This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff,

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Presentation transcript:

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton  What is Strategic Thinking Game Theory Applications to Business Applications to Life Strategic Thinking

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Survivor: Picking Sticks  Rules: 12 Sticks During a player’s turn each person can pick 1-3 sticks. Last person to move wins

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Modified Picking Sticks Game  Rules: 14 Sticks During a player’s turn each person can pick 1-3 sticks. Last person to move wins

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton The Cambridge May Ball  Casino Night Roulette  Play Money  Winner gets ticket to the ball  In the final round Barry has $700, and Eva $300

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton The Cambridge May Ball  Roulette Numbers 0-36  0 is green  1-36 odd numbers are Red, even are black Betting $1 on Red wins with prob 18/37 and pays $2 Betting $1 on a multiple of 3 wins with probability 12/37 and pays $3.  What should each person do?

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Forecasting Stock Performance  Bob is a veteran predictor of stocks. His predictions appear on a popular Web-Site Each Monday Morning.  Jim is unknown If his stocks perform better than Bob’s he may attract attention If his stocks perform the same or worse than Bob’s he remains unknown.  When should Bob post his picks on his web-site? How should he make his choices?

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton America’s Cup  A two boat sailing race  The Australian boat starts out behind

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton It’s your move Charlie Brown  Lucy: “I’ll hold the ball, you come running up and kick it Charlie Brown”  Charlie Brown “This year I’m gonna kick the ball out of the universe.”

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton New Cleaners & Fast Cleaners  Vacuum Cleaners Existing company Fast Cleaner’s Vacuums Potential Entrant: New Cleaners  Post Entry choices for Fast Cleaners Accommodate entry Fight a price war

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton New Cleaners & Fast Cleaners Newcleaners Enter Keep Out Fast Cleaners Accommodate Price War $0 to New Cleaners $-200,000 to New Cleaners $100,000 to New Cleaners

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton New Cleaners & Fast Cleaners Newcleaners Enter Keep Out Fast Cleaners Accommodate Price War $0 to New Cleaners $-200,000 to New Cleaners -$100,000 to Fast Cleaners $100,000 to New Cleaners $100,000 to Fast Cleaners

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Bargaining: Ice-Cream Pie  Take-it-or-leave-it offers  The pie is melting

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Politics and the High Road Obama McCain High Road Low Road Obama Wins McCain has a chance Obama Wins McCain has a chance

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Dominant Strategies  Professor Jones choosing the right grail  Baseball: 2-outs, 2-strikes, runner on first  Terminology Dominant Strategy Dominated Strategy

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Time and Newsweek Newsweek’s Choices AIDSBudget Time’s Choices AIDS35* / 35**70* / 30** Budget30* / 70**15* / 15** *Magazine sales for Time; ** Magazine sales for Newseek

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton A different situation Newsweek’s Choices AIDSBudget Time’s Choices AIDS42* / 28**70* / 30** Budget30* / 70**18* / 12**

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Football Defense’s Strategies Counter Run Counter Pass Blitz Offense’s Strategies Run 3*7*15* Pass 9*8*10* * Offense’s expected yardage gain

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Missile warfare A I American Ship Iraqi Ship B C D E F G H

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Table of Hits and Misses Iraqi Strategy AMERICANAMERICAN 1-IFCB2-IFEB3-IFED4-IFEH 5- IHGD 6- IHED 7-IHEB8-IHEF 1-ABCF HOOOOOOH 2-ABEF OHHHOHHH 3-ABEH OHHHOHHH 4-ABED OHHHHHHH 5-ADGH OOOHHOOO 6-ADEH OHHHOHHH 7-ADEF OHHHOHHH 8-ADEB HHHHOHHH

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Dominated Strategies Iraqi Strategy AMERICANAMERICAN 1-IFCB2-IFEB3-IFED4-IFEH 5- IHGD 6- IHED 7-IHEB8-IHEF 1-ABCF HOOOOOOH 2-ABEF OHHHOHHH 3-ABEH OHHHOHHH 4-ABED OHHHHHHH 5-ADGH OOOHHOOO 6-ADEH OHHHOHHH 7-ADEF OHHHOHHH 8-ADEB HHHHOHHH

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Reduced Table of Hits and Misses Iraqi Strategies American Strategies IFCBIHGD ABEDOH ADEBHO

This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton Nash Equilibrium  Definition  Feast: Too many equilibria Standards: Driving on the right side of the road. Phone connection breaks off: Who calls back  Famine Re-examine the Missile game Mixed Strategies

Summary of Concepts  Sequential Games First Mover Advantage Second Mover Advantage Solve the game backwards  Simultaneous Move Games Look for Dominant Strategies If there are no Dominant Strategies, eliminate Dominated Strategies, and check for dominant strategies in the simplified game. This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton 1991.

