Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations DCA-08-MR-003 Collision of Amtrak Train 371 and Norfolk Southern Railway Company Freight.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Managing Your Staff.
Advertisements

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DISASTER INVESTIGATION D. Lee Roberts, Jr.
Are you ready?. Welcome to Signal Indication JEOPARDY !
SCORT/TRB Rail Capacity Workshop - Jacksonville Florida1 1  A Primer on Capacity Principles  New Technologies  Public Sector Needs 22 September
Signals Refresher Training. S.O.C. Signals In this clinic, we will be reviewing the basic signal aspects we use on the S.O.C. We will be seeing various.
Signal Basics. Signals: –Allow for safe operation of trains – protecting your train, other trains, and the equipment –Lets the railroad operate more efficiently.
Union Pacific and the Environment Armour Yellow Outside -- Green Inside ORULE Meeting – October 2, 2008.
Chapter 7 Negotiating Intersections
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Collision of Metrolink Train 111 with Union Pacific Train LOF65-12 Chatsworth, California September.
Terminal Safety. Objectives Identify main causes Outline terminal safety organization State the safe working practices.
Transport Railways Incident Procedures. Aim To give students information about the emergency procedures to be adopted at incidents involving railways.
Transportation Tuesday TRANSPORTATION TUESDAY What needs quick thinking and concentration? Intersection, junctions, roundabouts & U turns all require your.
Locomotive Horn Rule Regulations
EMS Driving Information for EMS Personnel Indiana Code 9 - EMS Driving Information for EMS Personnel.
Intersections & Right of Way
Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations Transit Operations Oversight.
Materials developed by K. Watkins, J. LaMondia and C. Brakewood Rail Capacity Unit 3: Measuring & Maximizing Capacity.
Clarendon, Texas May 28, 2002 Collision of Two Burlington Northern Santa Fe Freight Trains.
Conductor Decertification Discipline
CVFD Training – Emergency Vehicle Operations SFFMA Training Objectives: –
CE 515 Railroad Engineering
Slide 1 ILLINOIS - RailTEC Capacity of Single-Track Railway Lines with Short Sidings to Support Operation of Long Freight Trains Ivan Atanassov, C. Tyler.
Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations Collision of Norfolk Southern Freight Train 192 With Standing Norfolk Southern Local.
CHAPTERS 1 and 2 o Advantages of Railroad Concept o Problems Early On o Economics Common Goal o Development of the Country o Common Goal CE 433.
Houston Trainwatch Working together to keep our city safe and moving Jack C. Hanagriff Houston Police Department Federal Railroad Administration Law Enforcement.
Accident Train 61 Passengers 12 Amtrak employees 1 Fatality 3 Serious injuries 43 Minor injuries.
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Performance of the UP Train Crew.
Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations Safety Oversight.
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Collision of Metrolink Passenger Train 111 and Union Pacific Freight Train LOF65-12 Signal.
Intersections.
NEGOTIATING INTERSECTIONS
Office of Highway Safety Grade Crossing Accident Elmwood Park, Illinois November 23, 2005.
Slide 1 School of Engineering and Applied Science Center of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence Center of Rail Safety-Critical Excellence BRIEFING September.
Not an Official Document Training purposes ONLY 1 FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION Operating Practices Division For Instructional Purposes Only; for further.
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Collision of Metrolink Train 111 with Union Pacific Train LOF Opening Statement Chatsworth,
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Collision of Metrolink Train 111 with Union Pacific Train LOF65-12 Chatsworth, California September.
Positive Train Control Labor Briefing Washington, DC December 10, 2008.
 Classes of trains  Fundamental principles of track authority  Impact of power/ton ratios  Drivers of dispatch priority 22 September 2010 SCORT/TRB.
North Carolina Rail Division Staff of about 50 Mission to: Improve & expand passenger rail service Improve safety at crossings Provide industrial access.
Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations Collision Between Two BNSF Railway Company Freight Trains Near Gunter, Texas May 19,
Operations Railroad Communica- tions Hazmat & Safety Personnel.
Drive Right Chapter 7 Negotiating Intersections Unit 4
Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations Right-of-Way Procedures & Safety Rules Compliance.
Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations Macdona, Texas Operations.
The Post Service Officer VFW Department Convention June 2010.
Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations Mechanical Rollback Protection.
NTSB Staff Ron HynesIIC, Operations & Mechanical Cy GuraTrack, Signals & IIC Jim Henderson Hazmat & Emergency Response Tom Lasseigne Environmental Derek.
1 PTC 101 A primer for PTC PTC 101 A primer for PTC.
October 2007 IRSC, Goa (India) 1 Lessons from an accident Marion Segretain, French National Safety Authority (EPSF)
Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations Dupont Circle Station May 14, 2006 Eisenhower Avenue Station November 30, 2006.
© 2006 PSEN Unit - #4 Let’s Go Driving Identification Evaluation Control Monitor.
Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations Derailment of Chicago Transit Authority Train Number 220 Chicago, Illinois July 11, 2006.
A stop sign is a traffic sign that stands for coming to a complete stop at an intersection or end of the road.
1 BLUE SIGNAL PROTECTION Blue Signal Protection of Workmen This rule outlines the requirements for protecting railroad workmen who are inspecting,
Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations Collision Between Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Trains at the Woodley.
Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations Collision of a Union Pacific Railroad Freight Train with a BNSF Railway Company Freight.
49 CFR PART 240 Qualification and Certification of Locomotive Engineers.
CE2303 Railway Engineering
Intersections.
1 COMMERCIAL DRIVER’S LICENSES. 2 PURPOSE OF THE CDL Mandated by the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of Public Law Title XII The federal.
INTERSECTIONS HIGH RISK LOCATION!! *33% OF ALL COLLISIONS TAKE PLACE AT INTERSECTIONS!!!! * 25% OF ALL FATAL COLLISIONS TAKE PLACE AT INTERSECTIONS!!!!
Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations Emergency Response.
MBTA/MassDOT RAILROAD QUIET ZONES
!train derailed! Find out what happened on the 28th of May in Cheadle Hulme in 1964, read on for more details on this tragedy.
Positive Train Control
ODOT Railroad Access & Safety
HSR Crossing Safety Update Elliot A
OVERVIEW: POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL (ptc)
AASHTO Rail Resource Center Webinar Series
Presentation transcript:

