DKIM Policy Proposals. 3 Proposals ‘A La Carte’ Discovery Mechanism RISC Policy Description –Its (almost) all in the Key Records RISC Policy Description.

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Presentation transcript:

DKIM Policy Proposals

3 Proposals ‘A La Carte’ Discovery Mechanism RISC Policy Description –Its (almost) all in the Key Records RISC Policy Description –Transitions Meets all of the requirements specified –[6.3 Req 7: MUST NOT provide]

Discovery Mechanism Proposal ‘Dialectic’ Thesis: Use Prefixed TXT Record –100% Compatible with legacy infrastructure –Simple –Not Wildcard friendly Antithesis: Use new RR –DKIM is made reliant on deployment of new DNS infrastructure –Transition management is problematic –Result: RR nobody uses and a graceless wildcard kludge Synthesis –Leave prefix policy record as is –Introduce new prefix pointer record to solve wildcard problem –Result: Compatibility but with incentive to upgrade DNS

How – an additional indirection layer PPTR record –Argument is a DNS node –Does not take a prefix → wildcard friendly New resolution scheme for prefixed records 1.Look for TXT at _prefix.example.com 2.If not found look for PPTR at example.com 3.If found look for TXT at _prefix.pptr.example.com Wildcards work –But domains that do not need them can still use TXT

RISC Policy There is only one policy that matters –‘I do DKIM on everything’ The policy language must be extensible –But there are no DKIM policy extensions –Only extensions to describe non DKIM features ‘I use this reporting mechanism’ ‘I do S/MIME’ RISC policy language: –Tag [=value] sequence Example –DKIM

Why only one policy matters Key Records contain all the detail –The Key algorithms permitted –The C18N algorithms permitted –The sender addresses record applies to What if I want a partial policy? –Specify a Key Record for NULL algorithm Probably a sender address restriction! –Add a static header to each message

RISC Policy - Transitions What is policy for? –Allow conclusion to be drawn from Lack of a Signature header No Signature header Both MUST be treated the same – NVS I always sign + NVS means not compliant with policy –Signatures do not encourage message rejection Policy does 3 Outcomes 1.Signed 2.Compliant with policy but not authenticated 3.Not compliant

What does recipient do? Signed –Check to see if recipient qualifies for whitelist –If not standard spam filtering Compliant but not authenticated –Standard spam filtering Not Compliant –Standard spam filtering –Standard spam filter with higher suspicion –Reject (Probably not a good gateway policy) –May apply third party attributes (Sender is phishing target)

Navigating a Transition Sign messages twice –Sign (Old), Sign (New) –Some recipients only process Old [New] Key records for unsupported algorithm –MUST be treated as valid Policy must express fact we sign twice –DKIM=selector1 DKIM=selector2

Why Policy has 3 outcomes 1.Signed 2.Compliant with policy but not authenticated 3.Not compliant Fake Sig‘I sign’‘I sign twice’ Foo3  Bar2  3  Foo+ Bar2  3 

Summary Significantly reduce complexity of SSP Meets all requirements –Fully wildcard compatible Policy discovery always 3 steps or less Fully compatible with legacy DNS, DKIM But still has new RR Meets unstated requirements –Only means of navigating transition

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