Summary Continued…  More on Simultaneous move games If all else fails use Nash Equilibrium  Each player selects a strategy that maximizes his payoff given the strategy selected by the other player. Characteristics of Nash Equilibrium  Sometimes there is more than one  Sometimes there is no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. There is always a Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies This slideshow was written by Ken Chapman, but is substantially based on concepts from Thinking Strategically by Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, W.W. Norton 1991.

Mary and Bob are playing the game described in the table below. Bob picks the columns (either A, B, C, D or E while Mary picks the rows (either 1, or 2). Use concepts from class to pick the likely outcome of this game if their choices are made non-cooperatively and simultaneously.

Statement 1: Non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is the economists favorite solution to use in games because you can always find a single predicted outcome to any situation. Statement 2: When we say that a player has a “Dominant” strategy, we mean that no matter what his/her opponent does, that player will always make the same choice. a. Statement 1 is true, but 2 is false b. Statement 2 is true, but 1 is false c.Both are true d.Both are false

Alice and Bob are playing the game described in the table below. Bob picks the rows (either A, B, or C, while Alice picks the columns (either D, E, or F). Use concepts from class to pick the likely outcome of this game if their choices are made non-cooperatively and simultaneously. a.Bob will pick B and Alice D b.Bob will pick C, and Alice F. c.Bob will pick C and Alice E. d.Bob will pick A and Alice D. e.None of the above are the solution to this problem

Bob and Alice are going to play the non-cooperative sequential game described below. Bob picks first choosing A or B. Alice picks second, picking C or D. After Alice picks, Bob gets to pick once again, choosing either E or F. Payoffs marked with * are for Bob and ** for Alice. What is the likely outcome of this game according to concepts discussed in class?

Statement 1: “In a two-player, simultaneous-choice game if strategy A is better for every possible choice of your opponent than strategy B, then we say that you have a dominant strategy.” Statement 2: “If there are no dominant strategies, and no dominated strategies in a game, then there will always be a single Nash equilibrium outcome to help predict what will happen.” a.Statement 1 is true, but 2 is false b.Statement 2 is true, but 1 is false c.Both statements are correct. d.Neither statement is correct

Statement 1: “Players in a repeated, simultaneous move game often wish to make a public claim concerning what strategy they will select. One strategy for developing the credibility needed for opponents to believe the claim is to establish a reputation for making that move over time.” Statement 2: “In the situation mentioned in statement 1, another strategy to develop credibility is to publish your strategy in a major newspaper.” a.Statement 1 is true, but 2 is false. b.Statement 2 is true, but 1 is false. c.Both statements are true. d.Both statements are false

Statement 1: “In the ‘casino night’ story from Dixit and Nalebuff by the last spin of the roulette wheel in the evening Barry had $700 and Eva had $300. Sine the money amounts were significant only if you had the most at the end of the evening, Barry’s best strategy was to wait for Eva to place her bet, and bet the same amount on the same event.” Statement 2: “In the ‘casino night’ story mentioned above, Eva’s best choice was to put her $300 on a multiple of 3 so that she would receive $900 if she won. Realizing this she should place her bet immediately and hope Barry didn’t know how to respond.” a.Statement 1 is true, but 2 is false. b.Statement 2 is true, but 1 is false.. c.Both statements are correct. d.Both statements are false.

Which of the following statements best describe the situation in the simultaneous choice game depicted above? a. Strategy F is a dominated strategy for Edna, while strategy A is a dominated strategy for Bob. b. Strategy E is a dominated strategy for Edna, while strategy A is dominated strategy for Bob. c. There are no dominated strategies in this game. d. Strategy F is a dominated strategy for Edna, while strategy c is a dominated strategy for Bob.