Office of Railroad, Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Investigations DCA-08-MR-003 Collision of Amtrak Train 371 and Norfolk Southern Railway Company Freight Train 23M Chicago, Illinois November 30, 2007

Launch Team Steve JennerHuman Performance Dana SanzoSurvival Factors and Emergency Response Jim ReminesOperations Richard HipskindTrack and Engineering Dave WatsonMechanical Ed DobranetskiSignals Debra HallTransportation Disaster Assistance Keith HollowayPublic Affairs Ted Turpin IIC Robert L. Sumwalt Member

Support Staff Cassandra JohnsonVehicle Recorder Frank ZakarMaterials Laboratory Joseph ScottEditor Robert TurnerGraphics

Parties National Railroad Passenger Corporation Norfolk Southern Railway Company Federal Railroad Administration Illinois Commerce Commission United Transportation Union Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen

Amtrak Train No. 371 Train 371 originated from Grand Rapids, Michigan, 27 minutes late The train encountered other delays Amtrak called a relief crew The relief crew boarded at Hammond, Indiana, about 10:45 a.m. The engineer opted to continue operating the train

Norfolk Southern Train 23M Accident MP Amtrak Train 371 Englewood Interlocking Red over Yellow Track 1 Track 2 Amtrak Train 371

Injuries 187 triaged at the scene – 182 passengers – 5 crew members 71 transported to hospitals 3 admitted – 2 passengers – 1 crew member

Safety Issues Crewmember communication and action in response to operating concerns. Wayside signal indication training and proficiency programs. Inadequate locomotive cab emergency egress and rescue access.

Safety Issue Crewmember communication and action in response to operating concerns.

Engineer Called the Signal When the engineer saw the red over yellow signal, he called it slow approach The signal was actually a restricting signal The relief engineer thought he may have “just called it wrong” and waited to see “what he was going to do”

The Restricting Signal The restricting signal required the engineer to operate – Prepared to stop in one-half the range of vision expecting the track beyond the restricting signal to be occupied – Not exceeding 15 mph

The Slow Approach The slow approach signal required the engineer to operate the train – Prepared to stop short of the next signal – Not exceeding 30 mph Not expecting a train

Delayed Challenge by the Relief Engineer Train was moving slowly – the crew engaged in a job-related discussion About 2 1/2 minutes after crossing over to track 2, the train accelerated to more than 40 mph The relief engineer became uneasy

Relief Engineer Spoke Up The relief engineer said, “if you called the signal slow approach shouldn’t you at least be going 30 mph?” About 70 seconds before the collision The engineer did not slow the train Only took action once the standing train was observed

NORAC Rule 94 Responsibilities of Employees: Signals and Restrictions Employees must communicate when a signal becomes clearly visible If a train is not operated in accordance with the requirements you must communicate with the engineer immediately If necessary, the employee must stop the train

Conclusion The engineer misinterpreted and miscalled the signal at Englewood which resulted in the operation of the Amtrak train at a speed greater than authorized, and when challenged by the relief engineer, the engineer failed to slow or stop the train while he and the relief engineer discussed their differences in understanding the signal displayed at Englewood.

Conclusion The relief engineer failed to communicate effectively and in a timely manner to the engineer that he had miscalled the restricting signal at Englewood interlocking and failed to then take action herself to stop the train after the engineer did not slow or stop the train when challenged.

Multiple Signal Systems Operate over several railroads and must be proficient on more than one signal system Crews could be confused by the different signal systems

Fundamental Conditions Title 49 CFR Part 236 – Red light must indicate Stop – Green light must indicate Proceed – Yellow light or lunar light must indicate Restricted and Stop May Be Required

Adjoining Railroads Same aspects Different meanings

Different Signal Indications Norfolk Southern - Restricting Be prepared to stop in one-half the range of vision Expect the track to be occupied Amtrak Terminal - Slow Approach Stop at the next signal Expect a clear track

Conclusion The lack of uniform meanings of signal aspects can lead to misinterpretation, as demonstrated by this accident.