NERC Lessons Learned Summary LLs Published in December 2015.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Disaster Communication Breakout Group 5. Before Disaster Soft Identify focal points for each stakeholder Establish partnership among different stakeholders.
Advertisements

EMS Checklist (ISO model)
Valley City State University | Facilities Services
1. Four LLs were published in February Transmission Relaying – Undesired Blocking 2.Lack of Separation for Critical Control Power Supply Leads.
PER
1 PER-005 Update Impact on Operators System Operator Conference April and May 1-3, 2012 Columbia, SC Margaret Stambach Manager, Training Services.
Key Reliability Standard Spot Check Frank Vick Compliance Team Lead.
1 Reliability Coordination (IRO Standards) 2011 System Operator Conferences #3 and #4 September & 20-22, 2011 Nashville/Franklin TN Rocky Williamson.
Goshen Area Bus Reconfiguration
NERC Lessons Learned Summary December NERC lessons learned published in December 2014 Three NERC lessons learned (LL) were published in December.
Reliability Software1 Reliability Software Minimum requirements & Best practices Frank Macedo - FERC Technical Conference July 14, 2004.
Interim Life Safety Measures Eleven Administration Actions of Interim Life Safety Measures ÷Ensure free and unobstructed exits. Personnel receive additional.
Responsible CarE® Process Safety Code David Sandidge Director, Responsible Care American Chemistry Council June 2010.
Teamwork The Role of the Fourth Official. General Mechanics Performs any other duties which the referee requests Primary point of contact between the.
1 Hot Work Permits Corporate Environment Safety & Health.
1 Continuity Planning for transportation agencies.
1 FUME HOOD SAFETY Environmental Energy Technologies Division Safety Topic July 12, 2012.
FLOOR WARDEN TRAINING Presented by State Risk Management 2011.
System Operator Conference NERC Standards Review for: Simulator Drill Orientation 2014 System Operator Conferences Charlotte NC & Franklin TN SERC/SOS.
September 2014 Lesson Learned Summary. September 2014 LLs 2 Three NERC lessons learned (LL) were published in September 2014 LL Redundant Network.
NERC Lessons Learned Summary March NERC lessons learned published in March 2015 Two NERC lessons learned (LL) were published in March2015 LL
Confined Space Ventilation Are We Really Moving Air, or Just Making Ourselves Feel Good?
NERC Lessons Learned Summary
Lumbermen’s Underwriting Alliance
NACMPI November 15-16, 2005 Risk-Based Inspection Dr. Barbara Masters Administrator, Food Safety and Inspection Service Philip Derfler Assistant Administrator,
EHS Management System Elements
EGRESS AND FIRE PROTECTION
B O N N E V I L L E P O W E R A D M I N I S T R A T I O N 1 Network Operating Committee (NOC) June 12 th, 2014.
NERC PER-005 Overview May 10, Who, What, When, Where, Why WHO: RC, TOP, BA WHAT: –R1: Systematic Approach to Training –R2: Verify operator capabilities.
Basics of OHSAS Occupational Health & Safety Management System
Current Job Components Information Technology Department Network Systems Administration Telecommunications Database Design and Administration.
Fatigue Management Rule Russell Smith Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
CLIC CES Webex 12 Nov Summary: – Set of fire safety measures defined in CERN Safety Report – Proposed Structure for CLIC/ILC Fire Safety Report Fabio.
NERC Lessons Learned Summary April NERC lessons learned published in April 2015 Two NERC lessons learned (LL) were published in April 2015 LL
EAS Lessons Learned Summary Lessons Learned Published in August 2014.
Project System Protection Coordination Requirement revisions to PRC (ii) Texas Reliability Entity NERC Standards Reliability Subcommittee.
Bill Lewis, Compliance Team Lead NERC Reliability Working Group May 16, 2013 Texas RE Update Talk with Texas RE April 25, 2013.
QUALITY MANAGEMENT STATEMENT
NERC Lessons Learned Summary February NERC lessons learned published in February 2015 Two NERC lessons learned (LL) were published in February 2015.
2 IMPACT - THE FIRE PERMIT = Hot Work Permit 3 Welcome ! This course is linked to the use of IMPACT, so it is assumed that: You know how to use IMPACT.
EAS Lessons Learned Summary Lessons Learned Published in June 2014.
A Guide for Management. Overview Benefits of entity-level controls Nature of entity-level controls Types of entity-level controls, control objectives,
Chapter 12 Implementation and Maintenance
Loss of EMS Events 2015 System Operator Seminar. Training Objectives 2 System Operators will be able to identify the ERO Event Analysis Process Category.
NERC Lessons Learned Summary LLs Published in September 2015.
2011 PLANT OPERATIONS MODULE 8 Maintain Bulk Plant Systems and Equipment.
Loss of EMS Events 2015 System Operator Seminar. Training Objectives 2 System Operators will be able to identify the ERO Event Analysis Process Category.
What is a safe work permit? A safe work permit is a written record that authorizes specific work, at a specific work location, for a specific.
Scheduling and Operating Transmission Devices in the Nodal Environment.
Teknologi Pusat Data 12 Data Center Site Infrastructure Tier Standard: Topology Ida Nurhaida, ST., MT. FASILKOM Teknik Informatika.
Impacts and Actions Resulting from the August 14, 2003 Blackout Minnesota Power Systems Conference November 2, 2003.
Restoration Concepts PEAK RC Training Classification: Confidential Version No.: 1.5 Date of Document: Document Owner/Author: B Pederson Classification:
NERC EAS Update WECC OPEAS Meeting 01/26/2016 Rich Hydzik.
Version 1.0, May 2015 BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module XX Regulatory control Case Study This material was prepared by the IAEA and co-funded by.
NERC Published Lessons Learned Summary
NERC Published Lessons Learned
NERC Published Lessons Learned Summary
NERC Published Lessons Learned
NERC Lessons Learned Summary
NERC Published Lessons Learned
“FRCC RESTORATION PLAN (BLACKOUT & BLACK START)” - TRAINING -
Hot Work Loss Prevention Program
Phase Angle Limitations
NERC Published Lessons Learned
EAS Lessons Learned Summary
NERC Published Lessons Learned Summary
NERC Published Lessons Learned Summary
Western Electricity Coordinating Council
CEO/Co-founder, SOS Intl
BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module XX Regulatory control Case Study Version 1.0, May 2015 This material was prepared by the IAEA and.
Presentation transcript:

