 60,000, with more than 2,000 tanks destroyed. Though Israel saw losses of fewer than 12,000 men, the Arab attacks had delivered a body blow to its military might. The war cost Israel the equivalent of its gross national product for a year. In the Sinai alone, the Egyptians had destroyed 110 helicopters and aircraft, about a quarter of Israel's air power.

Outcome After the 1973 war, one thing was clear to both the Israelis and the Arab leaders: War would not solve the many problems between the two peoples. The Arabs, while politically victorious, knew that they had been defeated militarily by the Israelis, not to mention the spectre of the Israeli nuclear arsenal. The Israelis had faced their first defeat, and they realized that they would not always be able to repulse an Arab attack. After the 1973 war, one thing was clear to both the Israelis and the Arab leaders: War would not solve the many problems between the two peoples. The Arabs, while politically victorious, knew that they had been defeated militarily by the Israelis, not to mention the spectre of the Israeli nuclear arsenal. The Israelis had faced their first defeat, and they realized that they would not always be able to repulse an Arab attack.