Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Brett Edwards Biochemical Security 2030 Project University of Bath SfAM Winter Meeting 15/0/14

Overview This talk will provide an introduction to: The idea of ‘innovation biosecurity’ Biological weapons The control of biological weapons The field of Synthetic Biology As a techno-scientific field Implications for biosecurity Some key trends and challenges

What is innovation biosecurity? Increasingly the term ‘biosecurity’ refers to biological weapon threats Innovation biosecurity relates to the promises and challenges raised for security specifically by advances in S&T New applications New foundational technologies Changes in the practice of innovation

What is a Biological Weapon ? (1) Definition: Systems designed to deliver toxins and microorganisms, such as viruses and bacteria, in order to cause disease among people, animals, and agriculture -Usually understood to include means of delivery, and agent payload. -Can serve a range of purposes (i.e terrorism, tactical/strategic, political objectives) -Can be low-tech or high-tech

What is a Biological Weapon ? (2) Biological weapons are ‘taboo’- why? Taboo- norms and laws Moral explanations The ‘yuck’ factor Non-discriminatory weapons State centred strategic explanation Absence of Military Utility Fear or retaliatory use and escalation Concerns about terrorists

What is a Biological Weapon ? (3) History of use and Development Before Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Evidence of Ancient use Large Bioweapons programmes established globally from 1930’s onwards Japanese Cholera Attack Kills 12,000 Since establishment of BWC Continued covert secret programmes in some states up until 1990’s Anthrax accident at Sverdlovsk, Russia- minimum 66 killed Russia officially closes programme in 1990 Developed a range of weapon strains Increase in bioterror threat perceptions Massive US investment into biodefense

How are biological weapons governed? International Agreements National Level Policy Scientific and Industry Initiatives

International level (1) Primary regime is the Biological and Toxins Weapon Convention Chemical Weapons Convention is also increasingly relevant because of scientific convergence States are banned from: developing, stockpiling, developing and using chemical and biological weapons, or allowing any of these things within national jurisdictions. Table: Michael Crowley, presentation, BCS2030 project meeting, Bath (0ctober 2013) adapted from Pearson (2002)

International level (2) There are two key facets of the BWC and CWC regimes: International reassurance: I.e states demonstrating compliance to other states. National implementation: i.e to support states in the development of national level policies

National level Laboratory biosecurity and laboratory biosafety Criminalisation of the possession of controlled biological agents without just cause. Import and export controls Dual-use governance of advancing S&T Also emphasis on mitigation, response and attribution.

So what is the field of Synthetic Biology? (1) ‘Synthetic biology is the design and engineering of biologically based parts, novel devices and systems as well as the redesign of existing, natural biological systems’ Synthetic Biology Roadmap Co-ordination group (2012) GM + ? Convergent Technology? Brand name?

So what is the field of Synthetic Biology? (2) -Emerged as a concept in US and EU around UK Research councils have invested £62+ million to date -US around $1 bn -Public and Private investment, Primarily biofuels

So what is the field of Synthetic Biology? (3) Six subfields (Lam et al 2009) DNA circuits standard biological parts Synthetic metabolic pathways biological synthesis of chemicals Proto-cell creation model of a cell Unnatural components New proteins, with functions Synthetic Microbial Consortia Cells, working together

Key concerns and responses (1) Concern Misuse of mail order Polynucleotides (2005) Industry emergence Concern about circumvention of select-agent controls by terrorists Response Tightening up of select-agent and GMO regulation so explicitly cover all means of production where neccisary Emergence of industry screening practices Two competing standards US government also generated guidance

Key concerns and responses (1) Concern Misuse of research findings, and laboratory biosecurity and biosafety Response Web of measures Education and outreach initiatives SB Community Law enforcement Scientific Institutions Forward looking policy discussions US- NSABB, SYNBERC EU -SYNBIOSAFE International- UNICRI, National academies. Engineering safety into biology. Intrinsic Bio containment, Berkley.

Key concerns and responses (1) Concern Militarization Throughout history rapid periods of scientific advance have been associated with militarization. Response Minimal discussion of policy responses

Key Potential challenges for the field in the future The advances Synthetic Biology represent fresh challenges for an already overworked international regime Need to think beyond existing laboratory and biosecurity when considering potential future challenges I.e broader trends such as industrialisation and diffusion, convergence Need to ensure that policies and capacities are in place before next public outcry to ensure measured and scientifically informed response. I.e to avoid case by case review, as seen with recent H5N1 dual-use debates

Thanks! Biochemical Security 2030 Project (PI Professor David Galbreath) Contact Website: Biochemsec2030.org