NERC Lessons Learned Summary LLs Published in December 2015

NERC Lessons Learned Published in December Three (3) NERC Lessons Learned (LL) will be published in December 2015 Human Error Leads to Evacuation of Primary Control Room Control Network Communication Path SOL and IROL Monitoring Tool Leads to Unnecessary Manual Load Shedding

Human Error Leads to Evacuation of Primary Control Room 3 A fire was caused by maintenance workers removing a decommissioned potable water tank Sparks from a torch ignited the plastic lining of the tank Fire caused extensive smoke which traveled up a utility tunnel and elevator shaft reaching the Energy Control Center (ECC) As a precaution, the personnel evacuated the primary ECC and utilized their back-up ECC When maintenance workers initially assessed the tank prior to starting the removal, they viewed the side section of the tank which had no lining or combustible materials The fire occurred in the center section of the tank which had the flammable lining

Human Error Leads to Evacuation of Primary Control Room 4 The maintenance workers failed to follow proper hot work procedures, which included requirements to fully inspect the area for combustible materials A fire watch was not established, and a hot work permit was not issued Corrective Actions The utility plans to implement the measures necessary to prevent smoke travel into the ECC as appropriate fire stops and ventilation changes All personnel have been retrained on the hot work permit system Workers should properly assess all work conditions before beginning any maintenance activities and follow established permitting processes

