Philosophy 224 Kant and Humans and Morality

Immanuel Kant Immanuel Kant ( ) was one of the most important philosophers of the modern era. His critical project revolutionized philosophy, and has remained a touchstone (positive and negative) for philosophers up to the present. It’s not widely recognized, but Kant was the first person to use the term ‘race’ in the way which we use it today.

The Critical Project The term that Kant uses to describe his fundamental philosophical position is "critical transcendental philosophy.” ◦ The central task of such a philosophy is to delimit the activities of reason. As Kant understands it, reason has two primary activities: cognizing and willing. ◦ To the first corresponds theoretical philosophy, which investigates the laws given by the concepts of the pure understanding (Critique of Pure Reason). ◦ To the second corresponds practical philosophy, which is concerned with the law's given by pure reason's concept of freedom (Critique of Practical Reason). Roughly, there is a philosophy of the sensible (phenomenal) world, and a philosophy of the intelligible world. However, in experience, the two worlds are one. ◦ The task of the third critique (Critique of Judgment) is to articulate the a priori conditions of this unity, the locus of which is in yet another faculty of reason: judgment.

The Anthropology Before we turn to the text for today, which belongs to the project of the second Critique, let’s consider the account of the human that is more in line with the results of the first. For this, we need to consider the lectures that Kant gave on what was then the newly emerging field of anthropology. ◦ Kant gave these lectures annually, from 1772 until he retired in The lectures (and the resulting book) were intended for a general (not specialized) audience and in them Kant not only discusses the information recently pouring into Europe about the diversity of human cultures, but his views of the world and humanity’s place in it. The key to the work is his reflection on what humans, 'as a free-acting being makes of himself or can and should make of himself.’

A Difficulty Kant begins the selection we read for today by noting a difficulty of adequately specifying human nature. We have no standard of comparison by which to judge the nature of human rationality. ◦ We have no example of non-terrestrial rational beings which could serve as the point of comparison to isolate the specific character of our rationality. All we can do, then, is to specify the character of our animal nature: humans are self-creating animals, perfecting themselves in relation to self- determined ends.

Three Aspects of Self Creation This account of the specificity of the human animal, highlights the centrality of the capacity of reason to our animal being. ◦ This capacity is expressed by the definition of a human being as a ‘rational animal.’ In this capacity, Kant finds three more specific aspects that characterize human activity (and also can be used to account for and characterize cultural development). ◦ Preservation: refers to the capacity to address the problems and threats posed to us by the world. ◦ Education: refers to our capacity to preserve and pass on our accomplishments in preserving our selves and serves as the basis of society. ◦ Governance: refers to our capacity to organize our social existence according to the “principles of reason.”

Three Predispositions Coordinate to the three aspects of humans as rational animals are three dispositions typically revealed in human action. 1. Technical: we are natural problem solvers. Indicated by our hand. (cf. also, the reference to Adam and Eve). 2. Pragmatic: we are naturally inclined towards civilization. Indicated by the fact that we progress as a species and not as individuals. 3. Moral: as rational, we are naturally inclined to the good, as sensible, we are naturally inclined to evil.

Three Questions, and an Answer As Kant makes clear, the identification of these three dispositions serves as the basis for answers to three pressing questions: ◦ Are humans by nature social? ◦ Is that social existence naturally civilized or are we instead naturally savage? ◦ Is man good by nature, evil, or both? There’s a clear progression to these questions, and Kant thinks that in the progression we find the key to the answer. ◦ The key: education in the good.

The Grundlegung Our text for today was written by Kant as a popular introduction to the results of the Critique of Practical Reason. In the Critique and in the Grounding, the thrust of his critical transcendental examination of practical reason is to locate a foundation for freedom. This foundation requires the capacity to choose one’s actions independent of sensible determinations such as instincts, desires, passions, and sensations of pleasure and pain.

Where to Start? The starting point of this examination is the capacity of conceive laws and to act according to them. In the practical sphere, as in the theoretical, Kant makes a clear methodological distinction between dependence upon sensory causes and independence from them. ◦ Pure practical reason is independent of all empirical conditions and completely self-sufficient. Kant claims that “all moral concepts have their seat and origin in reason completely a priori.”

A Good Will Our selection begins with a claim that Kant believes will be commonly accepted: nothing is good without qualification except a good will (153-4). ◦ A good will is intrinsically good; it is not dependent on external circumstances or consequences. Why might we think that there was such a will? ◦ Kant assumes that nature exhibits purposiveness, and that the different natural human capacities are fit for the ends to which they are aimed (155). ◦ A brief consideration of the role of reason in our lives reveals that, if happiness was the end appropriate to reason, nature has done a poor job of fitting the means to the end. ◦ Rather than produce happiness, reason often produces the latter. The situation is the same when we consider the role of reason in morality (156). ◦ Reason is an imperfect guide to the will, insofar as it concerns objects. ◦ After all, we've all been confused about how to go about getting something. ◦ If right action is our goal, we would have been much better served with a "moral instinct." ◦ So, if reason has a purpose (which it must, since we have it), it has to lie in the production of a will that is not instrumentally good, but good in itself.

Duty Now that we've established the possibility of something like a good will, we have to further specify the concept. Kant proposes to develop the notion of the good will through the related notion of duty. He proceeds to specify 4 different ways in which the concept of duty can serve as a motive (157). 1.Action is contrary to duty 2.Action is in accord with duty, but natural inclination is lacking (selfish inclinations can be operative). 3.Action is in accord with duty and there is a natural inclination to do it. 4.Action is in accord with duty and there is a contrary inclination in force.

From Duty to Morality Clearly in case 1. there is no motive offered by duty. Case 2. is developed by Kant in the example of the shopkeeper. Case 3. is explained with the help of the example of the naturally sympathetic person and Case 4. with the help of the example of the person whose natural sympathy has been submerged by other concerns. The implied point of these examples could be called the “first proposition of morality:” the moral worth of an action is solely dependent upon its being motivated by duty 158.

Second and Third Propositions The “second proposition of morality” is found on (159). It proposes that what makes an action motivated by duty morally worthy is not the consequences of the action, but the status of the maxim from which it is done. So what makes one maxim better than another? ◦ The motivational structure revealed in the reasoning. This leads Kant to the “third proposition of morality” the necessity implied by moral duty is a feature of the “lawfulness” of the maxim (the extent to which it is universalizable).

The Categorical Imperative On the basis of these propositions, we get a first provisional statement of the “principle” of morality, the Categorical Imperative: “I should never act except in such a way that I can also will my maxim should become a universal law” (161).