Human Error Leads to Evacuation of Primary Control Room 5 Periodic training on hot work procedures should be given to all maintenance employees ECC ventilation equipment and fire stops should be assessed on a regular basis to verify that proper precautions around ECC to ensure smoke prevented from reaching the ECC IF ECC is located adjacent to other facilities, attention should be given to the impact of these facilities on the ECC and means to mitigate such impacts

Control Network Communication Path 6 Entity scheduled a functional test of its Back-up Data Center (BDC) which included transfer from the primary Control Center (PCC) to the backup Control Center (BCC) When SCADA functionality was transferred, the TOP’s router bandwidth for network traffic between control centers (out-of-band router) saturated, preventing communication between the active Control Center (ACC) and the active data center (ADC) The ACC lost the ability to monitor and control its portion of the BES for approximately 39 minutes. SCADA Administrators failed back over to the PDC to resolve the issue

Control Network Communication Path 7 Going forward, the Entity is adding controls to prioritize SCADA communication network traffic on the out-of- band router to reduce the likelihood of saturation Entities should consider if there should be a prohibition on non-emergency changes when operating remotely from EMS/SCADA Servers

SOL and IROL Monitoring Tool Leads to Unnecessary Manual Load Shedding 8 System Operator (SO) ordered the removal of a shunt reactor for voltage control During removal, a fault occurred in the shunt reactor breaker that caused the high voltage transmission line to trip resulting in two IROL exceedances SO took emergency operating control actions to reduce the interface flows below the IROLs Both the SOL and an IROL for the interface were exceeded These limits are represented at the same time on the EMS monitoring displays adjacent to the interface flows During emergency condition (enabled in the EMS by the System Operators), the values of the SOLs on the EMS monitoring displays disappear and all the monitoring and assessment tools focus on the IROL limits

SOL and IROL Monitoring Tool Leads to Unnecessary Manual Load Shedding 9 When the IROL exceedances occurred, the SO didn’t enable the emergency condition in the EMS procedures to hide SOLs In his confusion, he mistook the value of the SOL as the IROL which led to a false assessment of actions to be taken to clear the IROL exceedances That led to the use of more aggressive emergency operation control actions than necessary 28 minutes after the event, the SO manually shed a significant amount of load even though it was not required

SOL and IROL Monitoring Tool Leads to Unnecessary Manual Load Shedding 10 System Operator – Training Enhance SO simulation training by implementing additional stressful conditions; Review SOs understanding of the different types of limits (SOL versus IROL) on a particular interface and how to distinguish and monitor them; Review the SOs understanding of the emergency operations control actions list; Review the SOs training guide regarding the monitoring of SOL and IROL limits to determine if additional clarification is required Monitoring Tools Verify that the EMS monitoring displays clearly differentiate between the SOL and IROL limits; Create a new tool for displaying the SOL and IROL limit timers; Develop a new display for SOs that would help them to quickly select the required control actions according to the type of exceedance

SOL and IROL Monitoring Tool Leads to Unnecessary Manual Load Shedding 11 Operating Procedures Clarify the definition of the SOL and IROL limits in the operating procedures; Clarify the application of the emergency condition in the operating procedures Clearly differentiate the SOL and IROL limits in the EMS displays and the control room timer display for SOL/IROL exceedances Review on a regular basis with the SOs their understanding of the SOL and IROL limits and the emergency operations control actions permitted in each situation More simulation type training for SOs needed with added stressful conditions in order to enhance their situational awareness and response during emergency operations

Link to Lessons Learned 12 Directions to Lessons Learned: Go to > “Program Areas & Departments” tab > “Reliability Risk Management” (left side menu) > “Event Analysis” (left side menu) > “Lessons Learned” (left side menu) NERC’s goal with publishing lessons learned is to provide industry with technical and understandable information that assists them with maintaining the reliability of the bulk power system. NERC requests that industry provide input on lessons learned by taking the short survey. The survey link is provided on each Lesson Learned.